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Genocide

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Genocide

Abstract

Overview: Before the 1940s the word genocide did not exist. There was no name for unique mass killings involving thousands to millions of targeted people. A man named Raphael Lemkin coined and popularized the word genocide and took on the responsibility to get the Genocide Convention passed. In the 1980s the United States finally joined The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Genocide Convention), however this came with many clauses and restrictions, causing the terms to be less effective. The convention defined genocide as any criminal acts harming or destroying national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, but left the terms very vague and confusing. It gave no specifics on a number of crimes or deaths which must be reached to qualify as genocide. Even with the passing of the Genocide Convention, there still was no judiciary system to enforce the international law and give repercussions. Many nations, including the U.S., remain resistant to intervene on genocide, and the United Nations has little authority due to limited funding and no military power. The Genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda are strong examples of the lack of willingness of the United States and international community to acknowledge genocide, intervene on the crimes, and hold war criminals responsible for their action.

Keywords

MLA, Writing

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Before the 1940s the word genocide did not exist. There was no name for unique mass killings involving thousands to millions of targeted people. A man named Raphael Lemkin coined and popularized the word genocide and took on the responsibility to get the Genocide Convention passed. In the 1980s the United States finally joined The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Genocide Convention), however this came with many clauses and restrictions, causing the terms to be less effective. The convention defined genocide as any criminal acts harming or destroying national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, but left the terms very vague and confusing. It gave no specifics on a number of crimes or deaths which must be reached to qualify as genocide. Even with the passing of the Genocide Convention, there still was no judiciary system to enforce the international law and give repercussions. Many nations, including the U.S., remain resistant to intervene on genocide, and the United Nations has little authority due to limited funding and no military power. The Genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda are strong examples of the lack of willingness of the United States and international community to acknowledge genocide, intervene on the crimes, and hold war criminals responsible for their action.

Regardless of the reasons behind intervention, genocide should not be ignored. Sovereignty should not prevent leaders from being held accountable for their actions, because the crimes create long lasting devastation in the regions and war criminals are fully aware of their choices. Without the assertion of Raphael Lemkin, the word genocide most likely would not exist, and there would not be international recognition in legislature with the aim to prevent the acts. This all occurred within the last hundred years, and even if there is still a lack of intervention or enforcement, it has gained international attention. As an international power, the United States has the responsibility to act on genocide to ensure global stability and security, because the U.S. has the ability to do so and is looked up to by numerous countries. There are many ways for the U.S. to respond to genocide and intervene in both safe and cost-effective ways. Reasons supporting intervention include for strategic reasons, economics and moral. In this paper, I argue the evidence supports intervention on genocide with military power for strategic reasons in both Bosnia and Rwanda would have been beneficial for the interests of those suffering as well as the involved nations. This paper proceeds with a review of literature conveying the positives of intervention, the research methods pursued when forming my argument, the case studies of Bosnia and Rwanda including summaries and U.S. responses, and an analysis presenting my findings on genocide and intervention.

LITERTURE REVIEW

After a deep study of the various genocides which have recently occurred, a main question that arises is: should outside nations intervene or not intervene in sovereign state affairs? Through reviewing over ten articles to compile research, I came to the conclusion that the U.S. should implement intervention when genocide is occurring in all cases where enough information is presented to the U.S. to know there is even the potential for crimes similar to

genocide. There are many reasons for a foreign nation to support intervention, including moral, economic, political and, most importantly, strategic. From a deep analysis of the list of sources I have organized, it will be clear to see the difference of opinions for intervention from multiple scholarly authors, which contain all relevant and valid points which strengthen my argument.

Before looking into the many positive reasons supporting intervention, it is important to note the key figure who was against it, President Bill Clinton. President Clinton, who was in power during multiple genocides, did not want to directly involve the United States in either Bosnia or Rwanda. From a White House document of an exchange with reporters on Bosnia, President Clinton stated, “Since the problem is in Europe, the American forces would be in the minority. So there will be no American group troops involved in this action” (1994, p. 2). By refusing to even use the word “genocide” in relation to Bosnia or any of the other cases, President Clinton showed his reluctance to admit to the events occurring in the fear it would hold him accountable for action under the Genocide Convention. Even if citizens initially supported intervention, the loss of soldier life, similar to what happened in Somalia, would most likely backfire on him. At the risk of lowering his popularity in the polls and placing a question on his second-term candidacy, intervention was not worth the possible gamble for the Clinton administration. This conveys how President Clinton’s non-intervention methods were overall weakly supported and not successful.

