In 1953, the Boston Braves relocated to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, marking the first time a major league franchise moved in fifty years. The Braves’ relocation ushered in major league baseball’s first phase of expansion – the relocation phase. By May 20, the Braves matched its entire 1952 attendance (281,000) and finished the season with an impressive 1.8 million. In 1954, the Braves topped two million en route to become one of the prominent franchises in the 1950s.

Research regarding the Boston Braves’ move to Milwaukee has been minimal. The overwhelming focus has been on St. Louis Browns’ owner Bill Veeck’s effort to relocate his club to Milwaukee, in the midst of stiff opposition from his fellow league owners. Braves’ owner Lou Perini owned the Triple A Milwaukee Brewers of the American Association. When Veeck attempted to purchase the Brewers from Perini, Commissioner Ford Frick used his influence to block the move. With Veeck blocked on every side, National League (NL) owners allowed Perini to relocate to Milwaukee for the start of the 1953 season. ¹

This research has enhanced our knowledge regarding major league baseball entering its expansion era. However, what is often overlooked was the Pacific Coast League’s (PCL) six-year attempt to become a third major league from 1945 to 1951, and how their failed effort influenced the expansion process. The internal reshuffling of major league baseball’s governance and the reclassification of the minor leagues has also
been virtually unexplored. Moreover, scholars acknowledge that the city of Milwaukee had built a municipal stadium for approximately $5 million, making the “German Athens” a coveted territory for relocation. However, they have yet to investigate the efforts made by civic leaders and local businessmen to build a stadium and lure a major league franchise there. This paper analyzes the forces that led to both the Pacific Coast League’s efforts to become a third major league, and the Boston Braves relocating to Milwaukee, ushering in major league baseball’s relocation phase. Two questions will serve to guide the narrative: how did the PCL’s efforts to become a third major league influence major league baseball’s expansion process; and what were the forces, both internal and external, that impacted upon the construction of Milwaukee County Stadium. The paper will also trace the Boston Braves move to Milwaukee and analyze the importance civic leaders and local businessmen placed on obtaining “major league” status to redefine its national identity in the 1950s.

At the forefront were the major league owners’ attempts to either maintain their existing monopoly or control the expansion process. In 1945, the Pacific Coast League sought to elevate their circuit to a major league classification. The move was in response to a previous effort made by the St. Louis Browns to relocate to Los Angeles and the post-World War II prosperity, which made the West the fastest growing region of the country. At the same time, civic boosters in Los Angeles attempted to urge the major leagues to either relocate one of its struggling franchises to their growing city, or expand their league structure to include the “City of Angels.” Yet in some ways being the fastest growing region worked against the PCL’s effort to become a third major league, and the civic boosters’ attempts to lure an existing franchise. Los Angeles grew
disproportionately larger than the other western cities. The major league owners rejected these overtures and established a policy whereby an individual owner could relocate their franchise to a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense and make the necessary negotiations. A determining factor for major league expansion was the size of the ballparks and adequate parking. While the stadium became a critical factor that dramatically influenced the expansion process, it still required a significant degree of external pressure to coerce the owners to expand. The culmination of both a threat of congressional action and Supreme Court intervention, and the overall decline in attendance resulted in the major league owners coming to grips with expansion.²

Concurrently, civic leaders in Milwaukee undertook a project to build a municipal stadium. The purpose of the project was to erect a memorial to honor the soldiers who died in World War I. By the end of World War II, however, the stadium project became an integral part of civic leaders and politicians’ efforts to revitalize Milwaukee’s cultural infrastructure. It also served to shatter the city’s “minor league” image and redefine its national identity. Civic leaders and politicians envisioned a windfall of revenue for their growing metropolis as a result of housing the Braves. Yet it still required a significant degree of external pressure from the city fathers to encourage Boston Braves owner Lou Perini to move there. Unlike civic leaders in Los Angeles, Milwaukee’s politicians and boosters formed a strong coalition to bring big league ball there. While these politicians and civic boosters probably overestimated the potential revenue a major league franchise could bring to their city, their endeavors exemplified the willingness of post-World War II cities offering incentives to these owners to hard to refuse. Moreover, the Braves’
relocation to Milwaukee marked the start of a dramatic restructuring of Major League Baseball’s (MLB) consumer market into its current configuration.

From 1903 to 1953, professional baseball was a relatively stable industry. At the peak of this professional structure were the major leagues – the American and National – and a host of minor leagues according to quality. A complex set of rules and agreements between and within various leagues, known as “baseball law,” regulated a vertically integrated monopoly known as “Organized Baseball.” The fundamental underpinning of these rules was a number of restrictive practices that formed the governance and economics of the industry. 3

The reserve clause represented a unique part of the contract between baseball clubs and their employees. It bound a player to their respective club until traded, sold, or released. Every club in Organized Baseball agreed not to employ or attempt to employ any player reserved by another club. The owners agreeing to respect each other’s players bound by the reserve rule gave the owners a hegemonious relationship over their player force.

The division of consumer markets among clubs constituted Organized Baseball’s second most restrictive practice. Also referred to as “territorial rights,” this market monopoly was instituted on the supposition that consumer demand for professional baseball was limited. As a result, only one club would have a far better chance of prospering than if several clubs competed for the same market. Although it would be modified over the years, the owners’ established a population requirement – 75,000 in the late nineteenth century – for a club to gain league entry. A five-mile radius surrounding the respective city was also considered as that club’s territorial region. Territorial rights
did not solve the problem of the unequal size of markets among the clubs of a league. However, this market imbalance was offset somewhat by the wealth and population of industrial America, as well as the best transportation system, residing in the Northeast. Virtually all of the major league teams were located in this comparatively compact and economically developed region of the country. Being concentrated in this area enabled major league baseball to deal with the damaging impact of two world wars and the Great Depression.  

