The Genocide in Rwanda: the Controversy over the United Nations Response

Jennifer Treuhaft
St. John Fisher College

Recommended Citation

Please note that the Recommended Citation provides general citation information and may not be appropriate for your discipline. To receive help in creating a citation based on your discipline, please visit http://libguides.sjfc.edu/citations.

This document is posted at http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/intlstudies_masters/10 and is brought to you for free and open access by Fisher Digital Publications at St. John Fisher College. For more information, please contact fisherpub@sjfc.edu.
The Genocide in Rwanda: the Controversy over the United Nations Response

Abstract
In 1994, close to one million people were killed in a planned and systematic genocide in Rwanda. Many writers have argued that the attacks were an effort to eliminate the Tutsi population by the ruling elite. The argument asserts that the United Nations refrained from intervening to stop the Rwandan genocide out of considered self-interest. While the Rwandan genocide occurred due to the ruling elite's political manipulations, the international community and the United Nations failure to address the socio-economic concerns over the struggle for power and wealth stemming back to the colonial era, paved the way for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Document Type
Thesis

Degree Name
M.S. in International Studies

Department
International Studies

This thesis is available at Fisher Digital Publications: http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/intlstudies_masters/10
St. John Fisher College

The Genocide in Rwanda: the Controversy over the United Nations

Response

A Master's Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of the Master of Science in International Studies Program

In Candidacy for the Degree of

Master of Science in International Studies

By

Jennifer Treuhaft

Dr. John Roche, Advisor

Dr. David MacGregor, Second Reader

Dr. John Roche, Program Director

Rochester, New York, the United States of America

August 18, 2008
Abstract

In 1994, close to one million people were killed in a planned and systematic genocide in Rwanda. Many writers have argued that the attacks were an effort to eliminate the Tutsi population by the ruling elite. The argument asserts that the United Nations refrained from intervening to stop the Rwandan genocide out of considered self-interest. While the Rwandan genocide occurred due to the ruling elite's political manipulations, the international community and the United Nations failure to address the socio-economic concerns over the struggle for power and wealth stemming back to the colonial era, paved the way for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
Table of Contents

1. Introduction: The Overwhelming Reality of the Genocide 4
2. The History of Rwanda
   2.1 Pre-Colonial Era and the Ubufake System 6
   2.2 Colonial Era and Independence 8
4. The Role of the International Community and the United Nations: Why Didn’t They Intervene and Are They to Blame? 18
5. Conclusion: Crises Response
   5.1 Evoking the Genocide Convention 24
   5.2 Rebuilding Rwanda 27

Appendix – Rwanda Chronology 29

Bibliography 37
Introduction: The Overwhelming Reality of the Genocide

This paper is comprised of the main themes and issues leading up to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. My evaluation begins with a historical overview of the crisis. This is followed by an analysis of the early warning signs. I then discuss attempts by the international community and United Nations to try and contain the conflicts in Rwanda.

In 1994, close to one million people were killed in a planned and systematic genocide in Rwanda. How did this slaughter occur? Who was responsible? Why did the international community fail to respond? The violence was directed towards Tutsis and moderate Hutus by a group of Hutu extremists known as Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi during the spring of 1994. The percentage of the Rwandan people that were killed in one day by genocide exceeded by at least a factor of ten the percentage of the United States population killed throughout the entire Vietnam War.1 The attacks were an effort to eliminate the Tutsi population of Rwanda that led to a massive killing spree that meets the definition of genocide articulated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.

The dynamic nature, unpredictability and complexity of the Rwanda crisis raise many issues for the international community in terms of timing, nature and scale of response. Was the onset of the genocide due to the ethnic hatred between the two groups fighting for power and wealth? A well laid plan of ethnic cleansing? The social class status, or over land and economic shocks? Was it ancient tribal feuds, which is what

---

many reporters believed?² Many people view what happened in Rwanda as a result of Ethnic hatred, others see it as a consequence to what can happen from bad politics. Are colonial and neo-imperialist manipulations to blame, the socio-economic hardships, or the international communities for not intervening before the killings turned into a massacre?

In one hundred days beginning in the spring of 1994, nearly one million Rwandans were murdered. Bodies piled up in the streets. At first it was difficult for the rest of the world to understand what was taking place. The history of this African nation involved a recurrent civil war which cautioned other nations from intervening. When nations began to realize these killings were not just due to civil war bloodshed, debates raged in the United States, France, the United Nations on how the International Community should respond to something other than civil war. Why did the international community and the United Nations allow these acts to continue? The answer is complex and raises many questions. What did the world know, when did they know it? What were the legal and ethical issues that impacted the world with its decision not to intervene? The world’s response to the events in Rwanda and the calamity that followed focused on the definition of a single term: genocide. While the Rwandan genocide occurred because of the ruling elite’s political manipulations, the international community and the United Nation’s failure to address the socio-economic concerns over the struggle for power and wealth stemming back to the colonial era, paved the way for the 1994 genocide.

2.1 Pre-Colonial Era and the Ubuhake System

The Kingdom of Rwanda, controlled by a Tutsi royal family, ruled the region throughout history. Rwanda is between the larger African nations of Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania. The population consists of Tutsi (roughly 14%), Hutu (roughly 85%) and Twa (roughly 1%). Most historians agree that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers and forest-dwellers, whose modern-day descendants are the Twa, today's small minority who have inhabited the country from as early as 2,000 B.C. Besides hunting, they practiced pottery and basketwork. Around 1,000 A.D., a migration of farmers, Hutu, began to displace them. This migration was part of the so-called Bantu expansion, which, in the case of Rwanda, can be followed from the savannas of present Cameroon to the Great Lakes area.³

By the 15th century, many Hutu were organized into "statelets". Each of them was controlled by a dominant clan and composed of several different lineages under a ruling lineage (which over time became dynastic) headed by a mwami (chief or king), who was a land chief as well as a ritual leader in charge of rain-making.⁴ There is evidence that some lineages had already acquired cattle at that time and that several states had emerged before the immigration of Tutsi (principally the Nyiginya clan). Two different phases of interaction between Hutu and Tutsi have been distinguished. The Tutsi immigration into Hutu areas is described as beginning with a gradual and peaceful infiltration. Cattle products were exchanged for agricultural products, forming the basis of social interaction. Peaceful co-existence, however, was usually followed by Tutsi