On the contrary of President Clinton's argument, many scholars believe intervention is necessary due to moral reasoning. The author of “A Problem from Hell”, Power (2002) claims, “The first and most compelling reason is moral. When innocent life is being taken away on such a scale and the United States has the power to stop the killing at a reasonable risk, it has a duty to act” (p. 512). It is hard for people to understand the true number of victims murdered during

genocide or wrap their mind around the gruesome treatment used, but in Power's argument it is morally and ethically unjust to watch it unfold without getting involved. She also mentions that no U.S. president has made genocide a priority, and the fact that a constant policy of nonintervention leads to the perception of a broken American political system. In her viewpoint even if moral intervention presents somewhat of a risk to the U.S., it is nothing in comparison to what the genocide victims deal with. Similar to Power's argument, Douglas Jehl from the *New York Times* wrote an article in 1994, which generally stated if U.S. citizens knew the full extent what was happening during genocide, the voters would be shocked and want an immediate response of intervention.

Power says intervention is the right approach, because, morally, it is right to defend the lives of those defenseless. However, Wertheim disagrees, because he believes intervention has a larger benefit for strategic reasons as a military tool. He advocates the aggressive states got away with their crimes, because no soldiers were dispatched to challenge them. Wertheim also believes military intervention should be considered when the rate of killing in a country exceeds the U.S. murder rate, which seems to be an interesting perspective to look at. In his article Wertheim (2010) uses an outside source to support his argument stating, "It must also be recognized that only the United States has the political and military muscles to lead such a response to genocide" (p. 159). The essence of Wertheim's arguments is the U.S. had the strength in military power to intervene during genocide without a high threat of danger to soldiers. If troops were sent over and involved during the genocide, not only would the killings have ended sooner, but the leaders would have been held responsible for the crimes. These conclusions add weight to my arguments that strategic intervention is the most beneficial for the U.S. due to the military capabilities.

Similar to Power and Wertheim, David Model also supports intervention, but on much different grounds. The important factor, he argues, is intervention due to international law through the Genocide Convention. Model went into detail explaining Article 1 of the Genocide Convention which shows the obligation of states to prevent genocide when they are aware of it occurring or the possibility of occurrence. Due to the fact that State Department and Intelligence documents were given to the President and his officials daily, he was aware of what happened in both cases on Bosnia and Rwanda. Model (2009) asserts, “Not only did the United States fail to act on its own or collectively with other state but deliberately took actions to prevent the United Nations from acting” (p. 2). In other words, Model believes the U.S. leaders had the knowledge of genocide occurring, but refused to admit the severity of the actions to avoid intervening, even though the Genocide convention holds them responsible. Model’s theory of intervention is extremely useful, because it sheds light on the difficult problems in the Genocide Convention due to the lack of enforcement in international law.

After looking at the reasons supporting intervention, it’s important to look at the cases of genocide in which intervention could have been used more efficiently. Both in Rwanda and Bosnia, intervention was not a policy the U.S. showed a great concern or effort in dealing with. Gourevitch and Randall give insight into these genocides through pro-intervention perspectives.

Gourevitch uses real stories from the Tutsi victims in his non-fiction book, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*, to demonstrate how intervention on behalf of the U.S. could have saved thousands of lives. Specifically, in Rwanda, strategic intervention could have been implemented to jam the radios, which gave killing orders. Also the U.S. could have delivered the promised armored personnel carriers in a timely fashion to allow the victims to protect themselves. According to Gourevitch

the U.S. was willing to give armored personnel carriers to the Tutsi in Rwanda, but only under UN power, and they sat on the runway in Germany waiting for the UN to pay the rental fees. In general the U.S. failed to get them there before the killing ended and did not give the people protection. Another strategy of intervention would be through jamming the radio signals, which the U.S. Air Force could have done from the air. Gourevitch (1999) wrote, “The radio transmitter of RTLM would have been an obvious, and easy, first target” (p. 313). Both of these plans are overall simple forms of intervention which use military resources without the risk of endangering soldiers or costing the U.S. an extreme amount.