The sixteen major league clubs were both business partners and competitors. They cooperated in the creation of a general set of operating rules, developing common playing schedules, and by eliminating competition for players. Major League owners also cooperated in attempting to maintain public faith in the sport’s integrity. This issue became crucial after the 1919 Black Sox scandal, in which Chicago players cooperated with gamblers in fixing the World Series. The owners created the commissioner’s office to reassure the public that the game was honest.

The 1922 Supreme Court ruling – the Federal League case – 259 US 200 – solidified major league baseball’s control over its economic environment. The Court ruled that baseball was not a form of interstate commerce, thus not subject to antitrust laws. Exemption from prosecution under antitrust laws gave baseball a unique status. Organized Baseball became a self-regulating monopoly and the major leagues wrote the rules that covered their relationship with the minor leagues. The most critical business relationship between the major and minor leagues was the draft system. While the number of their supporting minor leagues fluctuated, the minors provided the major leagues with a large pool of cheap talent. The annual draft of minor league players
ensured that quality talent advanced up the ladder toward the majors, but this movement was contingent upon terms favorable to the big leagues. The major leagues fixed prices on drafted players as an incentive for minor league owners to sell their best players, rather than losing them in the less profitable draft. 5

The culmination of the antitrust exemption, the reserve clause, and territorial rights represented the cornerstone of baseball’s system of self-regulation for profit. The reserve clause enabled member clubs to control the terms of employment of their respective players. Major League owners allocated consumer markets by sharing New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis. The National League was granted exclusive rights in Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati, and the American in Washington, Cleveland, and Detroit. These territorial alignments remained intact for half a century.

Not all major league clubs enjoyed this sense of stability, however. The St. Louis Browns of the American League (AL) were, according to historian James Edward Miller, “baseball’s by word for futility and mediocrity.” In fifty-two years the Browns won one AL pennant, finished second twice, sixth eleven times, seventh twelve times, and last ten times. The Browns’ attendance reflected this performance. From 1932 to 1936, they averaged a little more than 98,000 fans a year, and according to historian William Marshall, only 34 fans attended a game in 1933. Browns’ owner Phil Ball died that same year, depriving the club of a magnate who was rich enough to subsidize the team and willing to take financial losses. The executors of Ball’s estate refused to invest more capital in a losing ball club. In 1934, the club finished sixth and lost a reported $54,000. The following year the Browns finished seventh and drew 80,922 fans. 6
In 1936, the executors sold the Browns to a contingent headed by Donald Barnes, owner of an investment firm, and William O. and Charles DeWitt. The new owners raised $100,000 to pay for the club by selling stock, and the American League loaned them an additional $50,000 to complete the deal. In their first four years under new management, the Browns lost over $100,000 each year. Bill DeWitt, the club’s general manager, had devised a sound strategy to build the Browns into a pennant contender – hiring scouts, building a farm system, and acquiring major league talent from other teams. However, the Browns’ management simply lacked the financial residuals to achieve their goals.

In 1941, the Browns’ financial picture was so bleak that Barnes attempted to transfer the franchise to Los Angeles. In a 1949 Sporting News interview, the Browns owner unfolded the details of this huge undertaken that began in mid-season. According to Barnes, Harry Arthur, president of the Fanchon & Marco Amusement Company, approached him several times regarding a possible shift to the West Coast. Arthur reportedly told Barnes that there were interested parties who, from a civic standpoint, were willing to bring major league baseball to the West Coast. Barnes flew to Los Angeles and met with a group of civic leaders, headed by A. P. Giannini, co-founder of Bank of America. The Browns owner informed the group that he would be willing to sell them part of the stock in the club to finance a deal to purchase the Los Angeles Angels of the Pacific Coast League. This transaction was essential to gain the territorial rights so the AL club could move there.  

Barnes then met with several AL owners and Chicago Cubs mogul Phillip K. Wrigley. AL owners Connie Mack (Philadelphia Athletics), Clark Griffith (Washington
Senators), and Tom Yawkey (Boston Red Sox) expressed concerns over the safety of the players, since the Browns’ transfer would require the clubs to make trips to the coast by air travel. Nevertheless, according to Barnes, the AL magnates gave him the green light to explore the possibility of moving the Browns. In October 1941, Barnes met with Wrigley to negotiate a deal to purchase the Los Angeles franchise. After considerable negotiation, Wrigley was willing to sell the franchise, the players on the Angels’ roster, and Wrigley Field for a reported $1,000,000.

Next, Barnes underwent a series of negotiations with St. Louis Cardinals owner, Sam Breadon. The Browns owned Sportsman Park and they had invested heavily in a new scoreboard, and five years remained on their rental agreement with the Cardinals. According to the terms of the agreement, Breadon would pay the Browns $250,000 to leave St. Louis, give them two players valued at $25,000 each, and assume the Browns’ leasing agreement with the Dodier Realty Company. At the same time, Breadon would attempt to influence the NL owners to approve the Browns transfer. Baseball law required a unanimous consent from the owners of both leagues to approve a franchise shift. Moreover, the NL owners would probably have no qualms about the Browns moving to Los Angeles. St. Louis would become the exclusive territory of the National League.

While Barnes maneuvered within MLB’s infrastructure, Harry Arthur made preparations for the Browns’ transfer to Los Angeles. The Angels would be transferred to Long Beach, where civic leaders made assurances that a park would be erected, once the city was awarded the franchise. The other PCL franchise, the Hollywood Stars, was given the option to remain or relocate. If the Stars stayed, the Browns would cooperate in
devising a schedule that would not conflict with each other. Moreover, the Los Angeles Junior Chamber of Commerce went on record guaranteeing an annual attendance of 500,000 for five years. If the Browns attendance did not reach this figure, the Chamber of Commerce would underwrite the difference.

