American's Perception of China: A Study of Various American Social Statistics and Their Relationship to Perception of The People's Republic of China

Joseph R. Martello
St. John Fisher College

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Abstract
Over the past century, American perception of the People's Republic of China has been characterized as cyclical, alternating between longer periods of negativity, characterized by hostility and disillusionment, and shorter positive periods of admiration, infatuation, and benevolence. The two recent peaks in Americans' perception of China have been in 1979, when the Carter administration officially recognized China, and ten years later, when President Bush visited the country in 1989. American China-scholars generally agree that the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was the watershed that fundamentally changed U.S. perceptions of China. Since the incident, the percentage of Americans who perceive China in a positive light has yet to return to its pre-Tiananmen level. This study is a statistical analysis of the relationship between American perceptions of China and a number of specific social characteristics. The results indicate that, although reported perception of China has fluctuated greatly over the past century, little has changed in the way that most Americans fundamentally view China. That is, most American's retain a "missionary view" of China as a country in need of saving: originally from barbarism, and now from communism.

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Americans’ Perception of China:
A Study of Various American Social Statistics and Their Relationship to
Perception of The People’s Republic of China

A Master’s Thesis submitted to
The Faculty of the Master of Science in International Studies Program
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Master of Science in International Studies

By
Joseph R. Martello
Zhiyue Bo, Ph.D., Advisor and Program Director
Stephen Valone, Ph.D., Reader

Rochester, New York, the United States of America

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Abstract

Over the past century, American perception of the People’s Republic of China has been characterized as cyclical, alternating between longer periods of negativity, characterized by hostility and disillusionment, and shorter positive periods of admiration, infatuation, and benevolence. The two recent peaks in Americans’ perception of China have been in 1979, when the Carter administration officially recognized China, and ten years later, when President Bush visited the country in 1989. American China-scholars generally agree that the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was the watershed that fundamentally changed U.S. perceptions of China. Since the incident, the percentage of Americans who perceive China in a positive light has yet to return to its pre-Tiananmen level. This study is a statistical analysis of the relationship between American perceptions of China and a number of specific social characteristics. The results indicate that, although reported perception of China has fluctuated greatly over the past century, little has changed in the way that most Americans fundamentally view China. That is, most American’s retain a “missionary view” of China as a country in need of saving: originally from barbarism, and now from communism.
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I. Introduction

In this study, I will attempt to determine the relationship between Americans’ perceptions of China, and a number of specific social characteristics attributed to those individuals. Using data compiled after a 1991 study by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, this study will attempt to determine whether a correlation exists between an individual American’s perception of China and other attributes including the respondent’s age, highest year of school completed, income, political party affiliation, and sex.¹ The goal of this study is to determine which groups of Americans are more inclined to hold either a positive or negative perception of China, in the hopes that this information will serve as a powerful tool for those who aim to dispel American misperceptions about China.

The end of the Cold War has brought with it a renewed interest in U.S.-China relations. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China remains the largest and most powerful communist nation in the world. This fact, coupled with the country’s perceived hegemonic goals in Southeast Asia, has prompted many Americans to turn a watchful eye toward the eastern giant. In the past few decades, much research has been done on how Americans perceive China.² In his 1990 book, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality, Steven W. Mosher discusses the misperceptions

² Due to the relatively recent time frame in which I chose to focus my research, it has been difficult to obtain primary documents, many of which have not been declassified by either the American or Chinese governments. I have been therefore forced to rely on secondary materials to a greater extent.
and distortions that have characterized the American view of China for the past seventy years. Mosher describes the American perception as cyclical, alternating between longer periods of negativity, characterized by hostility and disillusionment, and shorter positive periods of admiration, infatuation, and benevolence. In his 1998 book, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton, James Mann reinforces Mosher's theory, writing that "over the past two centuries, U.S. attitudes toward China have fluctuated between attraction and revulsion—such as, in this century, the romance and dissolution with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China."

To measure American perceptions of China and support their claims, Mosher and Mann have used citations from papers, articles, and speeches given by American "China Watchers," that is, scholars, foreign policy analysts, or government officials who are considered experts within their field in regard to China. The theory of a cyclical perception of China in America holds true for the American public as well. Data gathered by the Gallup Organization, from 1979 to 2001, shows a similar pattern of brief periods of favorable opinion about China by Americans followed by longer periods of unfavorable opinions.

In Mosher's study, he attributes the change in American perceptions to two principal factors, the political climate in China and the altering sympathies of the American "China watchers." To Mosher, public opinion is formulated

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primarily by the political and intellectual elite. These individuals tend to portray China to the American public in a positive or negative light in accordance with their political goals. Mosher discusses the "critical" assistance that Richard Nixon received from American academic China specialists while trying to "sell" rapprochement with China to the American people.\(^6\) He writes: "American academics provided Nixon with a ready-made image of the New China, stamped with the scholarly seal of approval, which he in turn could sell to the American people."\(^7\)

Michael Kulma describes the American image of China as having "traveled a long and interesting journey...from enemy to ally, back toward enemy, to barbaric, and finally to an image of some complexity."\(^8\) Though Kulma's view of the American perception of China agrees with Mosher's, he believes that the prominent source of messages that help form this perception is the media.\(^9\)

Nicholas Berry, Senior Analyst with the Center for Defense Information, an independent military research organization, has applied Mosher's theory of American-Sino relations prior to 1990 to the past decade, he writes: "Up-and down swings in the American public perception of China prevailed in the 1990s."\(^10\) According to Berry, dramatic events shape popular attitudes,
measured by polls, which then pressure the media to report international events in either a positive or negative light depending on poll results.  

In an article in *The Baltimore Sun*, journalist Frank Langfitt writes: “The gap between U.S. perceptions of China and reality has been broad, and has helped fuel a roller-coaster view — spurred by events, news coverage and global politics — in which American popular opinion has oscillated between contempt, paternalism, fear and respect.”*12* When reviewing the literature surrounding the American perception of China, most authors choose to focus on the vacillation that has dominated American opinion over the past century. The conclusions drawn by these scholars are supported by the data gathered after 50 years of public opinion polls.