Richard Randall wrote a scholarly article on the speech given by Stephen Walker at Brown University. Walker believed the United States' hesitancy to intervene in Bosnia or act with aggression caused a great deal of lives to be lost. As an ex-diplomat Walker, is considered an expert in the field of intervention policies. He strongly believes the U.S. arms embargo contributed to the genocide in Bosnia. In his view the U.S. took on the perspective that it was too late to become involved, when in fact more people were still being murdered. Walker insisted, “The embargo not only is ineffective and morally reprehensible, but is legally invalid under the terms of the United Nations charter” (Randall, 1994, p. 1). The speech given by Walker and the article are from 1994, when the Bosnian genocide was occurring. If scholars were able to find means of intervention the U.S. could have implemented with little cost, then the government officials and President Clinton should have been aware of these. Randall’s article shows not only strategic intervention, but overall demonstrates the moral aspect to at least give the victims a chance to protect themselves. Randal also empathizes “sustainable peace” rather than “paper peace”, which I believe is a great point of view to take. The government is focused on how it looks from the outside but people need to recognize, if there is not stability enforced, it could

occur again. No matter what strategy is used, it is clear to see that intervention would have been possible and beneficial in both Rwanda and Bosnia.

In the discussion of genocide, one controversial issue has been the policy of intervention. On one hand, President Clinton argued against intervention for his personal political issues and the fear of losing human life. On the other hand, Power contends intervention is a moral obligation. Others even maintain intervention is required through the Genocide Convention or an economic benefit. My own view is the U.S. should intervene with its military for strategic reasons. Having reviewed the literature on intervention, I think that the U.S. should have acted more aggressively and involved themselves in both Bosnia and Rwanda to demonstrate that as a political and military world power, they will not let genocide occur. Although intervention was unfortunately not properly implemented, the sources I found strongly support my argument and show the validity of my claim.

METHODS

After studying various genocides from the past century and conducting research, I have found that the United States should have implemented a position of intervention with military power for strategic reasons, which include creating new alliances, establishing military bases and international trade. The specific cases of Bosnia and Rwanda support my belief that the U.S. has the responsibility as international leaders to show that nations cannot just stand by and witness genocide occur without taking action. In both of these cases, the U.S. had little to no involvement besides giving costly humanitarian aid in the aftermath. In the case of Bosnia, the U.S. refused to lift the arms embargo, and when aerial strikes were enforced, they were extremely effective, but were not enforced long enough. In Rwanda the killings were systematically planned and aided by the use of the radio signals, so the U.S. could have jammed the radio to make the killings much

more difficult or sent armored personnel carriers in a timely fashion. In both Bosnia and Rwanda, the U.S. could have used military technology and given protection to the groups in danger to allow them to protect themselves. These two case studies of genocide prove how intervention is necessary and effective.

I purposely chose to use these two cases to support my argument rather than the other cases of genocide, because they best display hypothetical military actions which could have halted the crimes. These merit my time and energy by showing the U.S. had the knowledge of what was happening in the region, even if they denied it at the time. The U.S., under the presidency of Clinton, was proposing many military actions but reluctantly delivered. This hesitancy and slow delivery of promised plans caused the genocide to unfold with little consequences.

Although many critics argue it was too costly and dangerous to intervene on genocide, there were cost-effective and safe procedures which could have been implemented to overall benefit the U.S. (Power 2002, Randall 1994, Wertheim 2010). Some of these actions include airstrikes rather than sending ground troops, intervening on radio signals, and holding leaders accountable for war crimes. These measures are more cost-effective than the humanitarian aid needed to help recovery in the regions after the mass killings and displacements from genocide occurred. Intervening is strategically effective for the United States, because it ensures global stability and promotes strong international relations. This also promotes the dominance of the U.S. overall and the strength of military power.

This work suffers, like all, because the alternate strategies which could have occurred during genocide are probabilistic and cannot be demonstrated. Also all the evidence is limited to the data collected during the 1980s and 1990s, and although this does not seem very long ago,

the technology and media coverage during that time span was far less than what we are capable of today. Another important fact to take note of is many articles are swayed to a specific perspective, resulting in opinionated documents. These flaws come with any form of research and are not detrimental to my work. Using a mix of new and older articles gives updated numbers, as more evidence has been uncovered by new technology. I aimed to create a mix of different opinions and different reasons supporting intervention to show a broader view. Finally, although there is not absolute certainty that my agreement would have lead to a more successful outcome, there is an overwhelming amount of scholarly sources supporting me.