⁴ Ibid.
conquests, resulting in the establishment of direct Tutsi military rule and administration.⁵

This phase was followed by a process directed towards the control of the factors of production, involving gradual restriction of access to land, cattle and labor.⁶

Tutsi were assimilated by Hutu. They took over the language spoken by Hutu (Kinyarwanda) and incorporated Hutu traditions and cults. Moreover, they shared the same hills - there was no segregation of people - and they intermarried and bore the same names.⁷ In large part, during the pre-colonial period or before the 19th century, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa roughly corresponded to occupational categories. Cattle-herders, soldiers and administrators were mostly Tutsi, while Hutu were farmers. Twa were marginalized and often mistreated by the others. Hutu and Tutsi were less sharply distinct, and individuals could and did move between the categories as their fortunes rose or fell.

Though there is no doubt that the early Nyiginya Tutsi was dominant, a range of institutions mediated social relations, notably the clan system, which spanned the entire Rwandese society.

The first European travelers who reached central Rwanda noted a socio-economic and "ethnic" stratification between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Tutsi were described as distinct in terms of origin, economic activities, social status and physical appearance, although sharing the language, religion and settlement with Hutu. This description of Rwandese "ethnic groups" - partly based on indigenous mythology - was upheld and diffused by outsiders, colonial agents, ethnographers, anthropologists, historians and came to

⁵ Ibid.
⁷ Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970); and Rennie, "The Pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda."
represent the generalized Western view of the Rwandese people. It seems, however, that the people themselves identified each other rather according to clan affiliation. In a number of studies, David Newbury has shown that while the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" existed in pre-colonial times, they did not have the same significance as in the recent era, and the meaning of an "ethnic" identity varied from place to place and over time. There was no single universal definition of ethnic identity, valid for all regions at one time.⁸

2.2 Colonial Era and Independence

From 1897 to 1916, Rwanda, a population of roughly seven million was under German colonial rule, and from 1916-1962 under Belgian colonialism. The country was declared a republic on January 28, 1961, and it became independent on July 1, 1962.

When, in 1916, Belgium occupied Ruanda-Urundi as a result of the World War I East African campaign against Germany, the two kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi had only been marginally administered from Berlin since 1899. In 1914 there were just six German civil servants in Burundi and five in Rwanda, i.e. a total of eleven officials for a territory twice the size of Belgium. Having discovered that the existing mwami kingdoms already functioned as fully-fledged nations before the arrival of the Europeans and also, undoubtedly, because of a shortage of colonial personnel, the Germans decided from the very beginning to favor a policy of indirect rule. This meant that full use was to be made of the existing political system, which was much stronger and more centralized in Rwanda than in Burundi. Belgian colonists arrived in 1916; their development of a colonial system of rule has proven to be a critical moment in laying the groundwork for
decades of civil tension and conflict in Rwanda. The Belgian colonists separated the two groups; they produced identity cards classifying people according to their ethnicity. The Belgians considered the Tutsis as superior to the Hutus. For twenty years, the Tutsis had better jobs and educational opportunities than the Hutus. The social status and relationships between the two ethnic groups is very complex, and one side has always been the dominant factor. After World War II, the Belgian colonial administration in Rwanda was placed under United Nations trusteeship, and was expected to prepare Rwanda for independence. The Belgian administrative structure had no choice but to disburse jobs, for the development of the economy through schools and churches, to Hutus. The change in the dominant social class forced competition between the two groups, now the Tutsi and the elite Hutu. Violence began when the members of the dominant Tutsi party known as the Union National Rwandese (UNAR), planned on wiping out the members of the Hutu elite, out of fear that the Hutu elite would soon become the dominant party. Everything collapsed when the Belgian administrators would not support the plan for eliminating the Hutu elite. The Belgian administration felt that it was in their best interest to now support and transfer allegiance to the growing power of the Hutus. This laid the groundwork for the Belgians pulling out and the elections that brought the Hutu nationalist Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) to power in 1959.10

In sum, the monopolization of power in the hands of Tutsi constituted a crucial and undisputed factor in firmly establishing ("structuring") the ethnic cleavage. This colonial intervention caused the groups to become distinct political categories. In a

9 See Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p. 18.
10 Ibid., p. 20.
certain sense, we have here an instance of ethno genesis, which in the case of Rwanda would inevitably lead to a reaction on the part of Hutu that they had been excluded from power. Tutsi discourse has drawn inordinate conclusions from the alleged ethno genesis by claiming that, before the arrival of the Europeans, the people of Rwanda (and Burundi) were quite homogeneous and that, through their policy of divide-and-rule, the colonial authorities deliberately introduced ethnic cleavages. Yet the ethnic groups existed before colonialism. Colonial policies were merely grafted onto a foundation that already contained a potential for conflict.\footnote{Newbury, “The Path of Genocide,” pp.202-204.} From the mid-1950s, political demands in Rwanda were formulated in ethnic terms. The opposing theses were expressed, rather stereotypically, in three main documents: on the one hand, the Bahutu Manifesto of March 24, 1957 and, on the other, two letters by the great Tutsi chiefs. Putting the ethnic problem in a social context, the Bahutu Manifesto demanded Hutu emancipation as well as democratization.

The revolution of 1959-1961, with the support of the Belgian administration, led to the abolition of the monarchy and to the removal of all political and administrative Tutsi structures on which, for decades, Belgium had based its policy of indirect rule. The peasants’ (or Hutu) revolt was largely provoked by the intransigence of a conservative political and administrative elite, which flatly refused any democratization, demanded not only by an emerging Hutu elite, but also by a Tutsi counter-elite, far more progressive than the one in power. Though, initially, the number of victims was rather small, the attempts on the part of the Tutsi-led traditional power-elite to maintain authoritarian rule led to violent clashes. The Belgians supported the revolt. The abolition of the monarchy
and the rise of the Hutu elite became definitive in September 1961 when, at a referendum, 80% of the electorate voted in favor of a republic. At the same time, the results of the parliamentary elections showed a correspondingly clear victory for the Hutu-dominated parties. The PARMEHUTU began a program of changing the power to the Hutu majority, while the Tutsi had been the favorites of the colonial powers, the perception began to shift along with violence that killed an estimated 20,000 Tutsi and 200,000 fled to other countries. Violence continued in and around Rwanda even after Rwanda’s independence and the PARMEHUTU established a one-party rule based upon Hutu nationalism. In 1973, a Hutu Juvenal Habyarimana gained control and ousted PARMEHUTU, but had kept the concept of Hutu nationalism. Under Habyarimana’s control, the state of Rwanda was also called akazu. This is a critical factor in the political movement between ethnic groups leading to genocide.