From 1950 and the start of the Korean war through Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, China was considered the enemy by most Americans. From Nixon’s visit, American acceptance of China slowly grew until it reached its first peak in the late 1970s. The two peaks in Americans' perception of China in recent years have been in 1979, when the Carter administration officially recognized China, and ten years later, when President Bush visited the country in 1989. During these two years, roughly two-thirds or more of Americans had a favorable opinion of China. After the violent Chinese reaction to student protesters during the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, favorable opinions of China plummeted and have yet to recover fully. According to David M. Lampton, “that George Bush Sr. ran for president in 1988 as a friend of China and his son

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*11* Berry, “U.S. Public Opinion Shifts in China.”

George W. Bush felt compelled to run for president a decade later calling Beijing a ‘competitor’ shows how much had changed.”¹³ For the past 12 years, polls have consistently shown that a minority of the country retains a positive opinion of China.¹⁴ There is evidence that the current American perception of China has continued to take a downturn, stimulated by reports of Chinese belligerence about Taiwan and US operation in the South China Sea, among other incidents.¹⁵

American China scholars generally agree that the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was the watershed that fundamentally changed U.S. perceptions of China.¹⁶ This assertion has been reflected in data gathered from public opinion polls since the event. Some of these polls have also shown evidence of China’s burgeoning role in the international community. According to a 1999 study of American public opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 69% of the public and 97% of leaders believe that China will play a greater role in the next 10 years than it does today. A nearly equal percentage of the public (57%) and leaders (56%) consider China to be a possible critical threat to vital U.S. interests.¹⁷

According to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll released in late April 2001, the American view of China has recently grown much more negative.

In May 2000, 51% of Americans thought of China as either an ally or friendly nation. Only 43% said China was unfriendly or an enemy. One year later, in May 2001, the proportion of Americans with a positive view of China plummeted to 27%, while 69% viewed the Communist giant as unfriendly or even an enemy. It is important to note that the second poll was taken following the April 1, 2001 emergency landing of a U.S. EP-3 Aries on the Chinese island of Hainan after the plane was damaged in a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter jet. The Chinese accused the U.S. of using the aircraft to spy on China. The detention of the American crew in China coupled with the death of the Chinese pilot created an international incident. Despite the popular attitudes in each country, it appears that a new period of bilateral cooperation has emerged as the United States leads the multi-country coalition against international terrorism. This new friendship, however, will most likely prove fleeting.

Scholars disagree on the level of influence that the American media holds in the shaping of public opinion of foreign countries. Some argue that the media is responsible for shaping public opinion regarding foreign countries, and that public opinion then plays a major role in the shaping of United States foreign policy. So in a roundabout way, the American media helps mold the foreign policy of the United States. It seems that foreign governments also recognize the important role that American media outlets play in the formation of public opinion.

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19 See “China and America: Friends again, for now,” The Economist, 13 October 2001, pp. 41-42.
It has become common for national governments to hire public relations consultants to influence the image of their nation as portrayed in the United States press.\textsuperscript{21} Other scholars, such as James F. Hoge, believe that the American media plays a lesser role in shaping popular opinion of foreign countries. Hoge argues that American news media coverage of foreign events has diminished sharply over the past three decades.\textsuperscript{22}

Although media may play a primary role in the shaping of public opinion, it is certainly not the only American source of images of China. Some argue that the entertainment industry does more to degrade China in Western eyes than any international incident could. The \textit{Asian American Media News} recently published an article accusing popular American author Tom Clancy of profiting from the "exploitation of middle America's xenophobia" by demonizing China in his novel \textit{The Bear and the Dragon}. The novel postulates a Beijing leadership that seeks economic salvation in Siberia's mineral wealth and launches a surprise attack on Russia.\textsuperscript{23} The popular fictional modern military genre is filled with plots that revolve around Chinese aggression.\textsuperscript{24}

American perceptions of China can also be shaped by the film industry. With the success of films such as the Academy Award winning \textit{Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon}, there has been a recent deluge of films that are either set in


China or feature Chinese actors.  

Most American films about China, however, are not set in contemporary China. Ben Calmes argues that “the popularity of these films is due not just to their superior production values but because they fit the American image of China—the China of old, the one that was ‘lost’ to the communists.” Calmes believes that most Americans still retain a missionary’s view of China as a backward land of hardworking friendly peasants, oppressed by ruthless rulers, and desperately in need of American values. According to Calmes, “the average American is abysmally ignorant of present day China yet generally hates the place.”

The “respectable” news media in both the United States and China has also been the target of these types of allegations as there has been much debate over the accuracy of foreign events coverage in both countries. There have been articles since the 1950s that support an American vision of China as a corrupt and oppressive regime that is hiding its ugliness behind the veil of the inaccurate Chinese media outlets that it uses as a propaganda tool. It may be easy to support such a claim when the limited availability of information in China is compared to relative freedom of information in the United States. For example, even Internet news sources are heavily policed in China under strict laws restricting the publication of news in electronic form. Commercial websites are

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now barred from hiring their own reporters or from publishing "original" content. Only news that has already been published by a state outlet (such as the 
People's Daily, the official Communist mouthpiece, or Xinhua, the state news agency) may be posted on Chinese websites.28

Likewise, China's "America watchers" accuse the American press of biased reporting which "plays up the negative aspects" of life in China.29 A signed 1997 commentary carried by China's Xinhua news agency, and published in full by most national dailies, accused the U.S. media of "plotting with anti-Beijing forces to undermine Sino-U.S. relations and fuel global fears of Chinese expansionist ambitions."30

In contemplating my research, I was forced to recognize two principles already established by American China-scholars: first, the American perception of China has, over the past century, been characterized by an opinion oscillating between compassion, respect, and outright contempt; and second, the American perception of China has been primarily shaped by two factors: 1) the American media's portrayal of China, the accuracy of which has been debated, and 2) the writings and speeches of America's political and intellectual elite.31 The puzzle

31 This oscillation between poles of positive and negative feelings is not unique to America's relationship with China, but more often than not holds true for the American perception of many different nations throughout the past century. Take, for example, America's relationship with Russia. The two countries moved from allies during the Second World War, to bitter enemies during the Cold War, and back to close allies after the demise of the Soviet Union. America's
that I find most interesting, and which few scholars have attempted to understand, is that of the individual. What makes the individual more or less likely to develop misperceptions about China? One way to answer this question is to determine the relationship between American perceptions of China, and a number of specific social characteristics attributed to those individuals.

