

2019

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Recommended Citation

Batten, Hannah. "Rhetoric of the Far Right: A Rhetorical Analysis of Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán." *The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research* 20 (2019): -. Web. [date of access]. <<https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/vol20/iss1/6>>.

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Abstract

This research consists of a rhetorical analysis of two world leaders: Donald Trump, president of the United States, and Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary. The particular lens of this rhetoric is that of the political far-right. This research works to compare the rhetorical devise and strategies used by two different world leaders that possess some overlapping elements in terms of their political agendas. While this work involves political elements by nature, it does not intend to promote or refute any form of political ideology, rather it is a purely rhetorical analysis.

Keywords

Rhetoric, Far Right, Trump, Orban, Xenophobia

Cover Page Footnote

N/A

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ABSTRACT

This research is based around the analysis of political rhetoric of the far right. By focusing on two far right political leaders, Donald Trump (U.S. President) and Viktor Orbán, (Hungarian Prime Minister), I was able to examine more specific examples of their own rhetoric. These examples include various forms of media excerpts, including social media and newspaper. Through this lens of rhetorical analysis, this research also makes use of various rhetorical devices, and it examines how the aforementioned individuals make use of different and similar linguistic tactics. While this study is not a political commentary, it does analyze how such uses of language can affect a wide array of audiences.

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to acknowledge the power of language in the political sphere. This analysis will demonstrate how rhetoric espoused by far-right leaders can take on many forms yet work towards the same goals of establishing a society in which white-Euro cultures, religions, and ideologies are dominant. Curating this sort of society includes reaching back to the past and preserving traditional, conservative values, as well as transforming society as it stands into one of racial and cultural superiority. Textual analysis of quotes from far-right political figures U.S. President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán will be utilized throughout this rhetorical analysis. In addition, comparison to other historical scholarship on the subject will be conducted, as well as analysis of historical context. The language utilized by these political figures will be analyzed in terms of rhetorical tools such as ideographs, terministic screens, and audience spheres. The basis of connection between these two figures is not necessarily the styles of their rhetoric, but rather how each of their rhetorical strategies emanate messages of xenophobia. The use of coded, complex language by Trump and Orbán can make it difficult for individuals to expose their rhetoric as prejudiced.

Given the assertions I make throughout this study, it is important to make special note of a few items. First, although there is supporting evidence from many scholars in the fields of rhetoric and political extremism, the connections made between the rhetoric of specific politicians and extremist groups can involve a degree of speculation, albeit well-informed. There are examples in which reactionaries specifically cite Trump, Orbán or another political figure, but there are also instances in which individual remarks are inspired by them without direct reference to them. These cultural, political, and linguistic assumptions are made through careful insight and research as well as extensive scholarship on the content in question. When anyone chooses to address the rhetoric of political extremism, there will often be some degree of anticipated speculation. This speculation will be determined by analyzing the findings of other relevant articles and works.

In addition, it is important to note that although cited as main examples, figures like Trump and Orbán cannot be considered the root of all far-right extremism. Far-right and extremist groups have existed in varying capacities far prior to the current state of tumultuous political polarization. In addition, these groups will exist far beyond Trump, Orbán and other influential political figures. The rhetoric of politicians has

largely impacted the public sphere all throughout history. What is unique about this particular moment is that figures like Trump and Orbán are helping to normalize these extremist values in ways they haven't been publicly encouraged for decades. This article is not intended to be a commentary on Trump or Orbán and all of their policies and whether they should be considered positive or negative. This study is interested only in the rhetoric posed by these leaders and how it influences each audience and public sphere around them.