It was toward the end of the 19th century, that the Hutu/Tutsi distinction clearly began to appear as a political distinction that divided the subject population from those identified with power. Yet, when contrasted with Belgian rule, which was soon to follow, one is struck by two mitigating features. First, the Hutu continued to be present at lower levels of officialdom. Second, the boundary between Hutu and Tutsi was softened by a degree of social mobility; no matter how low its quantitative significance, this would prove to be a fact of great social and ideological importance. If Hutu/Tutsi evoked the subject-power distinction in the pre-colonial Rwandan state, the colonial state gave it an added dimension: by radicalizing Hutu and Tutsi as identities, it signified the distinction as one between indigenous and alien. By making the Tutsi and Hutu identities of colonial power and colonial subjugation – and not just local power relations – colonialism made them more volatile than ever in history.\textsuperscript{12}

Status, rather than ethnicity, defined a person's social ranking and privileges in Rwanda. As a result, some ethnic Hutus had Tutsi status and held positions of power within the Rwandan hierarchy. The hierarchy was founded on wealth and status, not one's ethnicity, because status was based on ownership of cattle, who were usually Tutsi. Tutsi typically owned most of the land and held higher positions in society. Rwanda's system allowed for upward mobility, a Hutu could become Tutsi status if they were able to obtain cattle, and then land. If a person had Hutu ethnicity but the social status of a Tutsi, they were considered a Tutsi. Tutsi were considered Hutu if they did not own enough cattle. These stereotypes were formed from the Belgian colonial administrators who "viewed Rwandan's through a lens of ethnic and racial stereotypes."\(^\text{13}\) The evolution of ethnicity and the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi is a central factor of Rwandan history and was an important factor for the genocide. The tension between the two groups was a direct conflict of social and political power struggles.\(^\text{14}\) The media fed the minds of the world that the ethnic political problems were due to "tribal violence."\(^\text{15}\) The reports were wrong, the genocide was not due to tribal violence and ethnic hatred, but involved political issues including, economic recession and restructuring, population growth, growth of self-interested elites and power, civil war, and democratization.\(^\text{16}\) The genocide was orchestrated through political manipulation. Regional political dynamics over power and money and land led up to the genocide. The media developed a racist propaganda which gave way for the genocide by manipulating the people of Rwanda and

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., p. 17.
\(^\text{15}\) Villia Jefremovas, *Brickyards to Graveyards: From Production to Genocide in Rwanda*, p.109.
\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., p. 109.
causing the uproar of the Tutsi’s being the enemy and instilling fear. The strict differentiation along ethnic lines developed only after the arrival of the Belgian colonialists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The differentiation caused animosity over social and political interest between Hutu and Tutsi.

The revolution of 1959 was a Hutu-led political movement ending their subordination, but the political movements were not about equality, but about “replacing one system of domination with another.”\(^1\)\(^7\) The Hutu excluded all Tutsi from political order, as the Belgians excluded the Hutu from political order. “The genocide was orchestrated by radical Hutu elites at the center of government, calling it “Hutu Power,” that had close ties to President Habyarimana, the army, the police, the party structure, and the mass media."\(^1\)\(^8\) They instilled hatred and fear to keep them in power. Genocide made it possible for the Hutu to remain in power and implant their policies.\(^1\)\(^9\)

The Armenian genocide occurred in WWI, the Holocaust in the midst of WWII, the Cambodian genocide in the war over Indochina, and the Rwandan genocide was a product both of the revolution of 1959 and the war against the RPF that the revolution spawned. These four instances, the revolutionary regime was governed by an ideology that identified certain groups as the enemies of society, it was at war with foreign and domestic enemies.

Robert Gellately does not suggest that all revolutions lead to genocide, or that all genocides are the products of revolution, but they can promote genocide.\(^2\)\(^0\)

\(^1\)\(^8\) Ibid., p. 333.
\(^1\)\(^9\) Ibid., p. 335.
\(^2\)\(^0\) Ibid., pp. 336-337.
Faced with expressions of discontent, especially on the part of politicians and military from the north, the government eventually tried to resort to "ethnic" tactics. In 1973, violence - initially of an ethnic nature - erupted in schools, in the administration and in business enterprises. Psychologically, these developments were certainly influenced and facilitated by the bloody events of 1972 in Burundi, where Hutu were the victims of genocidal killings. It remains to be emphasized, though, that the impulse aimed at expelling Tutsi found its origin within the centre of power, which tried to detract attention from other issues.\(^{21}\) However, the politicians lost sight of the dynamism such a policy could provoke in a situation where complete control became rather precarious. Thus, the population began to attack the rich (and not only Tutsi); Hutu of the north began to chase those of the central region; politicians of the north shifted their attention from the schools - where everything started - to the ministries and the enterprises where they felt underrated or ostracized. As certain politicians from the north, especially the National Defense Minister, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, felt in danger of being physically eliminated, he finally decided on army intervention; an army in which, historically, the north had always been dominant. In 1972, the southern Hutu regime was overthrown in a military coup which was led by Major General Juvenal Habyarimana. This new elite consolidated its power over the government, military and economy for the next 20 years. Tutsi were permitted to engage in business activities that profited the new Hutu elite. Ethnic harmony began, but tension shifted between Southern and Northern Hutus.

July 1973 marked the beginning of the Second Republic under President Habyarimana. “The Second Republic claimed to complete the “national” revolution of

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 133.
the 1959 through a “moral” revolution.” The key change from the First to the Second Republic – a shift in the political identity of the Tutsi from a race to an ethnic group.”