In his 1988 doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan, David Shambaugh tried to analyze some of the factors that cause China’s America watchers to articulate the perceptions that they do. Working with limited biographical data, Shambaugh was able to identify six factors that affected 164 Chinese America watchers’ perception of the United States. The factors Shambaugh isolated included exposure to the United States, professional role, research sources, the domestic political culture, the impact of Sino-American relations, and cultural differences. Since Shambaugh’s Chinese America-watchers constitute a very small sample population that most likely fails to fairly represent Chinese public opinion, it would be interesting to see how Shambaugh’s theory translates to the average Chinese citizen. What social factors would be behind the average Chinese citizen’s perceptions of the United States? Unfortunately, Chinese social statistics are simply not readily available to an American scholar at any level. It would have been close to impossible for Shambaugh to conduct his study on a much larger scale. American social statistics, however, are readily available.

relationship with China, however, is important and will continue to be so because of China’s emerging role as a world leader.

II. Data

The data for this study consist of 1517 cases which represent a random sampling of residents of the United States who were polled during a 1991 General Social Survey (GSS) by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).\textsuperscript{33} In choosing variables for this study, I attempted to use characteristics that were in some way related to issues affecting Sino-American relations today. For example, with enforced birth control as a major issue between the United States and China, an individual's gender and feelings about abortion become very significant. Other variables, such as height and weight, will most likely have no effect on an individual's perception of China, as there are no laws against being too short or overweight in China. The variables are defined as follows:

**LIKING FOR CHINA**
The dependent variable is LIKING FOR CHINA. Respondents were asked to rate their individual feelings for the country China on a scale ranging from -5 to 5, with -5 representing the least favorable opinion of China and 5 representing the most favorable opinion of China. The results were then coded on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 equivalent to a "-5" response and 10 equivalent to a response of "5." Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 1 for a distribution.

**AGE OF RESPONDENT**
The independent variable AGE OF RESPONDENT represents the respondent's age in years. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 2 for a distribution.

**HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED**
For the independent variable HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, respondents were asked to give the highest year of school that they completed. This variable has a maximum of 20 years with 12 being roughly equivalent to a high school diploma and 16 being roughly equivalent to a bachelor's degree. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 3 for a distribution.

**POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION (DEMREP)**
The independent variable POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION represents the respondent's answer when asked to classify their political party affiliation under one of seven

\textsuperscript{33} At the time of writing (Spring 2002), the 1991 data was over a decade old. It was, however, the most recent General Social Survey available to this researcher. In order to control for any affect the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident may have had on American perception of China, an attempt was made to analyze data from earlier surveys that included similar questions. Unfortunately, earlier survey data was also inaccessible to this researcher. Therefore, as of April 2002, the 1991 survey was the only information available.
categories. The data was then coded on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 equaling respondent identification as a "strong Democrat" and 6 equaling a respondent identifying themselves as a "strong Republican." An input of 7 means that the individual belonged to a political party other than those named. For this study, the data was recoded on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, with an answer of 1 again being equivalent to respondent identification as a strong Democrat, and an input of 6 equaling a respondent's identification as a strong Republican. Those who answered that they belonged to a political party other than the Democrats or the Republicans were excluded from the recoded data. The recoded variable was renamed DEMREP to reflect the exclusion of answers by third party members. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 4 for a distribution.

RESPONDENTS INCOME (LOWHIGH)
The independent variable RESPONDENTS INCOME measures the yearly income of each individual respondent on a scale which ranges from less than $1,000.00 per year to $25,000.00 or more per year. The results were then coded into groups onto a scale ranging from 1 to 14. An input of 1 was equivalent to the lowest yearly income group while an input of 13 represents the highest yearly income group. An input of 14 signifies the respondent's refusal to divulge this information. For this study, the data was recoded into a new variable that excluded input from those who refused to answer the question. The new data ranges from 1 to 12 with 1 again equivalent to the lowest yearly income grouping, but with 12 being the group of highest annual earners. The new variable was renamed LOWHIGH to signify the range of yearly incomes, from low to high, that it represents. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 5 for a distribution.

RESPONDENTS SEX
The independent variable RESPONDENTS SEX represents each individual respondent's gender. Answers were coded with a numerical value. A value of 1 represents a male respondent, while a value of 2 represents a female respondent. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 6 for a distribution.

WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY
The independent variable WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY asked the respondents to tell whether or not they were born in the United States. The results were then coded with a numerical value. An input of 1 was equivalent to an answer of "yes," the respondent was born in the United States. An input of 2 signifies a "no" answer; the respondent was born in a country other than the United States. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 7 for a distribution.

FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM
For the independent variable FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM, respondents were asked to report their individual feelings about communism on a scale ranging from the "worst kind" of government to a "good form" of government. The results were then coded on a scale ranging from 1 to 4 with 1 equivalent to a "worst kind" response and 4 equivalent to a response of "good form." Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 8 for a distribution.

RACE OF RESPONDENT (DUMRACE)
For this dependent variable, respondents were asked to identify their race as one of three choices: white, black or other. The results were then coded onto a numerical scale where 1 was equivalent to an answer of "white," 2 represented "black," and 3 represented "other." For this study, the results were recoded and the "other" category was merged with the "black" category. For the new variable, DUMRACE, 1 represents "white" and 2 represents "non-white." Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 9 for a distribution.
REGION OF INTERVIEW (EASTWEST)
For independent variable REGION OF INTERVIEW, respondents were asked to indicate the region in which they participated in the social indicators interview. Respondents could choose from nine geographic regions in the United States. The results were then coded onto a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 9 with each region being assigned a numerical value. The results were then recoded onto a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 3, with 1 representing all of the Eastern regions in the United States, 2 representing the central regions, and 3 representing the Western regions. The new variable was named EASTWEST. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 10 for a distribution.