Rhetorical Tools: Ideographs, Terministic Screens, and Audience Spheres

Rhetoric, defined as persuasive speech or written word, acts as the pinnacle of this study. The basis of rhetoric relies on language, its complexities, and its availability for interpretation. Our abilities to communicate with one another are founded on how individuals, and resultantly groups, perceive elements of language. This is known as social reality (Palczewski et al. 12). Our own ideologies, belief systems, and cultural integration direct our thought processes and help us make specific sense of the language we encounter. These ideologies we carry from our own positions in life shape our interpretations of each word, as well as the ways in which words are grouped together in addition to many more forms of discourse. The ways humans create understanding for language is known as symbolic action: the meaning assigned to each word, as well as article of clothing, gesture, tendency, monument, and so on (Palczewski et al. 7). Every form of communication carries out symbolic action. This study is mainly interested in words as rhetorical communication and how they are presented by rhetors like Trump, Spencer and Orbán. Because there are so many situated positions from which to view different words, there are always going to be

disparities in communication. Differing cultures, lifestyles, and beliefs provide different lenses for each individual and group. Thus, language can be a disagreeable and unclear institution, and what's more, has the power to divide groups and individuals on the basis of meaning and purpose, as well as to unify groups that possess the same cultural interests.

In terms of rhetoric specifically, people use their own life situations, or at least what they are aware of, to establish their own arguments. In doing so, many tactical elements can be utilized to create strong, intentional points and effective rhetoric. Individuals, and politicians in particular, make use of specific strategies in their rhetoric. The audiences they attempt to reach influence how rhetoricians approach each speech, soundbite, tweet, and more. Because politicians are a cultural center of society, the language they craft and spread is deliberately constructed. Styles of rhetoric are often specific to different politicians, but intersections and similarities can certainly be drawn, particularly through study of content. Through everything from extensive public addresses to seemingly spontaneous tweets, politicians utilize language tactics. They pay close attention to different spheres of audiences as well as argument types depending on the audiences they intend to access.

Far right political rhetoric has come to society's attention in the last few years. The political climate, as it becomes increasingly polarized, has pushed the bounds of movements once considered "fringe" to center stage. Figures like Donald Trump, president of the U.S., and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, have been large contributors to the political shift to the far right. While these are not the only high position politicians with far right ideologies,

they are two of the most influential, as they have both amassed great followings.

Some of the most noted tactics these rhetoricians make use of include ideographs, terministic screens, and attention to specific spheres. In this context, ideographs are defined in terms of political discourse:

high-order abstractions that represent a collective commitment to an ill-defined normative goal. [Ideographs] warrant the use of power, excuse behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or anti-social, and guide behavior and ... belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable or laudable. (Palczewski et al. 49)

Throughout this study, ideographs surrounding prejudiced, stereotyping and discriminatory language serve as the primary examples, one of which will include the intangible term, “radical Islam” as used by Donald Trump. The ways in which particular words are fashioned abstractly and awarded meaning will be examined through the lens of discriminatory language.

In addition to ideographs, Terministic screens are also a focus of this research and analysis. Noted rhetorician, Kenneth Burke, describes these as “screens composed of terms through which humans perceive the world and that direct attention away from some interpretations and towards others” (Palczewski et al. 47). Essentially, terministic screens encourage certain schools of thought, and can veer perceptions in a specific direction with attempt to frame a situation in some particular way. Through the context of political rhetoric in this study, in conjunction with ideographs, I will examine how certain language reinforces particular ideas or beliefs while pushing away other potential perceptions. The work that “subtly” racist terminology does in

deflecting said racism while simultaneously encouraging it is an area to which this study turns its attention. For example, I will examine how Orbán’s language surrounding religion encourages and reaffirms negative opinions of non-Christians in Europe.

Lastly, the audience spheres utilized by each of these rhetors are considered very carefully. A universal audience is considered to contain all “reasonable and competent members of humanity,” while particular audiences are composed of the “actual audience,” which is the crowd a rhetor is actually trying to reach (Palczewski et al. 119). This study will examine how Trump and Orbán, as opposed to presenting arguments that can relate to all members of society, use rhetorical tactics that limit their audiences to those who maintain the same ideologies as these leaders. Furthermore, they are attempting to normalize rhetoric that may have previously been considered “extremist,” or “far right,” and reach citizens who may not self-identify this way, but share similar ideologies.