Overall it is important to analyze historical context and study the numerous genocides which have occurred in order to understand why it may be beneficial or harmful for a nation to become involved. The methodology I used to conduct my research was through case studies. Through finding expert opinions and secondary literature, I looked into the pros and cons for intervention. After taking on the pro-intervention stance, there were many reasons to intervene including economics, ethics, politics and strategically. As stated about I believe the most influential reason for U.S. intervention would be strategic. Having reviewed ten articles including primary sources and White House documents, I have found that my argument is valid and supported.

CASE STUDY: BOSNIA

During the time period of 1991-1995, the Christian Serbians killed approximately 200,000 Bosnian Muslims, and over two million more Bosnians were displaced. Marshal Tito took the position as the communist leader in charge of Yugoslavia for forty-five years. Although the nation was comprised of six individual republics and was very ethnically diverse, Tito gained

popularity and respect, becoming known as a national father figure, through creating peace among the many cultures. Power (2002) described the rule of Marshal Tito through stating:

“Because the national story in Tito’s era was one of ‘brotherhood and unity’ in which ethnic identity was discounted and even disparaged, and because the communities had lived intermingled or in neighboring villages for so many years, many found it even harder to take seriously the threat from their neighbors”(p. 256).

After his death in 1980, early violence was predicted for the nation as tensions grew between the Christian Serbians and the Muslim Bosnians. The Serbians gained a new leader, which allowed them to become powerful through controlling the government, military and education. This also meant they had a majority control of all weapons. The Bosnians, who wanted an individual state, were left defenseless after a UN arms embargo in 1991 prevented the shipment of weapons into the area. This allowed the Serbians to take over complete dominance and begin an ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian culture.

All non-Serbians living within the nation soon had to follow a military enforced curfew and list of restrictions. This included meeting in public places, hunting, fishing, carrying a weapon, traveling by car, gathering in groups of more than three men, selling real estate and wearing a uniform including military or police. Usually without warning the Serbians would come through towns with machine guns and begin random killings in the streets, or through entering homes. They also destroyed homes to give Bosnians no place to return and live. Sexual violence through an organized rape campaign was another horrific crime used to dehumanize the culture. Power (2002) describes, “They forced fathers to castrate their sons or molest their daughters; they humiliated and raped young women” (p. 251). Bosnians were deported from

their towns and often brought to camps. Most of the killing done within the camps were targeted to the male population, and although they weren't categorized as extermination camps, it is estimated that 10,000 people died within them. One account from within a Serbian camp claimed men were "Held in metal cages and killed in groups of ten to fifteen every few days"(Power, 2002, p. 272). The United States had known about these camps since May of 1992, and although Western journalists began to hear stories shortly after of the horrid events occurring, it was difficult to know if the stories were valid. Top political leaders categorized the events occurring as a civil war between the two cultures, even though all evidence pointed toward the deliberate attempt of the Serbians to diminish the Bosnian culture.

With footage of the Bosnian genocide flashing all over the news back in the United States and reporters getting first-hand stories and pictures of the camps, Americans were shocked at the resemblance to the infamous concentration camps from the Nazi regime. Not only because of the forced relocations into camps, but also the fact that it was happening for a second time in Europe. This garnered more attention for the crisis and popularity among the American people to intervene and provide aid.

Cognitive Misers in the U.S.

Although President George H. W. Bush knew about the Serbian camps, he never publicly acknowledged them or demanded they be closed. He repeatedly used the term "all means necessary" toward giving aid to Bosnia, but refused to send troops. Instead he gave limited funding to other groups willing to carry out short-lived action through aid relief. By focusing on the Somalia famine, President Bush overlooked the deeper problems occurring in Bosnia. He never had his high level staff do deeper research into the matter and would simply ask for an update on the death toll, as he sat back avoiding intervention. When asked about lifting the arms

embargo to aid the Bosnians, President Bush replied, “There are enough arms there already. We’ve got to stop the killing some way, and I don’t think it’s enhanced by more and more [weapons]” (Power, 2002, p. 263). Although there were large amounts of weapons throughout the nation, they were not evenly distributed, and the Bosnians were left defenseless against the majority Serbians.