MARITAL STATUS (DUMMARRY)
For independent variable MARITAL STATUS, respondents were asked to indicate their marital status by choosing from a list of five options: married, widowed, divorced, separated, or never married. The results were then coded and each status option was assigned a numerical value from 1 to 5. For this study, the results were then recoded into a "dummy variable." Individual cases were either listed as 1: married, or 2: not married (including widowed, divorced, separated, and never married). The new variable was named DUMMARRY. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 11 for a distribution.

FOREIGN AID
The independent variable FOREIGN AID asked respondents their opinion on the amount of foreign aid the United States currently supplies to foreign countries. Respondents could choose either "too little," "about right," or "too much" to represent their opinion on the amount of foreign aid provided by the United States. The results were then coded onto a numerical scale with 1 representing "too little," 2 representing "about right," and 3 being equivalent to "too much." Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 12 for a distribution.

MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE
The independent variable MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE asked respondents their opinion on the amount of money the United States government spends on military, armaments, and defense. Respondents could choose either "too little," "about right," or "too much" to represent their opinion on United States spending on military, armaments, and defense. The results were then coded onto a numerical scale with 1 representing "too little," 2 representing "about right," and 3 being equivalent to "too much." Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 13 for a distribution.

IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
The independent variable IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT asked respondents their opinion on the level of spending by the United States government on projects meant to either improve or protect the environment. Respondents could choose either "too little," "about right," or "too much" to represent their opinion of the level of government involvement in the protection of the environment. The results were then coded onto a numerical scale with 1 representing "too little," 2 representing "about right," and 3 being equivalent to "too much." Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 14 for a distribution.

R SELF-EMP OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY
The independent variable R SELF-EMP OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY represents information about each individual respondent's employment. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they are self-employed or work for somebody else. Answers were then coded with a numerical value. A value of 1 represents a respondent who is self-employed, while a value of 2 represents a respondent who works for somebody else. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 15 for a distribution.
ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS FOR ANY REASON
For independent variable ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS FOR ANY REASON, respondents were asked whether or not they believed that a woman should be legally allowed to receive an abortion if she wanted to, regardless of the reason. The results were then coded with a numerical value. An input of 1 was equivalent to an answer of "yes," and an input of 2 signifies a "no" answer. Refer to Table 1 for descriptives and Graph 16 for a distribution.

III. Hypotheses

It is probably safe to say, without conducting any calculations, that each one of these variables has a unique relationship with an individual's perception of China. Some of them, however, may prove to have no significant effect on an individual. In this section, using history as a guide, I will develop a set of preliminary hypotheses which will serve as a guide for the rest of my study. The following sections will include a presentation of the results that a statistical analysis of the data has yielded and a discussion of how, and possibly why, these results differ from the predictions made in this section of the paper.

The relationship between an individual's age and his or her feelings toward China is most likely more complicated than the simple positive or negative correlation that we can expect to see between LIKING FOR CHINA and many of the other independent variables. Rather than a simple formula, such as the older an individual, the more inclined he or she is to perceive China in a negative light and vice versa, it is probably true that perception of China varies with age, depending on which major event or time period in Sino-American relations is most clearly recalled by the respondent answering the survey. For example, an individual who witnessed the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident without having been alive during the positive rhetoric that came out of Nixon's 1972
rapprochement with China, may carry a less favorable impression of China than
the older individual who remembers both of these events clearly. Likewise, an
even older individual who remembers China as an ally against Japan in the
Second World War may have a very different opinion of China than the younger
individual who grew up during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and witnessed only
the Chinese support of America’s enemies.

It is my prediction that the cyclical pattern of U.S.-China relations, periods
of hostility followed by periods of rapprochement, will affect variable AGE OF
RESPONDENT in such a way that different age groups will tend to view China in
either a positive or negative light depending on the general state of U.S.-China
relations during most of his or her own lifetime. Since the survey population
represents more than two major age groups, with ages range from 18 to 89, we
will most likely find no general correlation between LIKING FOR CHINA and AGE
OF RESPONDENT in either direction. For the sake of this project, however, I will
predict a positive correlation between LIKING FOR CHINA and AGE OF
RESPONDENT. That is, the older a respondent is, the more likely he or she is to
view China is a positive light. This prediction is based on the assumption that the
1989 Tiananmen Square incident will have a greater negative effect on younger
respondents who have had little exposure to China over their lifetimes, than on
older respondents who were alive during periods of American rapprochement
with China.

The relationship between LIKING FOR CHINA and HIGHEST YEAR OF
SCHOOL COMPLETED will most likely yield a positive correlation. American
scholars have historically lobbied for rapprochement with China throughout the many downturns in Sino-American relations. U.S. scholars seemed to have retained an infatuation with China that shows itself in the relatively large number of “China specialists” in American universities today. In his book China Misperceived, Mosher claims that “the United States lead[s] the world in China studies.”

Mosher goes on to elaborate by asserting that the major remaining hurdle for scholars is the “unavailability of scientific statistics, which makes it difficult to analyze economic growth and social change.” It would, therefore, make sense to assume that American scholars should attempt to portray China in as positive a light as possible, in order to benefit from the educational exchanges that would come from rapprochement with China. A higher level of education may mean that a respondent received more exposure to this positive rhetoric about China, causing that individual to hold a more positive view of the country.

In making a prediction about the variable POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION, it is important to consider some of the many issues that continually affect Sino-American relations, including human rights violations by the Chinese government, economic opportunities in the Chinese market, China's hegemonic ambitions in South Asia, China's value as an ally, the status of Taiwan, and even China's very existence as a large and powerful Communist state. All of these issues, and many more, are brought to the forefront during political elections in the United States. Looking back on the history of America's

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strange relationship with China, one would find it difficult to pigeonhole either the Republicans or Democrats as having a generally favorable or negative attitude towards China. It seems that each party's feelings about China, along with its official position on many of the issues mentioned above, are in a constant state of flux. The eras of positive and negative American feelings toward China have transcended presidencies. The United States finally abandoned the notion that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime on Taiwan was the legal government for the Chinese mainland and therefore opened itself to China under Republican Richard Nixon, but China was granted official diplomatic ties with the United States under Democratic President Jimmy Carter. Likewise, tensions over Taiwan continued from George Bush Sr.'s Republican administration through Clinton's Democratic regime.