Terminology: Definitions in Context

As this article attempts to describe and analyze the rhetoric of these political leaders, specific terminology will be used throughout the argument. This terminology will include: far right, alt right, supremacy, immigration, identity, nationalism/nativism and xenophobia. These terms are often used in the media as well as in daily exchanges surrounding this topic without being fully defined.

The political party spectrum has been considered in terms of “right” and “left” for a long time. Branding either side as “far” contributes a layer of intensity that idealizes more extreme policies, although stemming from the same underlying values maintained by the “right” or “left.” The “far right” is a

buzz term that has become especially popular in the U.S. and Europe in the last few years, but is difficult to define. “Far right” is most often used to describe individuals and groups whose ideologies stem from traditionalist and conservative values which have manifested into extremes that include racism and supremacy (Viets and Poynting 536). The alt-right stems from the ideological components of the far right. The alt-right views biological and cultural differences as defining factors of society, and maintains that different groups with different expressions ought to be separated physically as well (Gray 151). In his article, “‘The fire rises’: identity, the alt-right and intersectionality,” Texas A&M professor Phillip W. Gray notes that in the case of the alt right, desire to divide society on the basis of culture, race, and religion stems from insecurity or uncertainty with group or individual identity (147). Separation on account of identity inevitably leads to certain groups claiming superiority, or at least striving for it. “Separate but equal” was disproven to be possible during the time of segregation, and the result of attempting to perpetuate this ideology leads to what is known as supremacy. Supremacy exists when in attempting to preserve their own identities, cultures, and beliefs, groups resultantly view themselves as greater than other groups (Gray 147). This mindset is tied to nationalism, in which individuals and groups take great pride in their own nations, but exercise this investment to the point of racism and exclusion. In this case, they try to exclude other ethnicities and cultures they view as different and prevent them from infringing on their own. This is out of fear that their own cultures and races will be depleted or lost (Gray 157). Similar to nationalism, nativism is interested in preserving a specific ideology associated with their nation. Furthermore, nativism

includes hatred of people who do not “fit” this compilation.

All of these terms contribute to struggles with immigration, or the migration of various peoples into another nation from their own. The political stance of groups who fear loss of identity contributes to policies that exclude immigrants as a result of inherently racist ideologies (Shafer 4). Although politicians claim that such discriminatory policies will work in terms of “betterment for the nation,” it can, at times, be considered xenophobia, the hatred of people from other countries. The “betterment of the nation” concept hides a coded desire for “purity” in culture, race, or religion.

Trump and Rhetoric: Twitter and Xenophobic Language

More than ever before, political rhetors are reaching out to “their audiences” as opposed to their state or nation with specifically targeting language. Because the U.S. and many European nations have become so polarized, politicians attempt to speak to those who maintain their same ideologies as opposed to the entire nation they are supposed to be serving. This phenomenon has become particularly evident with the campaign and presidency of Donald Trump. Naturally, speaking to “their audience” over “their nation,” which would include all peoples, is a tactic politicians have made use of historically, but the intensity of division has higher stakes during this presidency than those of the recent past. Trump makes use of rhetoric that is intended to reinforce the ideologies of the far right while deflecting those closer to the middle and “on the left.” This is a function of terministic screening in that specifically conservative ideologies are encouraged, while others are simultaneously deflected. Within this language, Trump

packages ideographs that contain racist connotations.

Not only has Trump implemented such messages throughout his speeches on policy, commentary on political circumstance, and other forms of spoken communication, he has also taken to social media more than any other president of the past. Obama was the first to make use of Twitter, but still, his use of the platform was calculated to seem extensively thought out and reviewed by members of his administration (Bostdorff 695). Trump however, extends tweets that are short, impassioned, and appear to be more sporadic. His messaging lends itself to the idea that he is solely responsible for creating and sharing it (Bostdorff 696). The rapid nature of Trump's tweets keeps him closely connected to the groups and individuals that make use of social media themselves, allowing his ideologies and policies to reach far and wide. Because Trump's tweets are often so brief and intense, they appear to lack complexity, but this is only at first glance. Although Trump may utilize language on social media that presents itself as simple enough, it is often coded with racist undertones and exclusionary rhetoric that discriminates against minorities.