Barnes drew up a new playing schedule for the 1942 season and devised a travel agenda to ease the concerns of his fellow owners. On December 6, 1941, Barnes and the DeWitt brothers met with K. O. Cocke, vice-president of sales for Trans World Airlines (TWA), to finalize the travel plans. Railroad officials from the Santa Fe Chief also attended the meeting. Reportedly, each club would make three trips to the West Coast, but only one trip would be made by air travel. Chicago was the “jumping-off” place for all flights and between 21 and 28 flights took off daily from the Windy City to Los Angeles. Therefore, no club was compelled to place all of its players on one or two planes. In other words, players could have been transported at the rate of one, two, three, or four per flight, so there would be no danger of losing an entire club, or a major portion of it, in an air disaster. According to the airline officials, 98 percent of all flights during the baseball season completed their trips. League clubs would use the Santa Fe Chief for the other trips. The revised schedule provided an open date the day before a league club was scheduled to come to California. The Browns’ management was also willing to underwrite a portion of the AL clubs’ travel expenses for at least five years. Since the Junior Chamber of Commerce guaranteed an attendance of 500,000, the Browns were prepared to pay each visiting club an additional 25 cents per head over the pay-off required by the American League. In other words, the Browns would add an additional
25 cents per admission to the visiting team’s share of the gate receipts or the guarantee, which ever was greater. 9

The following day Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and America entered World War II. Any aspirations of moving the St. Louis Browns to Los Angeles came to an abrupt end. On December 9 at the American League’s winter meeting, the owners voted unanimously against the Browns proposed transfer to Los Angeles. Barnes also voted against the move. When asked why he went along with the other owners after seriously considering the move, Barnes replied: “After submitting the proposal and after hearing the discussion relative to it by the league in general, I decided along with other members of the league that it would be best to vote to retain the Browns in St. Louis.” 10

Clearly America’s entry into the war thwarted the Browns move to Los Angeles. Wartime controls on fuel and transportation made any westward move impractical. However, the Browns aborted to move to Los Angeles illustrated the complexities involved in relocating a franchise to a new market. An owner attempting to move his club required him to establish a political coalition among his fellow owners. Without this contingent, he could never receive the necessary votes to move. If the owner desired to move into a new territory owned by another major league magnate, it was necessary to acquire the territorial rights, transfer or purchase the minor league players, and buy or lease the stadium. The magnate would have to dispose the tangible assets within their current territory – primarily the stadium. Adjustments would have to be made to the league’s playing schedule, in terms of revising the road trips and travel itineraries. Barnes’s travel schedule appears awkward by today’s standards, but jet air travel was something new to a generation of owners whose primary mode of transportation was by
rail. Therefore, their reluctance to embrace this manner of travel was understandable. The task of relocating a franchise was a huge and expensive undertaking.

Since the Browns were a financially weak franchise, they needed assistance from the city seeking a major league club. A booster coalition, in the form of civic leaders, businessmen, and politicians, was essential in making the transfer a reality. Boosterism has had a long history in sport. Local boosters used sport as a valuable tool for community enhancement. Promoters took on the task of promoting their communities in order to attract capital investment and political visibility. They were eternal optimist, growth oriented, and willing to take risks. Boosters were drawn to baseball because of its ability to generate visibility and support. Evidently, luring the Browns to Los Angeles was part of a larger aspiration to place the national spotlight on the City of Angels. *Los Angeles Examiner* sportswriter Davis Walsh speculated whether the “interested parties” Barnes referred to were the same men responsible for bringing the national golf championship to the city in 1942.  

By 1940, Los Angeles was one of the fastest growing cities in America and it became a dominant city in its region. Defense spending stimulated the city’s rapid growth during and after the war, as the federal government spent $30 billion on direct defense spending in the West. The defense industry was also the catalyst for a spectacular growth in the population and allowed for new uses of urban space – urban renewal for minorities and stadium construction to lure a professional franchise. The population growth was phenomenal, as 500 new residents per day moved to Los Angeles between 1945 and 1955 for a ten-year total of 1,725,000 migrants. By 1950 Los Angeles was almost 38% of California’s population. Moreover, the city represented the kinds of
demographic changes occurring in American cities, particularly in the West, that would alter Organized Baseball’s consumer market. 12

“Interested parties” in Los Angeles continued to make efforts to bring major league baseball to the West Coast. The Browns aborted move to the coast, however, evidently disturbed several club owners in the Pacific Coast League. The PCL had long been recognized as one of the premier minor league circuits. The PCL played the longest schedule in Organized Baseball, as many as 225 games a season. Major League stars like Frank “Lefty” O’Doul, Tony Lazzeri, and Joe DiMaggio played in the PCL. On December 5, 1945, the Los Angeles Times reported that PCL club members voted unanimously to make their organization a “full major league.” A three-man committee headed by league president Clarence “Pants” Rowland, San Francisco club president Charley Graham, and Hollywood president Victor Ford Collins led the effort to elevate their organization to a major league, beginning in the 1946 season. Acquiring major league status was contingent upon the approval by the commissioner, the two major league presidents, and the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues – the governing body of the minor leagues. The three-man committee sought to obtain major league status within the parameters of baseball law. 13

Concurrently, both the major and minor leagues underwent a dramatic reshuffling. Albert B. “Happy” Chandler was elected commissioner after the death of Kennesaw Mountain Landis in November 1944. From the outset, several owners attempted to usurp Chandler’s powers as commissioner. The former Governor and Senator from Kentucky defeated several moves to reduce his power, and he stood up to the owners and won approval of his programs. At baseball’s winter meetings, the minor leagues voted to strip
Chandler of his veto power and remove baseball’s promotional activities from his office. Major League owners refused to support the minors’ actions and instead approved one of the commissioner’s pet projects, a rule prohibiting baseball from signing high school players unless they had been out of school for more than a year. The minor leagues also created a new Triple A classification. Leagues would be classified as either A, AA, or AAA. The PCL, the International League, and the American Association were elevated to Triple A status. The new classification put a higher price on players selected in the annual draft and established new salary and player limits.¹⁴