President Clinton showed interest in Bosnia early on, and before his presidency talked of the military intervention needed to stop the killings. President Clinton claimed, “I would begin with air power against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity”(Power, 2002, p. 274). However in 1992, after his election, when it came time to take action against the Serbians, President Clinton had reluctance to intervene. Some reasoning behind this is President Clinton had no military experience himself, causing him to be ridiculed as a draft dodger and not in support of using military power. He also blamed the fighting between the Serbians and Bosnians to be “ancient hatreds”, stating it fell under the category of a civil war between the ethnically and religiously different groups. The final reason which caused the most reluctance to intervene was the fear that resided from fighting in Vietnam. The United States had little interest in going to war against Vietnam, and it ended up becoming an extremely costly war in both lives and money. It was also difficult to leave after entering and became an extremely unpopular war. The Clinton administration did not want to get involved in a foreign affair, if it would cause the president to drop in the popularity polls while he was still in his first term.

In August of 1993, a group of state department officials became fed up with the lack of intervention. They believed the current policy would never change or improve and couldn’t grasp the lack of willingness to stop the genocide. Power (2002) claims, “They found the U.S. policy so timid, so passive, and so doomed to fail that they chose to disassociate themselves with the

administration and go public with their discontent” (p. 313). This drew in the public attention and raised further questions among the Americans. In 1994 President Clinton took charge in a NATO campaign which focused on creating safe zones and banning the use of heavy weapons, which would be enforced by aerial strikes. President Clinton himself declared the risks of NATO bombing would be minimal. Although this plan was extremely effective when enforced properly, it unfortunately was short-lived. Power (2002) asserts, “For several months Sarajevans lived free of artillery and sniper fire. But when the Serbs resumed shelling the safe areas the president’s attention had drifted elsewhere and NATO did not bomb” (p. 324). Without the force of the United States taking charge in the issue to support the campaign and gain support of NATO allies, it did not last long and made little difference in the long-term impact of the genocidal killings.

Difference of Opinion:

Although some may support President Clinton’s opinion, believing it was more of a civil war than genocide, the statistics found within Power’s book shows 95% of the killings were Serbian on Bosnian. This statistic is among the information which was readily available to the U.S. policy makers during the time of the Bosnian genocide. In the text Power (2002) shows peacekeepers believed, “If the arms embargo were lifted or the Serbs bombed, humanitarian aid would be suspended... and the intended beneficiaries, Bosnian’s Muslims, made off far worse” (p. 306). I don’t find this to be true because the Bosnians had no defense to fight back against the Serbians who had complete control over military and government. If the United States lifted the embargo, provided the Bosnians with weapons, and perhaps some training, they would have been able to fight back, which could have decreased the death count. Also this would not put the U.S. troops into danger through fighting themselves, and the large amount of humanitarian aid would

not be needed if the killing decreased. The safe zones established by NATO, while enforced, were also effective, cheap and did not put any troops in direct danger. If the aerial strikes had been better enforced and supported by the U.S. military in a stronger way, then it could have made a bigger difference to end the genocide.

Overall, this shows how the reluctance from within the United States government and lack of intervention did not benefit the Bosnian culture or put an end to the horrific genocide. Both President Bush and President Clinton diverted their focus to other foreign affairs, including Somalia and Haiti, instead of taking a risk in the crisis which really needed immediate attention.

Enforcing Airstrikes:

The best course of action the United States should have taken regarding the Bosnian genocide would have been getting directly involved from the beginning and not taking the accusations lightly. Even if President Bush did not want to intervene, he could have at least put a stronger effort into having his administration gather research and specific information on the crisis occurring. As President Clinton ran for election, he made large promises, similar to most politicians, on the action he would take against the Serbians to stop the killings. Taking over near the climax of the genocide, I believe he had more of a responsibility to uphold his word and intervene. Although President Clinton finally took some initiative through establishing safe zones and air strikes, along with NATO allies, he did not give it much effort before becoming distracted in another affair and losing interest. This campaign was proven effective while enforced and would have been the best course of action for the United States to take in order to end the Bosnian genocide faster and prevent further loss of lives.