Since China remains a communist country, and for the sake of our preliminary hypothesis, we will assume that the more liberal an individual's political views, the more likely they are to hold a positive image of China, and the more conservative an individual's political views, the more likely they are to hold a negative view of China. Since a higher value for variable POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION refers to a closer affiliation with the Republican Party, and a lower value refers to a closer affiliation with the Democratic Party, the calculations should yield a negative correlation. That is, a respondent who holds conservative political views is more likely to hold a negative perception of China, while a respondent with liberal political views, is more likely to perceive China in a positive light.
The relationship between variable RESPONDENT'S INCOME and LIKING FOR CHINA is an interesting one to consider as an increasing percentage of the news reported by American news services about China pertains to economic issues. We will most likely find a positive correlation between variable RESPONDENT'S INCOME and the individual's LIKING FOR CHINA. Since China's "enormous coastal and urban population" has long been coveted as a "huge and increasingly real potential consumer market," it would make sense that American investors would like the U.S. and China to maintain a very friendly relationship.\(^{36}\) Additionally, it was previously predicted that an individual's level of education and his or her perception of China were positively correlated.

HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED and RESPONDANT'S INCOME are usually positively correlated to a significant degree; so predicting a positive correlation between an individual's income and his or her likelihood of having a positive perception of China would remain consistent with our earlier predictions.

Answers to variable RESPONDENT'S SEX were numerically coded so that an input of "1" represents a male respondent, while an input of "2" represents a female. One would expect to find a negative correlation between this variable and LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, females are more likely to hold a negative view of China. This prediction is grounded in the criticism that China has received from the United States regarding its forced birth control laws. According to polls conducted by the Gallup Organization, women are historically more supportive of abortion rights than men, the term "abortion rights" referring to the

freedom to choose whether or not to have an abortion.\textsuperscript{37} It is common for Chinese defectors to come to American media outlets with horror stories about forced abortions in China. Xiaduan Gao, who served as the director of a planned birth center in a Chinese township of 60,000 and later defected to the United States, complained of forced abortions as late as the ninth month of pregnancy, with woman who refused facing imprisonment.\textsuperscript{38} David M. Lampton writes that in China, “female fetuses are disproportionally aborted and girl infants sometimes killed or left to die as a result of implementing the one-child policy in a society heavily biased toward male-offspring.”\textsuperscript{39} Whether stories like Xiaduan Gao’s are fabricated or not, they must have had a profound effect on American, and especially the American female’s perception of China.

With this same issue in mind, we should expect to see a negative correlation between variable ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS FOR ANY REASON and LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, the less accepting of abortion an individual is, the less likely he or she should be to hold a negative perception of China. It is true that pro-choice Americans could also condemn China for mandated abortions, but we should expect to see stronger negative feelings expressed by those who are pro-life, and implicitly against abortion in any form. Additionally, China’s forced birth control laws may affect the relationship between


an individual's perception of China and his or her marital status. For this reason, there will likely be a negative correlation between variables MARITAL STATUS and LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, a married respondent would be more likely than an unmarried one to maintain a negative image of China.

For variable WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY, we will likely find a positive correlation with LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, a respondent not born in the United States should be more likely to hold a positive image of China than a native born American. This prediction stems from the assumption that, by comparison, an immigrant who is working and living in the U.S., would be less prone to the xenophobia and racial intolerance that plagues many native-born Americans. Being themselves “strangers in a strange land,” immigrants living in the U.S. may tend to be more accepting of foreign countries than native-born Americans, of which less than 50% have traveled outside of the U.S.

For variable FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM, we should find a very straightforward positive correlation with LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, the more positive an individual’s views about communism are, the more likely that individual is to hold a positive view of China. This assertion should generate little surprise, as China remains the largest communist country in the world. A respondent who is opposed to communism in general should inherently perceive China negatively.

To make variable RACE OF RESPONDENT more manageable, the data was recoded into one of two responses. A respondent is therefore either white, or not white, a category encompassing both the “black” and “other” survey
response choices. Since the non-White category probably includes a large percentage of Asians, a correlation between RACE OF RESPONDENT and LIKING FOR CHINA should yield a positive relationship. That is, respondents in the non-White category should be more likely to hold a positive view of China than those in the White category. This prediction was based on the assumption that Asians would be more likely to hold a sympathetic view of China than white Americans with no ancestral ties to the region. Family members who continue to live in Asia, or ancestors who once lived in the region, might cause Asians living in the U.S. to record a more sympathetic opinion of China.

This assumption will also help in predicting the correlation between REGION OF INTERVIEW and LIKING FOR CHINA. Variable REGION OF INTERVIEW was recoded into three categories, one representing the eastern region of the United States, one the central region, and one the western region. Studies of ethnic demographics of the United States have shown that Asians are much more prevalent as a percentage of total county population in the western United States, and especially in California, where some counties have an Asian population of up to 25%.40 With this in mind, along with the previous assumption that Asians should be more prone to hold China in a positive light than other Americans, we would expect to see a positive correlation between REGION OF INTERVIEW and LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, respondents interviewed in the western United States are more likely to perceive China in a positive light than those interviewed in the eastern United States. This prediction is based on the

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assumption that a higher percentage of Asians will have completed the survey in the western U.S. than in the eastern U.S.

The next three variables, “FOREIGN AID,” “MILITARY, ARMAMENTS AND DEFENSE,” and “IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT,” ask the respondent to rate his or her feelings about the amount of money spent by the federal government on foreign aid, defense, and the environment. We will most likely see a negative correlation between FOREIGN AID and LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, an individual who feels that the federal government spends too much on its foreign aid programs is more likely to perceive foreign countries in a negative light than an individual who believes the U.S. should provide more support to foreign countries. Although China receives little in terms of humanitarian aid from the United States, the country does operate under a trade surplus with the U.S. in the billions of dollars range. An individual opposed to American aid to foreign countries should also be against the current trading relationship between the U.S. and China.