Despite its new classification, the PCL continued to push for major league status. On December 8, the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that the minor league executives approved the PCL’s request to become a third major league, and they would be “welcomed back” if the American and National Leagues rejected their application. From the outset, Rowland recognized that a status change did not make his PCL a “major league.” He did not ask that the PCL champion play the winner of the World Series, nor did he claim that club owners were ready to pay major league salaries, which averaged $9,000 more than the coast league. As a major league, the PCL would not be placed in the unenviable position of selling its star players to avoid the draft. Moreover, major league baseball’s consumer market would be increased significantly. Collectively, eight PCL clubs had a population of over four million and the west was undoubtedly one of the fastest growing regions of the country. Hollywood Stars business manager Oscar Reichnow pointed out that the PCL’s attendance had tripled from one million in the prewar seasons to three million in 1945.¹⁵
Despite these factors, the American and National Leagues refused to consider the PCL’s application to become a third major league. Both leagues took a dim view of this West Coast circuit cutting into their exclusive territory. However, they soften their stance somewhat by acknowledging the PCL as a “potential major league territory.” League presidents Will Harridge (AL) and Ford Frick (NL) issued a joint statement outlining the criteria for gaining major league status. Their press release typified the kind of rhetoric major league owners and officials uttered in the postwar era. Both presidents stated that a name change did not constitute major league status. According to Harridge and Frick, a host of factors would have to be considered in order to become a major league. They also asserted the need to address a critical factor that would dramatically influence the expansion process – the size of the ballparks and adequate parking.\textsuperscript{16}

In response to the joint statement, Rowland declared that the PCL would return “and it will not be with hat in hand but with a straight-from-the-shoulder demand that we be given the right to offer our people that to which they were justly entitled – major league baseball.” He added that the major league owners were “postponing the inevitable,” as millions of baseball-minded people in California, Washington, and Oregon wanted better than minor league baseball. Moreover, PCL officials could not accomplish their ambition to become a third major league while dealing with the draft, or facing the forced sale of star players to avoid the draft. Undoubtedly, this factor, along with the Browns’ aborted move to Los Angeles five years earlier, influenced the PCL’s efforts to become a third major league.\textsuperscript{17}

The following year Rowland made a second effort to obtain major league status for his PCL. At the major league meetings in July, Rowland ask for a new classification
as “The Pacific Major League,” and for an exemption from the major league clubs to purchase the best PCL players for a maximum price of $10,000. Rowland argued that the PCL deserved special consideration because it was more than a Triple A league. Its attendance exceeded the combined totals of the International League and the American Association. By the end of the 1946 season, PCL attendance leaped to 3.7 million fans. Moreover, Rowland also wanted to protect the league “from the vultures who would like to descend on their little golden lode.”

Simultaneously, several spokesmen from Los Angeles, including County Supervisor Leonard Roach and *Los Angeles Examiner* sportswriter Vincent Flaherty, revived efforts to lure a major league franchise. From as early as December 1945, Flaherty had been campaigning for a major league franchise for Los Angeles. In a survey of PCL sportswriters, Flaherty reportedly said in the *Sporting News* that the PCL could not hope to compete with the two major leagues due to a lack of capital. He pointed out, however, that the coast league had two major league cities in Los Angeles and San Francisco. With the war ended, the prospect of relocating the St. Louis Browns to Los Angeles was being reconsidered. These efforts conflicted with Rowland’s effort to achieve major league status for all of its members, including those in smaller markets. The loss of either Los Angeles or San Francisco would threaten the league’s market potential. This external pressure fueled the Coast League officials’ determination that the major leagues would come west through the upgrading of the entire league, instead of relocating an existing major league franchise to a single city. The possibility of a Browns move to Los Angeles posed a serious threat.
In response to Roach and Flaherty’s efforts to lure a major league franchise, PCL officials sought a revision in the rules to protect their league from possible invasion. Concurrently, they voted again to press its efforts to become a third major league. The *Los Angeles Times* reported that PCL officials began the initial attempt to increase stadium size and provide adequate parking. Once major league recognition was granted, all league clubs pledged to expand their facilities and “improve the standards of [their] teams...” Construction of new parks had supposedly begun in Portland and San Diego.  

Once again major league owners thwarted the PCL’s efforts to become a third major league. A compromise solution was reached whereby the major leagues postponed recognizing the PCL as a major league for five years. In return, the major leagues would support the PCL’s desire for territorial protection. The PCL could also retain any player drafted, if the circuit matched the salary the drafting club offered. However, major league owners reneged on the promise of territorial protection. Instead, the majors agreed that a league club could move into the PCL’s territory by either compensating the people involved, or both parties accept a negotiated figure arrived through arbitration. More important, in the midst of postwar prosperity, it was evident the major league owners did not want to take on additional partners.  

On the other hand, Supervisor Roach and Flaherty’s attempts to bring major league baseball to Los Angeles were frustrated by the territorial rules of baseball law. Los Angeles was the property of Chicago Cubs owner Phil Wrigley. If a struggling franchise, like the St. Louis Browns, wanted to move to the coast, they would have to purchase the franchise rights from Wrigley, the ballpark, and possibly the players on the Angels’ roster. They would also have to make an indemnity payment to the PCL for their
loss franchise. Considering the Browns’ weak financial condition, the city of Los Angeles, no doubt, would have to bear some of the expense of moving them there. In addition, there was no evidence to indicate that these boosters mounted a campaign to either build a new stadium to adhere to “major league standards,” or renovate Wrigley Field. If they chose to renovate Wrigley Field then the city would have to purchase the ballpark from the Cubs owner. The Los Angeles Coliseum was the only alternative site, but playing there was still contingent upon buying the franchise rights from Wrigley. Furthermore, the Coliseum was more suited for football than baseball. In any event, franchise relocation represented an expensive and complex undertaking.