President Clinton strongly believed that European nations should have invested more of their abilities to intervene in Bosnia and wanted them to support NATO rather than the U.S.,

because in a sense they had more invested in geographical terms. Power (2002) implies this through stating, “The congressman took Clinton’s hand and said, “Bill, bomb the Serbs. You’ll be surprised how good it’ll make you feel.’ Unflustered, Clinton nodded thoughtfully for a few seconds and then blamed the Europeans for their hesitancy” (p. 326). Powerfully both economically and with military force, I find that the United States had a responsibility as an international leader to take charge of the genocide in Bosnia. President Clinton should have strongly enforced the safe zones with strict air strikes until the climate dissipated and a peace agreement could be reached. After the United States took lead, other nations would have followed close behind to stop the genocide, finally making grounds to show genocide will not be ignored or allowed any further. Without the intervention or holding the perpetrators responsible, events like Bosnia will continue to occur, because there are no repercussions in the international community.

CASE STUDY: RWANDA

With a daily killing rate which far exceeded any previous genocide, the Hutu of Rwanda killed 800,000 Tutsi citizens in 90 days. In Rwanda the Tutsi were the minority, only making up 15 percent of the population, however they were also considered the elite. The colonial masters previously in charge of the region favored the Tutsi and gave them preferential treatment over the Hutu majority, allowing them to be the leaders and given higher education. The Tutsi and Hutu were groups identical in language and culture, and were integrated in neighborhoods and marriages. This made them relatively indistinguishable from each other. In spite of the similarities, they have had a long history of periodic violence and killings between both groups. This eventually led up to a civil war in Rwanda, which was settled by the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement that enforced a cease-fire.

In December of 1990, a Hutu paper published “Ten Commandments of the Hutu,” which was a list of strict rules and limitations the Hutu wished to impose on the Tutsi people. Two years after this publication, in 1992, the Hutu began to stockpile and distribute weapons. Power (2002) states, “As well as 581,000 machetes—one machete for every third adult Hutu” (p. 337). The following year the Hutu began a campaign to dehumanize the Tutsi calling them names like “cockroaches,” along with compiling a list of names and addresses of Tutsi living among the communities.

On April 6th, 1994 the Rwanda President, Juvenal Habyarimana, was killed in a mysterious plane crash. Immediately after his death, the government collapsed and the military took over power. The violence began within hours as radios announced the addresses of Tutsi people for systematic killings. Power (2002) observes:

“In the countryside, where the slaughter gradually spread, the killing was done at first with firearms, but as more Hutu joined in the weapons became increasingly unsophisticated—knives, machetes, spears and the traditional masu, bulky clubs with nails protruding from them” (p. 334).

This displays how brutal and barbaric the killing methods used on the Tutsi were. Young Hutu men did the majority of the killing and also utilized a rape campaign against the Tutsi women. This created a generation of rape babies usually part Hutu and part Tutsi which breeds out the Tutsi genes. The entire campaign of killing occurred mostly within 90 days and with little force to stop the Hutu. They killed 800,000 Tutsi, along with moderate Hutu leaders.

A Crisis Ignored:

Major General Romeo Dallaire presided as the commander of the UN mission to act as peacekeepers and ensure the enforcement of the Arusha Accords in Rwanda. His multinational

force was made up of 2,000 soldiers, with about 800 of them from Belgium. A majority of the troops came from poor or weak nations; they were not well-trained nor well-armed. When the violent killings began in Rwanda, Dallaire asked for an expanded mandate and for more troops. He believed if he doubled the number of troops under his command to 5,000, he would be able to make an impact against the Hutu. After receiving and reading through the Genocide Convention, Dallaire stated, "I realized that genocide was when an attempt was made to eliminate a specific group, and this is precisely what we saw in the field" (Power, 2002, p. 358).

The United States was extremely resistant to use the word genocide when talking about the events occurring in Rwanda in fear that if they acknowledged it was genocide, they would be held accountable and forced to respond. The Belgians played an important role in Rwanda through the sizable amount of troops they provided to the UN. After ten Belgians died, they wanted to get out of Rwanda, but did not want to seem weak or unwilling to help through leaving. The Belgians asked the U.S. for security or political cover, but instead the U.S. officials demanded the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and refused to authorize UN military enforcement.