Defense spending is an interesting issue to consider, especially since China has been perceived as an enemy throughout many periods in its history of relations with the United States. Those individuals who perceive China as an enemy and a legitimate threat will most likely support additional defense spending, while those who do not see China as a threat to American security will most probably feel that the federal government spends an adequate amount of money on defense. This will result in a positive correlation between variables LIKING FOR CHINA and MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE. That is,
the more negative a respondent's feelings about China, the more likely that respondent should be to indicate that defense spending is "too little."

Variable IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT should result in a negative correlation. That is, the more likely a respondent is to hold a positive view of China, the more likely that respondent would be to believe that the federal government spends "too much" on improving and protecting the environment. This prediction is based on the growing international criticism aimed at China's environmental record, which became a major issue during World Trade Organization (WTO) accession negotiations. At the Kyoto Meeting addressing climate change in December 1997, "China was active in pushing to exempt developing countries from greenhouse gas reduction targets, thereby putting the burden to act first and effectively on the developed nations." David M. Lampton believes that "as China becomes an even greater carbon dioxide emitter, U.S. dissatisfaction with the Chinese stance is likely to grow." Those individuals who are especially concerned about the environment would likely feel that the U.S. is not spending enough on improving and protecting it. These individuals should also hold China in a negative light for the country's perceived ambivalence towards the environment.

The last variable I chose to study, R SELF-EMP OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY, should be positively correlated with LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, an individual who works for somebody should be more likely to hold a positive image of China than an individual who is self-employed. This prediction is based

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42 Ibid., p. 166.
on the rhetoric surrounding China's accession into the WTO (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the time the survey was administered) and the lingering effects this propaganda may have on small business owners. Many argue that the "Mom and Pop" stores that used to line the Main Streets of Small-town, USA are slowly being wiped out by the monster conglomerates that have benefited from globalization. The thought that goods usually manufactured locally can be mass-produced in China at a much cheaper price leaves some small business owners resentful of China and international trade agreements in general.

V. Methods and Results

To test each of these hypotheses, we must first start with a general research hypothesis: that an American's perception of China is affected by each of the variables that we have selected. The actual hypotheses that are tested are known as null hypotheses. Each of the null hypotheses states that a specific variable has no effect on an individual's perception of China. Since the study involves one dependent variable and 15 independent variables, a multiple regression analysis was used to analyze the data. Table 2 represents the model summary. The most significant value in the model summary is the Adjusted R Square. This value represents the percent of cases explained by a combination of all of the independent variables used. The Adjusted R Square for the model is .124, indicating that 12.4% of the cases in the dataset can be predicted by the model used. This number seems low, and can be explained by the low number
of valid cases (111), or cases for which data on all 16 variables is present. This number can be improved by dropping from consideration variables that do not prove to have a significant relationship with LIKING FOR CHINA. Increasing the number of valid cases will also improve the Adjusted R Square.\textsuperscript{43}

Table 4, includes three important statistics that must be addressed. Under the “Unstandardized Coefficients” column, value B indicates the effect that each individual variable has on LIKING FOR CHINA when controlled for all of the additional variables in the model. If B is a positive number, there is a positive correlation between the independent variable and LIKING FOR CHINA. A negative B represents a negative correlation between the independent variable and LIKING FOR CHINA. As Table 4 indicates, there is a positive correlation between LIKING FOR CHINA and HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, AGE OF RESPONDENT, RESPONDENTS INCOME, REGION OF INTERVIEW, FOREIGN AID, and MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE. There is a negative correlation between LIKING FOR CHINA and RESPONDENTS SEX, POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION, WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY, FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM, RACE OF RESPONDENT, IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, R SELF-EMPLOYED OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY, MARTIAL STATUS, and ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS FOR ANY REASON.

\textsuperscript{43} A secondary model was developed by dropping all independent variables that did not include at least 1000 cases. The number of valid cases was increased to 771. A multiple regression analysis of the secondary model yielded results consistent with those of the original model. Information regarding the secondary model is included in Tables 4, 5, and 6 in Appendix 1. Table 7 includes results from both models.
The Standardized Coefficients, or Beta, in Table 3 represents "the measure of determination that estimates the direction and strength of [the] relationship."\(^{44}\) The analysis shows that a respondent’s race has the strongest effect on his or her perception of China, followed by his or her feelings about communism, then his or her feelings about defense expenditures, respondent’s marital status, respondent’s income, and so on. The \(p\) value represents the significance of the relationship, the larger the \(p\) value the less significant the relationship, and vice versa. The analysis proves that an individual’s feelings about communism are a significant predictor of an individual’s perception of China, along with his or her race, and his or her feelings about defense expenditures.

V. Discussion of Results

The relationships between LIKING FOR CHINA and ten of the independent variables were predicted correctly. HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED has a positive effect on LIKING FOR CHINA; the higher the respondent’s level of education, the more likely that individual is to perceive China in a positive light. Variable RESPONDENTS SEX has a positive effect on LIKING FOR CHINA; a female is more likely to perceive China negatively, while a man is more likely to hold a positive perception of China. POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION was found to have a negative effect on LIKING FOR CHINA; an individual who holds political views closely associated with the Democratic party

is more likely to hold a positive perception of China, while an individual who
associates himself more closely with the Republican party is more likely to report
a negative perception of China. There is a positive correlation between variable
RESPONDENTS INCOME and LIKING FOR CHINA; the higher an individual’s
income, the more likely that individual is to report of positive perception of China.
Variable REGION OF INTERVIEW was also found to have a positive effect on
LIKING FOR CHINA; respondents who completed the survey in the western
United States were more likely to hold a positive view of China than those
respondents who took the interview in the eastern United States.

MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE proved to have a positive
effect on LIKING FOR CHINA; if an individual felt that defense spending was “too
little,” he or she was more likely to have a negative perception of China, while
those who considered defense spending “too much” were likely to hold a positive
opinion of China. It is important to note that MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND
DEFENSE was the third strongest and a significant predictor of an individual’s
perception of China. The variable IMPROVING AND PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT has a negative effect on China; an individual who believes that
the federal government spends “too much” on improving and protecting the
environment is more likely to hold a positive image of China than those who
believe that the government spends “too little” on the environment. There was a
negative correlation between MARTIAL STATUS and LIKING FOR CHINA;
marrined individuals are more likely to hold a negative perception of China than
unmarried individuals. The same is true for ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS
FOR ANY REASON, which also has a negative effect on LIKING FOR CHINA; an individual who is more accepting of abortion is more likely to report a positive opinion of China than is an individual who is against abortion under any circumstances.