In 1947, PCL officials made a third request to obtain major league recognition. Led by San Francisco Seals president Charles Graham, the Coast delegation requested that the PCL be granted a three-to-five year trial as a major league and that the magnates suspend their draft of the league’s players, to enable them to develop a reservoir of top-level talent. But the owners referred the PCL’s petition to baseball’s executive council, who planned to make a trip to the West Coast to survey the region for possible expansion. Supposedly, the trip would also determine whether the PCL warranted suspending the draft of their players. 22

Major League owners also referred Supervisor Roach’s second attempt to lure an existing franchise to Los Angeles to the executive council. Reportedly, Roach had invited the council to Los Angeles to persuade them on the merits of bringing big league baseball there. He claimed to represent every civic organization in the southern California city. In an open letter to Commissioner Chandler, Roach indicated that a prospective franchise would play their home games in the Los Angeles Coliseum. The
executive council, however, scheduled no meeting with Roach. According to the *New York Times*, Chandler told reporters: “We are here as the Coast League’s guests and our only consideration at present is the proposals they have made.” In addition, Lieutenant Governor Goodwin Knight supported the PCL’s desire for major league consideration and reportedly said, “We are completely past the bush-league stage.” Such comments appear to marginalize Roach’s assertion that he represented every civic organization in the city.  

By November, the Pacific Coast League modified its position and asked for a classification above Triple A status, with aspirations of gaining major league status in three-to-five years. Under this new classification, the Coast League would be under the jurisdiction of Commissioner Chandler and the executive council. PCL officials also requested a name change to the “Pacific Coast Major League,” an increase in the draft price from $10,000 to $25,000, and the draft eligibility be raised from four to six years. These requests were consistent with the PCL’s desire to develop a reservoir of playing talent to major league standards.

The Pacific Coast League suffered a serious setback at both the minor and major league winter meetings. Led by the American Association, the minor leagues unanimously rejected the PCL’s resolution. Association President Frank Lane summed up the minors’ disdain for the PCL’s request by stating: “Why don’t they quit trying to kid everybody else, including themselves?” He added: “Under their proposal they’d be neither fish nor fowl.” According to the *New York Times*, International League President Frank Shaughnessy had publicly blasted the idea several times. Despite this stiff opposition, the minors gave the PCL permission to continue their attempts to become a
third major league. As the Los Angeles Times astutely noted, the minors would probably “stand pat on that attitude, letting the majors apply the ax.”

On December 11, at the American and National League’s joint session, the owners rejected the PCL’s petition for major league recognition on a trial basis for a third time. Instead, the magnates adopted a resolution that left “the door open” for possible territorial expansion and eventually expanding their league structure from eight to ten clubs. Commissioner Chandler proposed the idea of expanding both leagues, with the possibility of adding Los Angeles, Hollywood, San Francisco, and Oakland. However, according to the New York Times, both leagues were divided on the issue, with the National League voting unanimously for a ten-club circuit. However, the American League voted five to two against the plan, with Cleveland abstaining.

Understandably, the major league owners positioned themselves to control any plans to expand their circuits within the parameters of baseball law. Nothing illustrated their intention more than their press release to the public: “...while the majors again shut down the Coast League bid for major rating in toto, they [the owners] left an opening for individuals members to seek major league entry. Such actions, however, must be initiated by those clubs which would have to assume all cost and responsibility.” Yet by the same token, the owners could not ignore the fact that the West Coast was the fastest growing region in the country, and their weak franchises in St. Louis and Boston (NL) were a cause of concern. Were the major league owners seriously considering expanding their league structure or relocating their weak franchises? Several factors suggest that the magnates were more concerned with sustaining their monopoly and maintaining the status quo.
Major League Baseball’s immediate postwar attendance boom constituted the first factor. The Pacific Coast League attempted to gain major league recognition at a time when the majors experienced unprecedented prosperity. Before World War II 10 million fans for all of major league baseball represented a banner year. In 1946, attendance rose to 18.5 million and reached 20 million in 1948 and 1949. Weak franchises, like the Philadelphia Athletics and Washington Senators, profited during this period. In the midst of this attendance boom, the last thing major league owners wanted was additional partners.  

Second, nothing illustrated the owners’ monopoly behavior more than the way they dealt with the new medium – television. While television was of great importance for baseball’s future, televised broadcasting was still in its formative stage in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Local broadcasting of baseball began in 1946. Three years later, the National Broadcasting Company developed the first limited “network” to telecast a World Series along the East Coast. The fundamental issue was to what extent Organized Baseball could exert control over this new technology. Baseball took its initial steps after World War II toward control by enacting Rule 1(d). This baseball law prohibited clubs from broadcasting into another major or minor league territory. It also prevented a visiting team from broadcasting from the home club’s stadium without permission. Organized Baseball showed its determination to regulate the broadcasting of its games by killing the Liberty Broadcasting System (LBS). The LBS represented the first effort to establish a national radio sport broadcasting network. Cooperation with Organized Baseball was critical for the LBS’s survival. In response, the major leagues invoked Rule 1(d), banning the LBS from re-broadcasting their games in minor league territory.
National League attorney Louis Carroll told a House committee that Organized Baseball crushed the LBS, firmly establishing the principle that it enjoyed control over broadcasting rights. 29

A final factor dealt with the rise of the Mexican League, an outlaw circuit. In 1946, seventeen players jumped their major league contracts for promises of higher wages. New York Giants outfielder Danny Gardella was among the seventeen players who made the jump across the border. Commissioner Chandler declared the contract jumpers ineligible, blacklisting those players for five years. After playing one season in the Mexican League, Gardella sought to return to the Giants and was turned down. Gardella brought suit against his former club, marking the start of several challenges against Organized Baseball’s reserve clause. The Gardella case goes beyond the scope of this study. What is important here is that the combination of Gardella’s suit, and the PCL’s effort to become a third major league were challenges to Organized Baseball’s fundamental business practices – territorial rights and the reserve clause. 30