President Bill Clinton addressed the issues in Rwanda by claiming, "I have spoken out against the killings. We have called for a full investigation of these atrocities" (Power, 2002, 377). Although he stated he did not support the Hutu killings and planned to further look into what was occurring, he did not even consider using military intervention to become involved. The United States and Europe however did successfully complete a plan to evacuate all "white people" from Rwanda. The U.S. evacuated overland without the need for military escort, while the Europeans seized the capital city airport to fly out their citizens. It was a relatively easy mission to complete, with no casualties and low costs. However, the Tutsi people surrounded

the airport and begged the Westerners not to leave, afraid of what would happen without any enforcement watching. Power (2002) explains:

“When the peacekeepers had departed out through one gate, Hutu militiamen entered through another, firing machine guns and throwing grenades. Most of the 2,000 gathered were killed. In the three days during which some 4,000 foreigners were evacuated, about 20,000 Rwandans were killed” (p. 353).

With the Tutsi confined in a tight area around the secure airport with no way to escape, the Hutu came through and easily killed them all once the Americans and Europeans fled.

After more details and images from Rwanda were revealed, people began to question if there was a genocide occurring. International public pressure rose, and President Clinton was forced to act, even though a majority of the killings already occurred. On May 19th, the UN asked for 50 armored personnel carriers (APCs) from the U.S., and on May 31st the U.S. agreed to send them to Rwanda. However many bureaucratic roadblocks from the Pentagon delayed and stalled the shipment. The Pentagon began questioning everything, including, “Who would pay for the vehicles? Should the vehicles be tracked or wheeled? Would the UN buy them or simply lease them? Who would pay for shipping costs?”(Power, 2002, 380). After finally deciding to repaint all 50 of the APCs to cover U.S. numbers and flags, they were shipped in July. By the time they arrived in July, the genocide had in most terms come to an end, making the action too late to help.

There were many reasons behind the lack of reporting while the Rwanda genocide was occurring. Some smaller reasons include the size and geography of the nation: Rwanda is small, extremely poor, and not well-known. The genocide also occurred relatively quickly, mostly

within 90 days, not allowing much time for a response. The Bosnian genocide was still occurring at this time and, as a European country, received far more media coverage. The United States was still involved in Somalia, with the famine crisis occurring and the failed attempt to provide humanitarian aid. In South Africa Nelson Mandela was elected into presidency in 1994 and famously ending the apartheid regime. In her book *Power* displays that in May of 1994 there were 2,500 reporters in South Africa reporting on Nelson Mandela, yet in Rwanda the number never exceeded 15. Many times the reporters remained in bordering countries and reported on false stories with skewed numbers. The fact that Africa was also viewed as unsophisticated and unstable led to a lack of support or interest toward the killings occurring within Rwanda.

United States Fighting Back:

Overall the United States response to the Rwanda genocide was a failure, due to the lack of intervention and an unwillingness to provide aid. From the start, President Clinton and high-level officials within the U.S. had no plans to become involved in Rwanda, and their reluctance to use the word genocide prevented most Americans from knowing the severity of what was occurring. After the genocide President Clinton made a half-hour appearance in Rwanda, remaining at the airport to give an apology. This showed an insincere and bad display due to the fact that President Clinton chose not to intervene, when he could have prevented the death of thousands of Tutsi.

I believe that the United States should have implemented a plan that directly aided Romeo Dallaire and used military intervention to stop the Hutu. The U.S. should have given complete support to the U.N. and helped Dallaire receive the 5,000 troops he believed were needed to apprehend the Hutu militia. Although the Clinton administration stated they did not have support from within the U.S. and it would have been unpopular to become involved, President Clinton

could have altered U.S. responses through explaining his reasoning to intervene. If he used the word genocide and explained the horrific details of the killings, he would build a base of public support. The Hutu were also hesitant to kill in front of Westerners, so the increase of UN troops and surveillance could have potentially decreased killings.

Another course of action that could have been used simultaneously with the U.N. troops, or in place of it, to prevent the risk of troops being killed would have been creating radio interference. The radios were a critical component of the killing, as the Hutu leaders would give specific names, addresses and times to kill Tutsi people. Tony Marley, a U.S. military liaison explained:

“The United States could destroy the antenna. It could transmit ‘counter broadcasts’ urging perpetrators to stop the genocide. Or it could jam the hate radio stations broadcasts. This could have been done from an airborne platform such as the Air National Guards Commando Solo airplane” (Power, 2002,371).