It was difficult to make a prediction about the effect that AGE OF RESPONDENT has on LIKING FOR CHINA. It was, however, determined that the analysis should yield a positive correlation. This prediction proved to be correct. That is, the older an individual, the more likely he or she is to have a positive opinion of China, while younger individuals are more likely to hold a negative opinion of China. As stated before, I believe this relationship can be explained by the individual’s exposure to major events in Sino-American relations over his or her lifetime. A younger individual would probably recall the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident as the primary event concerning China in his or her lifetime. This incident involved graphic images of young "students in the midst of a hunger strike, the ‘Goddess of Democracy,’ the unidentified solitary man facing off a tank, and the harrowing nighttime scenes of tanks racing though the crowd as the crackdown preceded."  

The images must have served to portray an oppressive regime cracking down on the relatively young protesters. To older individuals, this event, however horrific, was a single event among a lifetime of volatile Sino-American relations. These individuals may have recalled images of Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong laughing together, or Ronald Reagan toasting Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. Respondents with the luxury of drawing

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from a lifetime of images of China may have been more likely to rate their perception of China as more positive than younger individuals, realizing that the China that was broadcast around the world during the Tiananmen Square incident was not the only China that has existed over the past century.

Even more interesting, are those variables whose actual relationship with LIKING FOR CHINA proved to be the opposite of that predicted. One such variable was R SELF-EMPLOYED OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY. This relationship proved to have a negative effect on the dependent variable. That is, an individual who is self-employed is more likely to have a positive perception of China, while an individual who works for somebody is more likely to have a negative image of China. As predicted earlier, this effect could be the result of China’s WTO accession negotiations. The effect of the rhetoric surrounding these talks, however, must have had a much more profound effect on America’s blue-collar workforce than on its small business owners. According to David M. Lampton, “there is a deep-seated belief [in America] that trade liberalization has worked against America’s working men and women, particularly those in industrial and unionized jobs.”46 In the two decades between 1970 and 1990, U.S. employment in manufacturing had dropped by 300,000.47 Most of those jobs were lost to countries whose wage levels were at most one-half of those in the United States.48 With political candidates often using this information as a major platform issue, and promising to bring jobs back home, it is not surprising that America’s laborers were skeptical of China’s accession into the WTO. The

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
belief that American jobs are being lost to China may serve to explain the generally negative perception of China held by those who work for somebody else.

Another relationship that I failed to predict correctly was the positive effect that variable FOREIGN AID has on LIKING FOR CHINA. The results show that those who rated American spending on foreign aid as “too much” were more likely to have a positive perception of China than those who rated foreign aid spending as “too little.” One possible explanation for this effect is that those who believe that too much is spent on foreign aid may also have a positive perception of many of the countries of the world. This may cause the individual to believe that foreign aid from the U.S. is unwarranted. If an individual holds generally positive opinions about most other countries of the world, he or she may believe that money being spent on foreign aid could be more wisely spent domestically. If, for example, one has generally high opinions of China, he may feel that the country really does not need aid from the United States.

The next three relationships came as somewhat of a surprise to me. They include variables WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY, FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM, and RACE OF RESPONDENT. Variable WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY was found to have a negative effect on LIKING FOR CHINA. That is, those respondents who were not born in the United States were more likely to have a negative perception of China than those respondents who were born in the United States. This may be the result of the growing disparity between conditions in the United States and those in developing countries. Average
wages are higher in the United States than in the developing world, while average hours worked per week are lower. Consumer goods are also much more readily available in the United States. This disparity has caused many individuals to immigrate to the United States from developing countries around the world. Indeed many of the survey's respondents who identified themselves as not being born in the U.S. may have been immigrants who came from the developing countries of the world in search of employment opportunities, education, or a better life in general. Upon being asked to rate their feelings about China, a country which has declared itself the leader of the world's developing nations, these immigrants may associate China with the difficult conditions that they left behind in their native countries, thereby recalling negative feelings and rating their opinion of China as low.

Variable FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM was also found to have a negative effect on LIKING FOR CHINA. According to the analysis of the data, those respondents who feel that communism is a good form of government are more likely to rate themselves as having a negative opinion of China, while those individuals who feel that communism is a poor form of government, are likely to have a positive opinion of China. This effect is not only contrary to the dictates of common sense, but it has also proven to be significant and the second strongest of all the effects studied. The relationship between FEELINGS ABOUT

COMMUNISM and LIKING FOR CHINA proved difficult to understand. In an attempt to explain the data I offer the following hypothesis.

In searching for an explanation for this relationship, I was forced to assume that those who rated communism as a positive form of government were referring to communism in its purest form. This is the communism that Karl Marx was referring to when he said “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”

Communism as an ideology is very different from the political and economic structures that exist in today’s few remaining socialist countries. Paul M. Johnson of Auburn University describes communism, as being “based on the communal ownership of all property and a classless social structure, with economic production and distribution to be directed and regulated by means of an authoritative economic plan that supposedly embodies the interests of the community as a whole.”

It was predicted by Marx, that communism would “rapidly lead to the elimination of...major social problems such as class conflict, political oppression, racial discrimination, the inequality of the sexes, religious bigotry, and cultural backwardness – as well as put an end to such more ‘psychological’ forms of suffering as alienation, anomie, and feelings of powerlessness.”

When considered ideologically, it is not surprising that believers in communism would be disappointed with the communist government of the People’s Republic of China, for it is far from the utopia that Karl Marx dreamed could exist in a classless society. Steven W. Mosher explains the

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51 Johnson, “Communism.”
52 Ibid.
paradox between communist ideology and reality in China when he discusses the "central myth of communism." According to communist doctrine, "the leaders of the party ('the vanguard of the proletariat') are temporarily exercising dictatorial power on behalf of 'the masses' for only as long as it takes for the state to 'wither away.'" According to Mosher, this myth disguises "the reality of a despotic state that derived its power not from the just consent of the governed, but from force or threat of force." Those who approve of communism as an idealistic type of government will no doubt find fault in China's communist leaders. When stories of corruption among China's massive party bureaucracy abound, it is little wonder that respondents who believe in the ideals that communism represents would rate their liking for China as low.