Within this context, the Pacific Coast League was in open revolt. They had been totally frustrated in their attempts to gain major league recognition, within the framework of baseball law. Between 1948 and 1951, the PCL threaten to break from the National Association and operate as an outlaw league. During the 1951 winter meetings, Ford Frick announced a plan to elevate the minor leagues to major league status. A new classification above Triple A was established for leagues or associations with at least eight teams whose consumer markets included at least 10 million people, possessed ballparks with a combined seating of 120,000 that had an averaged paid attendance of over 2.25 million for the preceding five years. Once a minor league reached this “open”
classification, a new set of conditions had to be met to achieve major league status. These included: a consumer market of 15 million, ballpark capacity of more than 25,000 for each franchise, and a paid attendance of at least 3.5 million for each of the previous three years. Major League Baseball had raised the bar so high that it was problematic for any Triple A league to gain major league status. According to the census figures in 1950, the combined population of PCL cities was a little over 4.5 million. Their seating capacities for their ballparks were 117,850. More troubling, the PCL’s attendance, along with several other minor leagues, began to decline sharply. In 1949, the minors drew 41 million fans with 49 leagues and 446 teams. By 1953, attendance dwindled to 22 million, 38 leagues, and 284 teams. Major League owners had no intentions of expanding their infrastructure.  

However, by 1950 Organized Baseball found itself being pressured on several fronts. First, efforts to crush the Liberty Broadcasting System occurred almost at the same time the Supreme Court was examining baseball’s antitrust exemption. New York Yankees’ prospect George Toolson filed suit against his employer on the grounds of being deprived, through the reserve clause and blacklisting, of his professional means of livelihood. When Toolson v New York Yankees reached the Supreme Court, a principle argument was that by entering into contractual agreements with television baseball was engaging in interstate commerce. Organized Baseball was wary of negotiating a national television contract until the court ruled on this case. The minor leagues garnered support from Congress to convert the 1950 version of Rule 1(d) into law. Senator Edwin Johnson, a senior minority member of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and president of the Western League (Class A), introduced legislation to
legalize Rule 1(d). Johnson asserted that television was destroying the minor leagues. He arranged hearings to put pressure on the major leagues to end the game of the week and back his legislation. Organized Baseball managed to avoid this potential minefield of court litigation and proposed legislation. Chicago Federal Court Judge John P. Barnes ruled that the clubs had a right to control and profit from broadcast of their own games, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption in the Toolson case.  

Second, in July 1951 Brooklyn Congressman Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Committee opened an extensive series of hearings before a subcommittee charged with the “study of monopoly power.” He called a number of representatives of Organized Baseball and asked for their justification regarding their restrictive economic practices and the sport’s antitrust exemption. Celler raised a number of uncomfortable issues that included the farm system, the reserve clause, territorial rights, the exclusion of the West Coast and other cities from the major leagues, and the treatment of minor league players. Various individuals with agendas and grievances against Organized Baseball, ranging from disgruntled players to officials from the West Coast who lobbied for big league franchises, were given the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. Knowing how sensitive major league owners were to charges of monopoly, Los Angeles supervisor Roach accused them of conspiring to keep Los Angeles from becoming a “member of the major league family.” Republican Congressman Patrick Hillings pressured the owners to either expand to the West Coast, or assist the PCL to become a third major league. Baseball officials, including (now former) Commissioner Chandler, NL President and Commissioner designate Ford Frick, AL President Will Harridge, and Chicago Cubs’ owner Phil Wrigley, were also summoned and subjected to lengthy
questioning. In the end, however, the subcommittee made no recommendation and Congress took no action. 33

Major League Baseball managed to survive the external pressure brought on by the Pacific Coast League’s attempts to become a third major league, Supreme Court rulings, court litigations, and extensive congressional hearings. Expanding or revising major league baseball’s infrastructure rested solely in the hands of the owners. The PCL’s plight resulted in the magnates establishing a policy that an individual owner could relocate their franchise to a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense. The attempts of local boosters and politicians in Los Angeles to lure a major league franchise frustrated the PCL’s efforts to elevate their entire league and whetted the appetites of MLB owners, with struggling franchises, to move to this growing market. These boosters’ endeavors, however, were thwarted by MLB’s territorial rights, the lack of a suitable stadium, and their failure to establish an effective coalition of politicians and businessmen to advance the project. Yet the major league magnates had to come to grips with the changes in demography, in the postwar economy, and civic boosters pressuring the owners to bring big league baseball to their growing cities. By 1950 major league attendance began to decline, dropping sharply to 17,227,000. Two years later, sixteen teams could only draw approximately fifteen million customers. During the congressional hearings AL President Will Harridge admitted that the league had collectively subsidized the fledgling St. Louis Browns. Faced with these issues, major league baseball’s consumer market would be altered, breaking the logjam of big league franchises residing in the Northeast and Midwest for half a century. 34
IF YOU BUILD IT THEY WILL COME

In the 1950s, major league baseball’s consumer market was impacted by the demographic changes in American cities, the impact of technology, and the new consumerism. Historian George Lipsitz states “elite populations and industries abandoned older neighborhoods in pursuit of expansion to inexpensive land and low cost labor in the south and west.” Between 1940 and 1970, the west and south increased their share of the nation’s income from 33% to 43% and their population rose from 42% in 1940 to 48% in 1970. “Sunbelt” cities escaped years of wear and tear, allowing them to offer lower taxes and more pleasant surroundings to industries seeking to relocate. They could do so precisely because the desire to escape the effects of urban growth had adversely impacted upon the older industrial cities in the first place.  