Hutu Power was the rallying cry of the 1959 Revolution and those opposite to President Juvenal Habyarimana’s line of “ethnic reconciliation” between the Hutu and the Tutsi. In many respects, the Second Republic contrasted sharply with the First. There was a period of distinct modernization, manifesting itself in an opening towards the outside world, in urban growth, in investment, and also in business. Whereas the regime of the First Republic was turned inwards, that of the Second Republic adhered to a policy of opening up the country.

Conflict and tension never ceased in Rwanda. In 1985, the Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed under Paul Kagame. After the drought in 1989, Rwanda entered a hard economic period, fighting began in 1990 with President and the RPF. After 2 years, the President agreed to international negotiation because the RPF threatened with international sanctions. With the onset of civil war, the RPF saw an opportunity in their own country to demand recognition of their rights as Rwandans, including the right to return to Rwanda. The RPF invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990, this was the onset of civil war, blaming the Rwandan government for failing to democratize and fix the problems that the Tutsi refugees faced around the world. The Rwanda government saw this invasion as an attempt to bring the Tutsi ethnic group back into power. Ethnic tensions between the Tutsi and Hutu increased again along with fear, hatred and violence over Rwandan political and power structures. Radical Hutu groups began building their weapons and conducted training programs years before the

22 Ibid., p. 138.
extermination began. This group was organized and funded by the government and they formed and armed militias called Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. This is evidence that the killings were well organized.

Rwanda has long been one of the world’s poorest nations. Lack of natural resources and years of poverty, along with the deeply engrained hierarchy system, can cause some groups fueled by desperation to engage in violence. Disputes over land are reported to have been a major factor for Rwandans to hate each other. Land scarcity, diminishing food production, and reduction in jobs caused economic hardship and intense rivalry among Rwandans. The economic conditions in Rwanda also added more constraints between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The political problems in Rwanda turned into economic and social problems. These problems were not separate spheres, nor can they be separated when explaining conflicts in Rwanda. The political conflicts were resting on the wealth and power one ethnic group maintained. Class status and the economic conditions played a role and set a stage for Hutu extremists to use as a political tool. They used deliberate strategies to impoverish groups of people, to promote discrimination, and fear in order to obtain political control. When Rwanda’s own Hutu president, Juvenal Habyarimana, was assassinated and then the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana was murdered, the Hutu people felt their only choice was servitude or to take power. Rwanda has always shown that there will never come a day where power sharing between Hutu and Tutsi can exist. Habyarimana and Uwilingiyimana were the two political figures that were the only possibility of “ethnic reconciliation”. Their

---

23 See Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p.31.
24 See Bodnarchuk, Rwanda, p. 27.
25 See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p.197.
murders shaped the political manipulation which led to the belief that the only way to keep the power was violence, which led to the 1994 genocide.

What happened in Rwanda?

In January 1994, Rwandan-based United Nations (UN) General Romeo Dallaire, leader of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), informed the UN headquarters in New York that Hutu’s were planning to massacre thousands of Tutsi’s and make it look like a civil war. General Dallaire sent warning to UN headquarters warning that violence was impending and asked for reinforcements immediately. The UN Secretary General, the Security Council, and the international community denied his request. He requested help and advised the UN and the international community as to what was really going on in Rwanda, it was beyond civil war. The UN could have controlled some of the violence, with all of the information and resources that were available, the UN Peace-keeping mission could have sent more military, and expanded the efforts.²⁶

On 6 April 1994, a jet carrying the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu President of Burundi, was shot down. Both Presidents were killed when the plane crashed. Within hours of the attack, a campaign of violence and slaughter of Tutsis and moderate Hutus began spreading throughout the country. On April 6 and 7, the Rwandan Armed Forces and Colonel Bagosora had a falling out with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda over the legal authority of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. In broad daylight, Uwilingiyimana was assassinated by the presidential guard and the Belgian soldiers of the United Nations Assistance Mission

for Rwanda were tortured to death. Then began the rounding up and killing of all Tutsis, even the moderate Hutus despite their ethnic backgrounds.

Many nations evacuated their nationals and closed their embassies as the violence escalated each day in Kigali, Rwanda's capital. National radio warned people to stay in their homes. The killings spread from Kigali throughout the whole country as roadblocks were set in place by the militia. Ordinary citizens were ordered by local officials and the government to kill their neighbors; if they refused they would be killed themselves. The militia members mostly killed their victims by chopping them up with machetes just to save bullets; this was after being raped, and tortured. In June of 1994, an estimated 3000 Tutsis sought refuge in a Catholic Church in Kivumu. Local Interahamwe used bulldozers to knock down the church while people were still inside. The plan was to kill every Tutsi without exception. The Rwandan genocide is the greatest humanitarian crisis of this generation. Why did the UN refuse to send help to Rwanda? Could the massacres have been prevented?

The International Community and the United Nations: Why Didn’t They Intervene and Are They to Blame?

The United Nations Organization (UNO) is the world's second attempt in creating a world government to ensure world peace, based on sound economic, social and political foundations. After the League of Nations, the UN became a continued version with stronger executive powers that were assigned to the Security Council. Member states were required to make armed forces available as peacekeepers to maintain economic and social order. Like the League of Nations, the UN member’s obligations are limited, the organization has no means of enforcing its decisions and determination of obligations is

---

27 See Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p.1.
left to the members themselves. The UN has been active in international relations since 1945 and has been innovative in preventative diplomacy and peace-keeping missions. However, when dealing with security issues, the UN has a mixed record. After the Korean War, the security principle on which the Organization was founded became under pressure of superpower rivalry in reference to the security concept of peace-keeping. Since 1991, the Organization’s successes lie within non-political, non-security aspects. The UN system has proved more effective in dealing with low-profile functional issues than with the questions of preservation of peace, which was the organization’s original objective. The United Nations Charter is basically a written constitution of the UN. It is also a multilateral treaty, which dealing with the issue of agreements, rights and duties, confers on its members the duty to uphold international law. The primary objectives in the Charter are to maintain international peace and security through peaceful settlement of disputes and collective security, to promote international economic and social cooperative, and to promote respect for human rights. Between 1991-1995, the UN was overwhelmed by active involvement in seemingly intractable intra-state conflicts, rather than the inter-state variety it was designed to deal with. Communal conflicts occurred in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Palestine, Mozambique, Burundi and Rwanda. In particular the debacle in Bosnia (where UN troops were taken hostage) and Somalia (where the UN withdrew ignominiously after US troops suffered casualties).