In her study of Trump's "Political Incorrectness," Jessica Gantt Shafer explores the veiled rhetoric of Trump's tweets. One example she cites is as follows: "More radical Islam attacks today—it never ends! Strengthen the borders, we must be vigilant and smart. No more being politically correct." In three brief sentences, there is a lot to unpack. Within the first sentence, the term "radical Islam" is utilized. This phrase is an example of an ideograph. The phrase itself is an abstraction that does not exist in the physical world. This term guides collective thought to an ideology that imagines Islam as a radial religion in

general. The effect is stereotyping and prejudice against anyone who practices the religion. In addition, it is wielded by Trump in accordance with his designated power as president. Had the term been espoused by someone with less political power, it would have likely been written off as racist or assuming. However, given the president's status, the term is not only accepted, but considered viable commentary by many, helping to legitimize coded, prejudiced language.

While acting as an ideograph, the term "radical Islam" also functions as a terministic screen. By conflating "radical" with "Islam," the term encourages the idea that all of Islam is radicalized, when in reality, very few of those who practice Islam maintain extremist or radical values. The use of this rhetoric, especially on such a prevalent platform as Twitter, directs societal thought towards the idea of Islam as an inherently violent or dangerous religion, which can help to form prejudices against the religion as a whole. According to a 2017 Pew Research Study, 41% of adults believe that Islam encourages violence more than any other faith. While there is no concrete link between Trump's use of "radical Islam" and this specific study, the conflation of Islam with radicalization rhetorically connects extremism to the religion as a whole. Simultaneously, this term ostracizes those who peacefully practice Islam. By recognizing the assumptions made by the leader of a nation as prejudiced or xenophobic, Muslims are made to feel like the "other." When Muslims as a whole are scapegoated, or blamed, for all threats or actions of terrorism or radicalization, they are unethically excluded from the positive core of society (Roberts-Miller). They are made to appear dangerous, in the wrong, and contemptuous.

Not only does Trump's tweet include and exclude different schools of thought, but it also encourages supportive response, creating an interactive loop that perpetuates potentially damaging language. In the same study, Shafer includes responses to a set of Trump tweets surrounding immigration. From an anonymous user: "Trump is right we need a complete time out from all immigration it's not politically correct but it's a national security issue." As is clearly stated, this Twitter user references Trump directly. The supportive elements of this language (i.e. "Trump is right") suggest that everything that follows in the tweet is in accordance with Trump's intentions and policies. A "time out from all immigration" is not the policy that has been implemented by Trump throughout his administration. However, Trump's rhetoric, such as "strengthen borders," alludes to the fact that ideologically, Trump is not in favor of immigration in general. Because of this nonspecific language, Trump is able to appeal to his supporters that view immigration the same way he does, as well as those who maintain an even more conservative position on immigration.

Still, there are many interested in Trump's agenda as it coincides with prejudice against Muslims specifically. The Travel Ban, or "Muslim Ban" of 2017, which has attempted to prevent immigration from dominantly Muslim countries such as Libya, Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen in addition to North Korea and Venezuela, has caused great controversy according to the *The New York Times* (Gladstone and Sugiyama). Upheld in the Supreme Court as of July 2018, the ban limits immigration from these countries to varying degrees. Actions such as the enactment of this ban, when considered with rhetoric like Trump's use of the ideograph "radical Islam," appeal to those who oppose immigration on account of the U.S.'s safety. As aforementioned, the