Simultaneously, government spending in the postwar era stimulated economic growth and prosperity. Federal home loans policies, defense spending, highway construction, and urban renewal contributed immensely in allowing the federal government to channel tax dollars into the private sector. To urban America, government’s role in capital accumulation manifested itself in federal aid, and also in local pro-growth coalitions seeking to use public funds as a catalyst for economic expansion.

The culmination of the demographic trends, government policy, and business interest fused itself into what can best be described as the suburban-industrial complex. At the peak of the great European immigration in the early twentieth century, 1.2 million new immigrants came to America in a single year. During the 1950s, the same number moved to the suburbs every year. For example, Irving, Texas had a population of 2,621
in 1950; ten years later 45,000 people lived there. That same decade the total population increase was only 28 million. 

Eastern cities, like Brooklyn and Boston, suffered from the forces that helped shaped western and southern cities like Los Angeles and Houston. Defense spending shifted tax dollars from the East Coast to the West Coast. FHA loans providing mortgage insurance for single-family homeowners’ subsidized new and growing suburban cities, but this growth had negative consequences for older multi-family dominated cities like Brooklyn and Boston. Moreover, the federal highway program provided industry the means to move away from the older industrial centers like New York. This exodus of the population to the suburbs left behind deteriorated formerly middle class neighborhoods.

The process of suburbanization coincided with an encore performance of the automobile revolution. From 1945 to 1960, the number of cars in America increased by 133 percent. Under the Highway Act of 1956 Congress appropriated $32 billion to build 41,000 miles of highway. With the government providing loans for new suburban homes, building highways that went to those homes, and with an economy structured primarily around the consumption of new housing and automobiles, a spiral of sustained prosperity and growth occurred.

Consumerism represented one of the essential elements of this prosperity. Recreation was a primary focus of this “new consumerism.” The average family in the suburbs earned roughly $6,500, seventy percent higher than the average income for the rest of the nation. More than eight million people traveled abroad in the 1950s. With all the new automobiles and highways, people who stayed at home helped to create a new industry of domestic tourism, visiting national parks, and providing consumer amusement
areas like Disneyland. Organized Baseball was in the midst of competing with other forms of amusement, spurred by entrepreneurs who saw an opportunity.  

By the end of the 1952 season, these changes in demography, in the economy, and technology were influential in altering major league baseball’s consumer market. In response to these changes, the owners amended their regulations. Previously, a franchise shift required a unanimous vote from the owners of both leagues under Rule 1(c) of the National Agreement. At the leagues’ 1952 winter meeting, the owners ruled that a team could move with a unanimous consent of its own league. The other league could not block the move, if the invaded area was the property of a club in the same league. Indemnity payments would be made to both the minor league and the pre-empted club. Amendment to Rule 1(c) facilitated major league baseball’s expansion process.  

It was within this context that Milwaukee, Wisconsin became one of several cities ripe for either prospective league expansion or franchise relocation. Referred to as the “German Athens,” Milwaukee was in the midst of a dramatic transformation that saw the old city of ethnic neighborhoods and aging factories give way to a modern metropolis built on the service industries. Milwaukee was the 13th largest city in America, as its population increased from 587,472 in 1940 to 637,392 a decade later. Between 1940 and 1970, the number of housing units in the Milwaukee metropolitan area almost doubled, increasing from 238,514 to 449,044. At the peak of the wave in the 1950s, new homes were popping up at the rate of nearly 1,000 a month. Milwaukee County was emblematic of the encore performance of the automobile revolution. The number of motor vehicles registered in the county rose from 177,969 to 319,071 in 1955, a 79 percent increase in ten years.
To understand how Milwaukee became a coveted city for possible big league expansion, it is necessary to analyze the forces that led to the construction of Milwaukee County Stadium. As a member of the American Association, the Milwaukee Brewers played in Borchert Field, and according to Neil Sullivan, this “ancient marvel” added to the special quality of baseball in the midwest. Borchert Field was characterized as an “undersized firetrap shoehorned into a single city block at Eighth and Chambers.” Few seats afforded a decent vantage of the field, and truculent storms occasionally blew parts of the structure onto neighboring homes. Talk of replacing the ball park began as early as 1909, when Charles Whitnall, a banker and member of both the city’s Public Land Commission and the County’s Park Commission, suggested the construction of a sports stadium next to the Menomonee River parkway. Efforts to build the new ballpark were thwarted by America’s entry into World War I and the idea died on the planning table.41

The first concerted efforts to build a municipal stadium began in the 1930s. Two proposals, one in the local city government – the common council – and the other in the County Board of Supervisors, marked the start of Milwaukee’s political involvement in stadium building. On September 1, 1931, Alderman Charles C. Schad introduced a resolution in the common council, asking for the construction of a 50,000-seat facility. Since construction costs were low during the Depression era, Schad estimated that the stadium would cost $300,000. Concurrently, Milwaukee County Supervisor Raymond Moore introduced a resolution in the county board asking for a legal opinion on whether the county could build a stadium. The corporation counsel replied in the affirmative, if the project was designated as a war memorial. Thus the municipal stadium would serve as a memorial for soldiers who died in World War I. On October 27, 1936, the county
board adopted the Moore resolution and took the initial steps to seek a federal Public Works Administration (PWA) grant. However, it took the county two years to submit their application and by that time all PWA projects had been closed down. Temporarily, the board abandoned the idea to build the stadium.  

A fundamental obstacle that stalled efforts to build the new stadium was the selection of a suitable location. Neither the county supervisors nor the common council could agree on a prospective site. On March 8, 1938, the county board authorized a study of possible locations for a county memorial stadium. County Supervisor Frederick Heath, founder of the newspaper the *Social Democratic Herald*, recommended the Story quarry as the location for the new stadium. Named after one of the original families that settled in Milwaukee, Hiram and Harry Story began quarry operations in 1850, after a windstorm revealed some of the hardest limestone in Wisconsin. The quarry operations ceased operations in the mid-1930s when the land was annexed to the city. Simultaneously, the Milwaukee common council established a special site committee, which recommended that the council acquire 15 acres of tax delinquent land at North Holton Street and West Capitol Drive. The committee proposed the construction of a 26,000-seat facility at an estimated cost of $650,000. However, in 1940, the city land commission thwarted this proposal by indicating the location was too far from the population center. The commission also recommended the Story quarry.  