In Rwanda the international community’s diagnosis was based on civil war, not genocidal acts. 28 By the end of April there was acknowledgement from the UN that they should respond more forcefully to the conflict in Rwanda. The Secretary-General called on the Security Council to take a more forceful action. The Secretary-General was under

28 See Khan, Shallow Graves of Rwanda, p.196.
increasing pressure from African countries to demonstrate that the UN took its African constituency seriously and did not give preference to European crises.

There were significant signs that forces in Rwanda were preparing the climate and structures for genocide and political assassinations. However, people both in the region and the broader international community ignored, discounted or misinterpreted the significance of these signs, thereby indicating an unwillingness to intervene. Key actors in the international community thus certainly share responsibility for the fact that the genocide was allowed to begin. Moreover, as it began, through hesitations to respond in providing and equipping peacekeeping forces, the international community failed to stop or stem the genocide and in this regard shares responsibility for the extent of it. The essential failures of the response of the international community to the genocide were and continue to be political. Had appropriate political decisions been taken early on, much of the humanitarian action operation would not have been necessary. In effect, humanitarian action substituted for political action. The UN and the international community have been criticized for their reactions to the genocide in Rwanda. The information was there, months before the massacres began, the UNAMIR commanders warned the Rwandan government, United States and Belgian embassies that the Interahamwe were gathering weapons and planning to kill. The response was that “intervening was beyond its stated mission and might create unnecessary violence.”

UNAMIR provided aid but could not protect. UNAMIR was created before the genocide due to the civil unrest in Rwanda, but only with the idea that they would have to control civil unrest; genocide is a completely different situation that needed to be controlled. UNAMIR’s mandate was limited to monitoring the Arusha Accords, easing tensions, and

---

29 See Bodnarchuk, *Rwanda*, p. 69.
investigating and reporting human rights violations. Three years after the genocide reports in reference to the massacres were being confirmed, allegations as to why troops were not sent to protect, and why those that were to only provide peace-keeping were withdrawn, began creating questions of whether the Geneva Convention, article 3, the right to life, was violated. There is ample evidence that reports were sent asking for help in order to protect groups of people that had been targeted for extermination. The killing of civilians is a direct violation of international human rights law. A critical issue relating to Rwanda was the international community’s failure to make a distinction between genocide and civil war.\(^{31}\)

In recent years, civil wars have taken place across the world, in Somali, Liberia, Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sri Lanka. Genocide is not something that is seen regularly across the globe. After the breakdown of the Arusha Accord, violence was mounting. With all of the reports and warnings to the international community, what they failed to comprehend was that Rwanda was heading into civil war, but also entering into a state of genocide occurring simultaneously. International presence was placed in Rwanda for peace-keeping efforts before the genocide. The efforts were not to prevent genocide but to help prevent the conflicts that already existed with high hopes that the Arusha Accords would bring peace to the country.\(^{32}\) The Rwandan peace-keeping efforts failed, the operation was not strong enough to have prevented the genocide. Opinions vary as to whether the UN could have prevented the genocide. I agree with many authors that under the circumstances in Rwanda, it would have been impossible to

---

\(^{30}\) See Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p. 103.


\(^{32}\) See Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p. 2.
have prevented it. But if the UN used conflict dynamics and assessments when civil war in Rwanda broke out in the early stages the number of massacres could have been dramatically reduced. Conflict management and conflict prevention are different strategic issues that were misinterpreted in Rwanda. The UN and international communities can not be blamed for radical polarization of politics, they had good intentions to help the conflicts within Rwanda with peace agreements and negotiations, but when all agreements and negotiations went wrong and the operation failed, there was no stopping the genocide; the plans were already in motion. The UN and the international community are to blame for withdrawing the little help the Rwandan’s had and for not intervening quickly enough. In July 1994, the UN Security Council finally approved Operation Turquoise, but by then nearly one million people were slaughtered. The UN Security Council voted Resolution 929, which under the UN Charter gave the French the ability to intervene in Rwanda. The French government promoted the idea of an intervention force to create a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda. Operation Turquoise saved a small number of lives with this safety zone, and stabilized the situation for refugees fleeing Rwanda, but they also provided this safety zone for Hutu Interahamwe militia forces to infiltrate the refugee camps, and also permitted many of the Rwandan government and armed militias to escape across the border into Zaire. France had a very strong relationship with the President of Rwanda, Habyarimana. Indeed France was the key supplier of arms to the Hutu Habyarimana government. Belgium supported the Arusha Accord negotiations, and also helped contribute to the UNAMIR

33 See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p.213.
34 See Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p. 5.
36 See Bodnarchuk, Rwanda, p. 65.
37 See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 291-293.
mission, but when ten Belgian peace-keeping troops were protecting Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, all were murdered and all Belgian troops were withdrawn in early April 1994. As the world’s leading military power and one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United States was capable of supplying, funding and supporting troops in Rwanda. Instead the U.S. made the decision to reduce the UNAMIR troops. This decision was a major failure of the Clinton Administration.\(^{38}\)

When the Security Council voted to reduce the only protection that Rwandan civilians had, the UNAMIR force, the reduced the number from nearly 2,500 down to about 300 troops in April 1994.\(^{39}\) The failure of the UN Security Council to provide moral leadership led to thousands more deaths that could have been prevented if troops were not withdrawn and additional troops were sent at the request of General Dallaire to protect Rwandans. The genocide could not have been prevented, but rapid reaction to the early warning signs could have controlled the amount of killings of Rwandan civilians. The situation in Rwanda became complex, yet today it seems clear that what was happening in Rwanda was civil war leading to genocide. UNAMIR’s original mission was to oversee the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement, but at the time the genocide was happening, UNAMIR attempted to intervene, but the peace agreement was no longer apart of the mission. Any chance of a peace agreement was unthinkable and without the agreement, UNAMIR, under orders of the UN, were not allowed to use force. Many authors believe that the world knew what was happening, but chose to hide behind the consequences from Somalia, and other civil wars to provide an explanation of why

\(^{38}\) See Khan, *Shallow Graves of Rwanda*, pp.
\(^{39}\) See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 213.
they would not intervene. The world’s justification does not excuse their behavior. The genocide may never have been able to have been prevented, but when help was requested, troops for intervention should have been sent when civil war was already in place, and killings were being reported. The term genocide did not have to be used in order to intervene, civil war and the murder of innocent civilians is enough for intervention. The UN and the international community have a moral responsibility, a moral obligation to protect, not prevent, the destruction of life.