rhetorical abstraction suggests that all who practice Islam are "radicalized" and inherently dangerous. Therefore, audiences of Trump's Twitter are encouraged to believe immigrants, specifically those from dominantly Muslim countries, to be a threat to national security. This idea is validated through the fact that Trump has rhetorically equated all immigrants who practice Islam with those who practice extremism. According to a 2018 Pew Research Study, 58% of adult Muslims living in America immigrated to this country, and as of 2017, there were 3.45 million Muslims living in America. Thus, approximately 2 million of the Muslims now living in the U.S. hailed from other nations. Trump's "radical Islam" rhetorically categorizes all of these individuals as radical, and encourages prejudice against them. Despite being comprised of just a few words, Trump's tweet has licensed people to support and encourage xenophobic thinking.

Trump's language and actions have garnered the attention of groups whose ideologies exploit not only supremacy but nativism. Although Trump outwardly suggests that he feels the nation is threatened in terms of security, his prejudiced use of "radical" Islam reveals his own bigotry and intentions as well as the potential for policy based on identity. "Radical Islam" as a term engenders fear among citizens, and presents an entire people as dangerous, therefore ostracizing them. As president, Trump is utilizing what is known as "colorblind racism," which, according to Shafer, involves the "subconscious discomfort," which accompanies interracial mixing. Trump's innate unease with non-white, non-Christian immigrants propels him to act and enact policies that bar these peoples from partaking in Trump's vision of "American society." Through this mindset, Trump employs language that marginalizes other groups, via Twitter, and in many forms of

discourse throughout his administration. On Twitter in particular, Trump's basis of support exemplifies his level of influence.

No prior president of recent history has presented ideologies and policies that so blatantly spoke to what Shafer refers to as "the white truth." This concept involves extremely blunt language. Shafer's study explores Trump's dissatisfaction with political correctness, an idea that is intended to provide inclusion, gender equality, and avoid racist commentary. By dismissing political correctness, Trump often excludes peoples that do not fall within "white America" (Shafer). While this appeals to audiences in favor of an America that shares the same homogenous race and Christian heritage, it makes many more feel unwelcome in the U.S. And what's more, these policies directly contradict anti-discriminatory laws and values of inclusion that are held by many U.S. citizens.

Orban and Rhetoric: Anti-Immigration and Xenophobic Language

Many scholars have noted that the Islamophobia of the Hungarian government stems from the history of the Ottoman Empire. It wasn't until 1922 that Hungary became an independent country from the Ottomans, an empire consisting of dominantly Muslim rule (BBC). Residual bitterness towards the Muslim community over a history of ruling has led to modern Islamophobia and anti-immigration sentiments (BBC).

Viktor Orbán, current Hungarian prime minister, has enacted policies and utilized rhetoric that stereotype and discriminate against Muslims. Similarly to Trump, Orbán takes a clearly anti-immigration stance. Orbán's presentation style, however, varies. Orbán is not active in the same ways as Trump on social media, and therefore

provides fewer sporadic, abrasive comments than Trump. Rather, Orbán's rhetoric on immigration is constructed more eloquently, but also more bluntly. According to Agnes Bolonyai and Kelsey Campolong, in their study, " 'We mustn't fool ourselves': 'Orbánian' discourse in the political battle over the refugee crisis and European identity," Hungary as a nation is moving more quickly towards the far right than the U.S. Orbán is the current leader of Fidesz, the political party representative of Orbán's administration. The party, established in 1990, has been progressively moving further to the right over the last three decades, maintaining strong anti-immigration policies (Bolonyai and Campolong 253). Orbán was elected to one term as prime minister in 1998 and was re-elected in 2010, and since then Orbán has been acting as prime minister. As the head of Fidesz and prime minister of Hungary, Orbán has been leading the charge towards far-right politics centered around national identity and Christian values particularly in the last decade. Because Orbán has been working towards the same goals throughout his entire political career, and additionally has maintained his administrative position for the last eight years, the political agenda of Hungary as a nation has been set far to the right. Thus, Orbán has the rhetorical power to make blunt, clear comments on his distaste for immigration and expect them to garner support and interest from his audience spheres, given that he worked to make the sphere of this nation one of xenophobic standing.