The effect that a respondent's race has on his or her liking for China is equally as surprising as that of the individual's feelings about communism. Variable RACE OF RESPONDENT was found to have a negative effect on LIKING FOR CHINA. To make the data more manageable, respondent's answers to this question were recoded into one of two categories, either "white" or "black and other." With the recoding, "is respondent white" would probably have served as a better name for this variable. The negative correlation revealed by the analysis tells us that a white respondent is more likely to have a positive opinion of China than respondents who identified themselves as "black or other." This effect was contrary to my original predictions. Moreover, variable RACE OF RESPONDENT proved to be significant and the strongest predictor of an

53 See Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality, pp. 103-104.
54 Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality, pp. 103-104.
individual's perception of China. What possible explanation for this effect could there be? I believe that this relationship is the result of the lingering belief held by many Americans that the Chinese are a people in need of saving. This is an idea which began in the 1830s when "American Protestant missionaries intent on converting the Chinese to Christianity joined in the Western penetration of Asia already spearheaded by Europeans." These missionaries judged the Chinese civilization as stagnant and immoral yet reformable."

Steven W. Mosher believes that the "special responsibility that America had come to feel for the well-being of the Chinese" was especially prevalent in the Open Door policy of 1900, an attempt by the United States to "guarantee China's freedom and independence" from imperialist powers "intent upon dismembering the ancient empire." This feeling of responsibility for China manifested itself many times throughout the history of Sino-American relations. One notable period was during the mass famine in China during the 1960s. A majority of Americans polled in 1961 and again in 1962 were in favor of sending surplus food to the country despite a generally hostile attitude toward communist China and its leaders. Even today, the United States continually supports the release of jailed Chinese political dissidents, going so far as to house them in the American Embassy in the case of Fang Lizhi. This pattern of American sympathy supports Ben Calmes' assertion that many Americans retain a missionary view of China, "that of backward land of hardworking friendly

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57 Ibid.
peasants, oppressed by ruthless rulers, and desperately in need of American values."\textsuperscript{60} This image of China sounds remarkably similar to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Western imperialist power's sense of obligation regarding its relationship with the "uncivilized world," a sense of obligation that drove Rudyard Kipling to write his poem "The White Man's Burden."\textsuperscript{61} Could it be that this sense of obligation to deliver the Chinese from their communist oppressors, however latent, may have caused Americans of European ancestry to be more likely to rate themselves as having a positive opinion of China than other Americans?

\section*{VI. Conclusions}

Throughout a relationship spanning three centuries, America's experience with China can be easily characterized by the popular cliché "change is the only constant." The American perception of China has tended to vacillate between periods of positive and negative feelings, including periods of ignorance, friendship, distrust, and at times hostility. The statistical analysis of the available data regarding the respondent's perception of China and other social statistics characteristic of that respondent has shown that race is the strongest predictor of an individual's liking for China. According to a multiple regression analysis of the data compiled after a 1991 General Social Survey conducted by NORC, white Americans are more likely to report a favorable opinion of China than Americans who are not of European ancestry. I attribute this effect to the continued missionary view of China held by many white Americans today. This view has

\textsuperscript{60} Ben Calmes, "American Perceptions of China Or What You Won't Learn By Spying," \textit{Sinomania!} [online].

adapted over time to reconcile itself with changing American foreign policy agendas. While the Protestant missionaries who ventured to China in the 19th century believed that conversion to Christianity was the only means by which the Chinese could deliver themselves from ignorance and oppression, today’s missionaries (foreign policy makers) believe that deliverance can be achieved by China’s conversion from a communist state to a capitalist democracy.

Regardless of the century, the underlying assumption is the same; that we, as Americans, are both capable and destined to rescue the Chinese from their own ignorance. It seems that, despite the evidence of a constantly fluctuating popular opinion of China, there has been little fundamental change in the way that the American individual, and white westerners in general, view China.
### Appendix 1: Tables

#### 1: Descriptive Statistics (Primary Model)

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Valid N (listwise) 111

#### 2: Model Summary (Primary Model)

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<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
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| .494     | .244              | .124                       | 2.11

Factors: (Constant), ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS FOR ANY REASON, DUMRACE, IMPROVING & PROTECTING ENVIRONMENT, WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY, MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE, LOWHIGH, R SELF-EMP OR FOR SOMEBODY, FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNISM, AGE OF RESPONDENT, EASTWEST, RESPONDENTS SEX, P, HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, FOREIGN AID, DUMMARRY
### 3: Coefficients (Primary Model)

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**Predictor Variable:** LIKING FOR CHINA

### 4: Descriptive Statistics (Secondary Model)

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**Note:** The descriptive statistics table provides a summary of the distribution of each variable, including the number of cases (N), range, minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, and variance.
### e 5: Model Summary (Secondary Model)

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Predictors: (Constant), R SELF-EMP OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY, DUMRACE, EASTWEST, AGE OF RESPONDENT, REP, RESPONDENTS SEX, WAS R BORN IN THIS COUNTRY, DUMMARRY

### e 6: Coefficients (Secondary Model)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
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*Dependent Variable: LIKING FOR CHINA*
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The dependent variable is LIKING FOR CHINA.

* p < .05; ** p < .01

Errors in parentheses are standard errors.
Appendix 2: Graphs

Graph 1

LIKING FOR CHINA

Graph 2

AGE OF RESPONDENT
Graph 13

MILITARY, ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE

Graph 14

IMPROVING & PROTECTING ENVIRONMENT
Graph 15

R SELF-EMP OR WORKS FOR SOMEBODY

Std. Dev = .31
Mean = 1.89
N = 1415.00

Graph 16

ABORTION IF WOMAN WANTS FOR ANY REASON

Std. Dev = .49
Mean = 1.57
N = 951.00
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