5.1 Conclusion: Crises Response: Evoking the Genocide Convention

Earlier in the century the UN was created to try and maintain international peace, and promote human rights and the fundamental freedoms. However, in so doing it failed to resolve the question of what responsibilities member states have regarding armed conflicts, civil wars, systematic human rights violations, mass killings and genocides that take place within the borders of sovereign states. Our international institutions have shown that they are unable to respond to genocidal conditions once unleashed, along with the fact that the international community of powerful states can be unwilling to respond once the costs of intervention are too high. If the U.N does not have the capacity or the will to respond, it cannot be left to the UN to develop effective solutions. I believe that it is imperative that the international community read the early warning signs of violence. The international community and the UN need to work together to shift to preventive strategies and avert genocidal conditions. The problems of receiving clear and unequivocal signals are found in four areas: contradictions in the international systems;

---

the UN structure; attitudes of senior officials towards messengers and inadequacies in the message sent; and interference.

Once genocidal attacks have been unleashed, it is virtually impossible to mediate, stop or transform them. We must develop an early warning system that allows us to mobilize international pressure when the first patterns of violence discrimination appear. In addition to responding quickly and with ‘powerful’ pressure to violations against human rights, we also need to be able to respond to emerging patterns of group violence. Governments are often directly responsible for sparking communal conflict or indirectly responsible for utilizing group identities as a means of wielding political control or political legitimacy. The international community and the UN need to establish goals to distinguish between standards of state behavior and determine the degree of accountability a state has for either reinforcing intolerance, and/or unleashing violence. Government discrimination can marginalize communities and create a climate of suspicion and intolerance. The international community and the UN should establish strategies for certain expectations and entitlements based upon identity of the State. In turn, they can create conditions of tension between groups that will warrant government intervention or produce private violence which governments fail to control as part of a plan to eliminate threat to their power. One of the issues that will arise has been a problem for years; intervening into affairs of another state is a violation of that state’s sovereignty. I believe that despite the protection of a state’s sovereignty, the horrors of human suffering demand some action from the international community. In order to justify intervention, some type of convention must be made, for example, sets of rules, conditions or circumstances would have to be meet, in order for an intervention. Instead
of inventing some new guidelines governing interventions, using the tenets of the Just
War Tradition could be used to justify an intervention. The Just War Doctrine is well
documented, which has also been socially acceptable. It has also been successfully used
to justify sovereignty infractions.

Ethnicity, social class status and economic conditions were factors that led up to
the genocide, but these factors alone did not cause the genocide in 1994. Many authors
and historians try to find the one main cause of the Rwandan genocide. Hatred did not
cause the Hutu people of Rwanda to kill their neighbors, their friends and even their own
family members. Hatred built throughout many years of tension and rivalry led to a split
between the people of Rwanda, led to a nation living in civil war. In the beginning of the
1960s, two crucially important events occurred. First, the Bazungu abandoned formal
political power and second, some Hutu overthrew the Tutsi oligarchy in what was known
as the “social revolution” which led to the killing of thousands of Tutsi’s between 1959 to
1963. The structure of the Rwandan political life led Rwandans into a mind-set that
made genocide a solution to its political problems.

The UN has limited capacity and constrained mandate to shift from peacekeeping
to peacemaking, and the experience during the Somalia operation created a climate
hostile for nations to commit military forces. If the crisis response stage is reached, our
primary responsibility is to compel the powers of the international system to uphold their
commitments under international law to respond to genocide. Ian Linden said it best,
“The withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces and the failure of the Security Council to
reinforce them and acknowledge that genocide was taking place cost thousands of lives
and will be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN’s many mistakes on intervention.”  

5.2 Rebuilding Rwanda

There are many factors that shape the current prospects for Rwanda’s recovery. Overt rearming and reorganization of the former leadership, military and militia in or beside internationally supported camps in Zaire have posed a threat of war in the region. However, with recent arrests of a number of former Rwandese government officials by Zairian authorities and proposed joint plans with UNHCR to begin substantial repatriation in 1996, a barrier to repatriation may be reduced. The inability or unwillingness of numerous refugees to return also results from insecurity, harsh detention and uncertain or conflicting government policy inside Rwanda. The failure of the international community as a whole to provide adequate support for the government of Rwanda has also undermined the future stability and development efforts. In particular, insufficient attention and resources have been given to the survivors of genocide and the war inside Rwanda. An essential element of reconstruction in Rwanda must be established for an effective system of justice through which perpetrators of genocide are held accountable and punished, thus thwarting the “culture of impunity” that has been allowed to persist over the decades by Rwandese governments and by the international community. Real and lasting resolution of problems in the Rwandese political arena regarding land use rights and other requirements for successful economic and social integration will be achieved only with the creation of a domestic inclusive political system that reflects the underlying principles of the Arusha Accords. The Great Lakes Region is itself confronted by similar issues, especially in Burundi, where politically

\[41\] Ibid., pp. 74-153.
motivated violence has created an explosive situation that threatens regional security and stability.

The major markets for Rwanda are Belgium, Germany and China. In April 2007, an investment and trade agreement began to unfold and is in the making. Belgian cooperation with the ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry continues to develop and will help rebuild agricultural practices along with distributing agricultural tools and seed to help rebuild Rwanda. In Eastern Rwanda, The Linton Hunter Development Initiative, along with Partners in Health, is also helping to improve agriculture productivity and water and sanitation along with health services.