In an editorial statement released to a German newspaper, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Orbán spoke to his position on immigration amid the 2015 Refugee Crisis.

Let us not forget, however, that those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically

different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? If we lose sight of this, the idea of Europe could become a minority interest in its own continent. (cited in Bolonyai and Campolong 261)

In this editorial, Orbán expresses straightforward xenophobia, suggesting that a society in which Christianity does not dominate is “worrisome.” By suggesting that this is problematic, Orbán is “othering” religions and cultures that are different from Christianity (Bolonyai and Campolong 261). Used as a strategy to appeal to those that agree with Orbán, his othering is effective, reaffirming and supporting his followers’ beliefs in maintaining a dominantly Euro-Christian society.

However, for those that feel ostracized by Orbán’s rhetorical interest in maintaining this type of society, i.e. groups that cannot identify with the Euro-Christian culture, rage and frustration can mount towards the government and society as a whole. In her journalistic study of extremism titled *The Rage*, Julia Ebner explores cyclical extremism, in which Islamist extremism is perpetuated by far right extremism and vice versa. Throughout her book, Ebner highlights extremism and terrorism, both Islamist and far right, through demographic studies, crime cases, and group meetings. A particularly poignant aspect of Ebner’s study is her assertion that as we as groups and individuals express hatred for other ethnic, religious, or cultural groups, those same groups amass reciprocal hatred, and are more likely to act against their offenders. Therefore, as Orbán, Trump, or any other individual perpetuates ideals that only favor

white, Euro-Christians, other peoples of different religions, cultures, and ethnicities are more likely to experience rage on top of exclusion. It is this rage, stemming from exclusion, that can result in attacks against communities that expressly favor white Euro-Christian values, thus perpetuating the cycle of extremism.

Although every variation of interest in recognizing Euro-Christian ideologies as dominant exists, Péter Krekó’s and Attila Juhász’s study of social demand, political supply, and international context, “The Hungarian Far Right,” explores the increasingly prejudiced nature of Hungary’s citizens. Krekó and Juhász use a tool known as DEREK, the “Demand for Right-Wing Extremism Index” (39). Established by Political Capital Institute, DEREK is a means of measuring “social demand for the far-right” (39).

DEREK is complex tool broken into different tiers, assessing different aspects of cultures moving closer to the far right. The tier of “Prejudice and welfare chauvinism” includes sentiments of homophobia and anti-immigration attitudes. Immigration attitudes are formed on concerns such as detriment to economy, culture, or “livability” (Krekó and Juhász 41). According to Krekó and Juhász, opposition to immigration is “an integral part of all extreme right-wing ideologies,” and stems from “racism, xenophobia and nativism” (41). Krekó and Juhász state that prejudice and welfare chauvinism in Hungary in 2015 garnered a DEREK score of over 50% (46). The significance of this data is the fact that over 50% of Hungarian citizens within the recent past have expressed homophobic and or anti-immigration attitudes. Given that anti-immigration attitudes ideologically align with the far right, it is clear that among voters, Hungary as a nation maintains a

dominantly far right society (Krekó and Juhász 41).

Hungary's far right interests are reiterated by the electoral scores of 2014. 44.87% of the voting population voted for the Fidesz party, of which Orbán was the candidate (Krekó and Juhász 68). Since 2014, Orbán has remained prime minister of Hungary, and continues to espouse rhetoric that appeals to individuals and groups with far-right ideologies. And what's more, 20.22% of votes were cast in the name of Jobbik, a far right group that is categorized by the Southern Poverty Law Center as an extremist group (Krekó and Juhász 68). This majority of votes between Jobbik and Fidesz suggests that Hungary, within the last decade in particular, is advancing further towards the political right.