Although leaders claim the cost of jamming the radio was too high, President Clinton asked Congress for \$320 million for emergency relief funds and received \$170 million. The cost for the National Guard planes to fly would be around \$8,500 an hour, which is far less than the relief funds. If the use of radio transmissions or jamming were implemented and prevented deaths in the first place, the relief would not have been needed. If the radios could not properly relay messages by the Hutus, then the systematic killings would have been made much more difficult to complete and wouldn’t have caused a high cost or danger to the U.S. This would have been the best solution for the U.S. to use to combat the Rwanda genocide.

CONCLUSION:

Overall it is evident that intervening on genocide has not been a popular action in U.S. history. Primarily during the Clinton administration, a wide range of excuses were used to support a policy of neutrality and non-intervention. This included the cost of involvement, the risk of losing soldier life, and endangering the security of America. In general these reasons lack strength, because humanitarian efforts caused a higher cost, and there are many forms of intervention that have low risk and the U.S. is one of the strongest nations. The nations responsible for genocide lack the resources to attack back on U.S. soil, which does not create a plausible danger for the U.S. Also the U.S. should not hold the value of U.S. lives higher than the victims being murdered. For most it is reasonable to say a dozen or so U.S. soldiers would not equal thousands of lives of the defenseless. From the time the U.S. signed the Genocide Convention under President Reagan, it had a reluctance to intervene on the sovereignty of other nations due to genocide. Instead of this fading it only worsened as genocide began to unfold. It is clear to see that the fear of even using the word genocide would hold the U.S. accountable to act and protect others. As a strong nation, this seems weak and pathetic for the U.S. to fail to intervene.

Many lessons can be learned from studying the genocides which have occurred and viewing the compelling arguments towards intervention. To start with a major reason President Clinton had reluctance to intervene in Rwanda was the lack of support from citizens. With almost no representation of that culture in the U.S., there was not a strong push to get involved. This shows the importance of staying informed on current world events and researching what is going on around you. If there is an increased awareness, the citizens directly influence the vote of Congress on what international matters take importance. Another important lesson is that you cannot always trust what political leaders are telling you. Often times they give opinionated

information and withhold important facts. In general the U.S. can look back at the lack of intervention to see it was not the appropriate course of action to take. No matter what perspective is taken, it is hard to argue the U.S. was right in ignoring the horrific crimes and mass killings which occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda. This demonstrates the importance of acting quickly in any matter, especially when it involves the loss of lives. Even if it is not in the best interest to send ground troops, there is always some form of intervention which can take place to attempt to end genocide.

After researching the case studies of Bosnia and Rwanda, I found many similarities in the matters. The policy of non-intervention backfired after it came to attention what the U.S. knew and was capable of doing. In the cases presented, the Clinton administration refused to use the word genocide and would tell the people a civil war was occurring with both sides committing crimes, when in fact they knew it was not the truth. It was easier to categorize the events as ancient hatreds and try to divert the attention elsewhere than get involved. The U.S. should also not have allowed other foreign affairs happening at the same time to create a negative view on intervening on this separate matter. For Bosnia they claimed it would turn into another Vietnam and become a costly war impossible to leave. With Rwanda President Clinton feared it would turn into another event like the failed humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia which caused negative views on his administration. Even though there were a number of similarities in Bosnia and Rwanda, it is also important to recognize the differences. In Bosnia there was an increases awareness of the events as they were occurring. Also because of the location and other parallels with the Holocaust, there was a heightened anxiety. As previously stated there was not a large interest in Rwanda and a generalized negative perception of African culture. Another

important fact is the difference in press coverage. What the news focuses on creates a big impact on the views back in the U.S.

In the future I would conduct further research and analysis on other cases of genocide. A main case I would like to focus on would be Kosovo. This interests me particularly because unlike Bosnia and Rwanda, the U.S. did intervene in the matter. Overall I know the intervention was positive with a low cost to the U.S. It also included using air strikes and other military support without casualties. This would further support my claim by showing intervention is possible using military power and does not create harm for the United States. On a long-term level this would create a U.S. strategic advantage by allowing international alliances which could further benefit the American economy through trade and benefit military by establishing new for military bases. In general terms this shows how the United States may have to give some sacrifice for intervention but overall receives the higher gain.

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