After the 1994 genocide, the RPF installed a single party government. Paul Kagame became Vice President. In 2000, he was elected President of Rwanda. Kagame’s government wrote a new constitution which was adopted in 2003. The new government and the constitution establish security, and promote reconciliation and economic development. The new constitution forbids any political activity or discrimination based on race, ethnicity or religion. The right of return for Rwandans displaced between 1959 and 1994, primarily Tutsis, has been enshrined in the constitution. There are four preconditions for reconciliation that need to be reached in Rwanda: end the legacy of violence and culture of impunity; material reconstruction; political solutions; and reconstitution of the social fabric.
APPENDIX A: RWANDA CHRONOLOGY


A.D. 1000: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa peoples establish settled cultures in the Great Lakes region.

1400s: Independent Hutu Kingdoms begin to expand throughout what would become Rwanda.

1500s: Tutsi monarchy established in central Rwanda. As it expands, the monarch incorporates smaller Hutu Kingdoms.

1600s: Tutsi monarchy is reorganized, and more Hutu kingdoms are incorporated. Rwanda becomes a unified state.

1700s: Tutsi monarchy continues to expand. Tutsi elite establish the ubuhake system.

1899: Germany establishes colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi and the territory becomes part of German East Africa.

1910: The frontiers of the Belgian Congo, British Uganda and German East Africa - including the territory of Ruanda-Urundi - are fixed at a conference in Brussels.

1911: A popular uprising in northern Rwanda is crushed by the German Schutztruppe and Tutsi chiefs, leaving continuing bitterness among northern Hutu.

1916: Belgium takes over the territory, which after the First World War is administered under a League of Nations mandate.

1930s: A process of "Tutsi-unification" results in a monopoly of political and administrative power in the hands of Tutsi. Ethnic classification through the introduction of identity cards began.

1959: The social revolution by the Hutu population supported by Belgium. Tens of thousands of Tutsi flee into exile.

1960: Rwanda's first local elections result in an overwhelming victory for the party Parmehutu.

1962: On 1 July, Rwanda and Burundi gain independence from Belgium.

1963: Armed attacks by Tutsi exiles from Burundi, the so-called inyenzi, deepen ethnic tension in Rwanda. In the violence, which escalates in November-December, some 1,000
Tutsi are killed and there is a new wave of Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.

1973: Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana assumes power. He founds a new party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, MRND). Beginning of the Second Republic.

1978: MRND becomes Rwanda's only party under a new constitution. Habyarimana is confirmed as President in 1978, 1983 and 1988, with more than 99% of the vote.

1988: In April, ethnic tensions in Burundi cause a wave of refugees into Rwanda. In connection with a conference on Rwandese refugees, held in Washington D.C., the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) is founded.

1990

July: A first breakthrough in negotiations between Rwanda, Uganda and UNHCR on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees in Uganda is achieved.

5 July: President Habyarimana recognizes the necessity of a separation between the MRND party and the state.

24 September: A National Commission is set up to prepare for the introduction of a multi-party system.

1 October: Uganda-based RPF invades the northern parts of Rwanda, demanding the right to settle thousands of (mainly Tutsi) refugees and political reforms, such as introduction of a multi-party system. In the war that follows, several RPF leaders are killed and the attack is repulsed.

Mid-October: Local Hutu take revenge on Tutsi in the commune of Kibilira (in Gisenyi). More than 300 people are killed.

24 October: A cease-fire concluded in Mwanza, Tanzania, a week earlier is violated.

27 October: The heads of state of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire agree to form a military peace-monitoring force as a first step to end the civil war in Rwanda.

End of October: There is a stalemate in the war. RPF abandons conventional fighting and reverts to guerrilla warfare.

October-November: Thousands of RPF "collaborators" are arrested. Most of them are released in March/April 1991.

13 November: President Habyarimana announces the introduction of multi-party system and the abolition of ethnic identity cards. The ID cards were, however, never abolished.
1991

January-February: Trials of arrested RPF "collaborators" start. Several prisoners are sentenced to death, but no executions are carried out.

23 January: RPF raid in Ruhengeri. Prisoners are liberated, some of whom join the RPF.

29 March: A ceasefire between RPF and the Rwandese government is reached. An agreement on the integration of RPF in a transitional government is signed.

10 June: A new constitution is introduced.

Early November: Widespread ethnic violence.

17 November: A Committee of Consultation organizes political demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one-party system. Some 10,000 people participate.

Early December: The Rwandan Catholic church takes a political stance, calling for serious talks with RPF and formation of an independent transitional government.

1992

8 January: Demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one-party system with some 30,000 participants.

Beginning of March: Ethnic violence in Bugesera. At least 300 killed.

13 March: New negotiations between the government and main opposition parties.

March: CDR (Coalition pour la Défense de la République) and MRND militias are built up by extremist Hutu supporters.

2 June: Government army forces begin looting in several towns in anticipation of losing their jobs if the government signs a peace pact with RPF.

9 June: After talks in Brussels and Paris between RPF and all government parties except MRND, an agreement to hold a peace conference to end the two years of civil war is reached.

10 August: Formal opening of the peace conference in Arusha, Tanzania.

10-18 August: Negotiations on the Arusha protocol on the rule of law.

7-18 September and 5-30 October: The second Arusha protocol on transitional institutions is discussed.
November: Political violence by extremist Hutu Interahamwe militia escalates.

End of November: A demonstration, in favor of the peace-talks and against Habyarimana's veto to the protocol on transitional institutions, takes place despite the government's attempts to stop it.

24 November-9 January 1993: A protocol on power-sharing and a transitional parliament is discussed in Arusha, but President Habyarimana refuses to sign it.

1993

21-26 January: Ethnic violence in the north-west. Some 300 people are killed.

8 February: RPF occupation of an important zone in the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Byumba. As a consequence, almost one million people are displaced. The French reinforce their troops in Rwanda by 300 men.

25 February-2 March: Peace negotiations between RPF and the opposition parties within the government on the withdrawal of all French troops and their replacement by UN or OAU troops.

7 March: A new cease-fire agreement is signed in Tanzania.

Mid-March: The 300 extra French troops are withdrawn.

15 March: Peace talks are taken up again in Arusha (and continue until 24 June).

April: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warns that the 900,000 displaced people in Rwanda face a major humanitarian catastrophe. ICRC says that famine is imminent.