In the aforementioned editorial, Orbán makes strong use of ideographs and resultant terministic screens. By claiming that "European identity is rooted in Christianity," Orbán excludes individuals and groups that identify as European but not Christian (Bolonyai and Campolong 261). Orbán appeals only to a demographic that identifies as both European and Christian, dismissing, ostracizing, and refuting any other form of European identity. This xenophobic position denies the legitimacy of those who do not fit the exact Euro-Christian mold, which is not only socially and lawfully unethical, but can also lead to frustration and anger towards the state by those that do not agree with this form of society, particularly those it would exclude. In terms of ideographs, Orbán makes use of the phrase "minority interest": "If we lose sight of [keeping Europe Christian], the idea of Europe could become a minority interest in its own continent" (Bolonyai and Campolong 261). In this context, Orbán is claiming that Europe, although not legally defined by a Christian background, is losing its ability to "keep

Christian." Furthermore, Orbán's reference to Europe as an "idea" speaks to his idea of Europe as a dominantly Christian continent. His concern is that immigrants will turn the tables and make a minority out of this "European as Christian" interest. As an intangible, non-defined concept, the idea of [Christian] Europe as a "minority interest" is something Orbán is attempting to protect Hungary against. He is doing so by inciting fear, hoping to increase attention to the situation from those interested in preserving this form of society. With the power he maintains as prime minister, Orbán utilizes this ideograph of "Christian Europe" to steer the public towards anti-immigration sentiments. These rhetorical devices appeal to supporters of the far-right, the audience sphere Orbán has been interested in reaching since his first administration. Given his re-election and the DEREK scores of Hungary in 2015, Orbán is successfully appealing to the majority of Hungary's society as it moves further to the far right.

Conclusion

Over the past several years, as political leadership in the U.S. and Europe has moved further to the right, the rhetoric utilized by figures such as Trump and Orbán has taken a turn toward xenophobic by nature. Trump's tweeting and Orbán's statements have all raised concern in terms of unethical exclusion by identity. Trump's rhetoric, without explicitly stating so, portrays an image of disdain for the Muslim communities as well as immigration. Orbán's position, in no short terms, expresses concern for the religion of Hungary and Europe being compromised by Muslim immigration. Although unique in presentation, these rhetors are interested in curating the same sort of society- one in which white Euro-Christian heritage dominates Europe and the U.S. Immigration from Muslim countries as a negative action

is of the utmost concern to Trump and Orbán, and because of this, both politicians wield their high positions in society as a means to spread anti-immigration ideologies. And what's more, the spread of this rhetoric can be conducted in many different forms, from Twitter to editorials. The significance of these findings is that socially, they lack ethical inclusion. Both the U.S. and Europe are home to many citizens that are not white or do not practice Christianity. As leaders like Trump and Orbán grow in popularity and continue to perpetuate rhetoric that encourages xenophobic mentalities, they further exclude, ostracize, and discredit their own citizens.

While rhetoric may be used to divide different peoples, it can also be used to create respectful, accepting societies. It is important for individuals, and furthermore groups, to respect one another in order to create a society that recognizes everyone as equals. The difficulty lies either in the fact that groups and individuals view themselves

as superior, or they don't understand the rhetoric they use to be offensive. This potential scenario stems from the fact that rhetoric deemed xenophobic has gone unchecked historically for a very long time: this is what politicians and extremists are capitalizing on in this time of polarization. Rhetoric that requires close analysis to be understood as discriminatory allows for the boundary of nationalism to be pushed further and further.

By educating and highlighting the importance of rhetoric, with close attention to the fact that it is received and processed differently by individuals and groups, society as a whole can work towards determining how language excludes and discriminates. Furthermore, this knowledge would allow people to be more thoughtful, empathetic, and purposeful in their rhetoric. By even attempting to comprehend how policies and rhetoric may negatively impact others that differ from ourselves, we can lay a foundation for expressing rhetoric of peace and acceptance.

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