9 June: Agreement concerning refugees and internally displaced people. An estimated 500,000 displaced people are reported to return home.

8 July: The Hutu extremist Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) starts broadcasting.

4 August: Rwanda's government and RPF sign an accord in Arusha to end the civil war, allowing for power-sharing and the return of refugees.

5 October: The UN Security Council approves a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force to Rwanda, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

17-18 October: 37 MRND supporters are killed in the Ruhengeri area.
21 October: A military coup takes place in Burundi, in which Hutu President Ndadaye is killed. The ethnic violence that follows results in tens of thousands of dead and some 600,000 Burundis fleeing into neighboring countries. Escalated political and ethnic violence in Rwanda.

1 November: The UN starts placing UNAMIR forces in Rwanda.

30 November: At least 20 people are killed when RPF forces break the cease-fire and attack government troops in north-western Rwanda.

28 December: 600 RPF soldiers arrive in Kigali in accordance with the Arusha agreement.

1994

30 December 1993-5 April 1994: Transitional government fails to take off, with each side blaming the other for blocking its formation.

6 April: President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi and a number of government officials are killed in a plane crash in Kigali. President Habyarimana's death sparks violence and widespread massacres in Kigali, which spread throughout the country. The violence soon escalates, mainly targeting Hutu moderates and the Tutsi population.

7 April: Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is killed by government forces. Ten Belgian UN peacekeeping soldiers, who were guarding her, are killed. As a result, Belgium withdraws its forces. The 600 RPF soldiers in Kigali leave their headquarters.

8 April: RPF forces in northern Rwanda launch an offensive. Former Speaker of parliament Theodore Sindikubwabo announces the formation of an interim government and declares himself interim President. Prime Minister: Jean Kambanda (MDR).

11 April: Relief officials estimate that as many as 20,000 people have been killed in Kigali alone in five days of violence. With foreign journalists out of Rwanda, news from the country is restricted.

12 April: The interim government moves from Kigali to Gitarama as RPF threatens the capital.

21 April: The UN Security Council resolution No. 912 reduces the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in Rwanda from 2,500 to 270 men with an unchanged mandate.

End of April: An estimated 250,000 people stream across the Rwandese border to seek refuge in Tanzania.
30 April: UN Security Council affirms the need to protect refugees and help restore order, but does not mention peacekeepers. At least 100,000 people have been killed and more than 1.3 million have fled their homes.

17 May: The UN Security Council passes a new resolution (No. 918), approving the deployment of 5,500 UNAMIR troops to Rwanda.

22 May: RPF forces gain control of the airport in Kigali and the Kanombe barracks, and extend their control over the northern and eastern parts of Rwanda.

17 June: France announces its plan to the UN Security Council to deploy 2,500 troops to Rwanda as an interim peacekeeping force until the UNAMIR troops arrive.

22 June: The UN Security Council narrowly approves a resolution (No. 929) to dispatch 2,500 French troops to Rwanda (Operation Turquoise) for a two-month operation under a UN peacekeeping mandate.

28 June: The UN Human Rights Commission's special envoy releases a report stating that the massacres were pre-planned and formed part of a systematic campaign of genocide.

4 July: RPF wins control of Kigali and the southern town of Butare. Its leadership states that it intends to establish a government based on the framework of the Arusha Accords. French troops in south-western Rwanda receive orders to halt the RPF advance.

5 July: The French led operation has established a Safe zone defined roughly by the prefectures of Gikongoro, Cyangugu, and Kibuye. As RPF advances towards the west, the influx of displaced persons into the zone increases from an initial 500,000 to an estimated one million within a few days.

13-14 July: As a result of RPF's advance in the north-west, an estimated one million people begin to flee towards Zaire. Approximately 10,000-12,000 refugees per hour cross the border and enter the town of Goma. The massive influx creates a severe humanitarian crisis, as there is an acute lack of shelter, food, water, and non-food relief items.

15 July: Members of the Hutu government escape to the French "safe zone". UN Security Council orders cease-fire.

18 July: RPF announces that the war is over, declares a cease-fire.

19 July: The new President and Prime Minister are sworn in, and RPF commander Major General Paul Kagame is appointed Defense Minister and Vice-President.

End of July: The UN Security Council reaches a final agreement on sending an international force to Rwanda.

24 August: End of Operation Turquoise. UNAMIR forces take over from the French.
October: The UN estimates that there are now about five million people in Rwanda, compared to 7.9 million before the war.

8 November: UN Security Council adopts a resolution (No. 955) on the establishment of an international court for war criminals of Rwanda.

24 December: An exile government is announced among Hutu refugees in Zaire.

1995

22 April: Soldiers of the RPF army carry out a massacre at the Kibeho camp for internally displaced persons in Rwanda.

April: Refugees are forced to return to their home districts from the camps for internally displaced persons.

7 September: The UN Security Council adopts a resolution on the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry on the sale and supply of arms and related materiel to the former Rwanda government forces in violation of the UN embargo implemented on 17 May 1994 (Resolution 1013 1995).

13 September: Zaire closes its borders with Rwanda following bomb explosions in Goma.

17 October: A Supreme Court is established by an act of the Parliament.

2-6 November: An international conference on "Genocide, Impunity and Accountability" is held in Kigali.

7 November: Clash between the army and Hutu rebels on Lake Kivu Island. Many people are reported killed.

23 November: The prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Judge Goldstone, signs his first indictment.

14 December: The UN Security Council extends UNAMIR’s mandate in Rwanda for an additional three months to 8 March 1996 (Resolution 1019). The Force will be reduced from 2,100 men to 1,400 and concentrate its activities on the return of refugees.

1996

Refugees begin returning to Rwanda and new conflicts begin in Zaire. A rebel force led by Laurent Kabila begins attacking refugee camps to remove Hutu militia members, whom he believes are aiding the Zairian government. These raids are the start a movement of refugees back to Rwanda.
1997

As refugees begin to resettle in Rwanda, violence between RPA and Hutu militias continues. UN tribunal and Rwandan judicial system continue holding trials for suspected war criminals.

1998

Rwanda government executes twenty-two people found guilty of taking part in mass killings. Jean Kambanda, the former head of the interim government, is found guilty of genocide.
Bibliography