America’s entry into World War II delayed attempts to build the stadium. By the end of the war, Supervisor Bert Busby introduced a resolution in the county board that, according to the *Milwaukee Journal*, “started the final push.” The resolution called for building a stadium as a war memorial – this time honoring World War II veterans – and
recommended that the county park commission study the cost. More important, for the first time the city and the county joined forces. Meeting separately on February 19, 1946, both the common council and the county board appointed a committee to work jointly on the project. In September, the two committees developed a joint report, recommending that the stadium be built by the county on the Story quarry and that the city improve the surrounding streets. 44

On February 24, 1947, the county board voted to build a stadium. Despite the joint report’s recommending the stadium be built on the Story quarry site, the board took no action on selecting a suitable location. Rather, they referred two resolutions calling for specific locations to the highway committee. One resolution recommended the Story quarry, while the other favored the Haymarket square, located at North 5th and West Vliet Street. Yet another proposal called for the location of the stadium north of the state fair park. 45

Haggling over a suitable location delayed attempts to begin construction. On January 11, 1949, the county board voted to approve the Story location, if a city sponsored referendum on a $3.5 million bond issue to improve streets passed. The referendum failed. The county board reconsidered other locations. They came within one vote of approving the Haymarket square, located on North 5th and West Vliet. The board voted to build the stadium at the state fair park site, but later rescinded its actions because the state would not give the county the land without certain reservations unacceptable to the board. 46

Despite the constant bickering over selecting a suitable location, the county board continued to flesh out the details to build the stadium. This action seemed to be
premature on the board’s part, since it had yet to choose a suitable location. However, their actions appeared to be consistent with the 1946 joint report that recommended the Story site. In any event, the park commission was assigned this daunting task, and one of its first moves was to begin negotiations for additional land with the local and federal governments. The city owned 34 acres of the Story site, including the quarry itself. The federal government owned land south of the Story site, which the county wanted to lease for extra parking space. The commission established a special stadium committee to handle the details. The committee, headed by William R. McGovern, a former president of the Wisconsin Telephone Company, was, according to the *Milwaukee Journal*, to become an important force in pushing forward the efforts to build the stadium. 47

Simultaneously, the Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) was pivotal in moving forward the stadium project. McGovern was a member of the GMC and this coalition exemplified a booster group that were eternal optimists, growth oriented, and willing to take risks. The GMC grew from a group of fifteen Rotarians in 1939 to represent the leadership of 200 of the city’s largest corporations. Although its roster was limited to 150 members, the GMC owned or managed at least a quarter of the business property in the city, with a concentration on the larger end of the scale. The GMC’s involvement in the stadium project represented an overall larger effort to rebuild Milwaukee’s cultural infrastructure. In addition to the stadium, the GMC urged commitments for the construction of a new civic center, library addition, zoo, indoor sports arena, museum, art center, and an express road from the airport to downtown. 48

On July 20, 1949, McGovern got Senator Alexander Wiley to introduce a bill in Congress. With the GMC’s support, the bill passed and was signed by President Harry
Truman. Under the terms of the legislation, the county would buy 93 acres at half the appraised value, and lease another 22 acres for one dollar a year. The 93 acres, which the city needed for expressway purposes, cost the county $35,000.

Although the preliminary plans for construction were completed by June 1950, the county board confronted several obstacles that delayed efforts to build the facility. The board voted to approve the plans and asked the finance committee to recommend a financing plan. On July 25, the board approved the issuance of $3.5 million worth of bonds. One month later, the board sold two million dollars worth of bonds to a syndicate headed by the First National Bank of Chicago at a net interest cost, after premium, of 1.172%. However, efforts to begin construction coincided with America’s entry in the Korean conflict, resulting in a steel shortage. Despite this unexpected delay, on October 19 ground was broken to lay the stadium’s foundation.  

The county board faced another setback that could have killed the stadium project. On October 26, 1950, the National Production Authority (NPA) in Washington, D. C. banned construction on any new recreational facilities. It appeared the stadium project would be stalled for the duration of the Korean conflict. However, projects that began prior to the ban could possibly receive an exemption. With this in mind, McGovern went to Washington and put the county’s case before NPA head William H. Harrison. On November 3, Harrison granted the county permission to build the stadium. He indicated that an exception was being made because to halt the project would mean an “unusual handicap” here. But Harrison pointed out that the agency could not provide a priority on materials for the stadium.
By the spring of 1952, two-thirds of the stadium had been completed when the project confronted another delay. In April, five trade unions went on strike, bringing the project to a virtual halt. Once the strike was settled, stadium construction went smoothly, and by the spring of 1953, Milwaukee County Stadium was ready for occupancy. According to the *Milwaukee Journal*, the city and the county had invested a reported $4,843,000 in the facility.  

Upon the completion of Milwaukee County Stadium, politicians and civic leaders had aspirations of luring a major league franchise. County officials had envisioned a structure that would be adaptable to the needs of minor league baseball and professional football yet could be converted to major league standards if the need arose. They ambitiously estimated that big league baseball would amass between $5 to 10 million annually for the city of Milwaukee. Roughly half of this attendance was expected to come from outside the city. Civic leaders envisioned thousands of visitors drawn by baseball would boost the sales of stores, and the patronage of hotels, restaurants, and other businesses. The desire to bring major league baseball to Milwaukee was not without foundation. Throughout the course of construction, Commissioner Albert Chandler proposed an expansion plan that would increase the number of league clubs in both circuits from eight to ten clubs. Cities under consideration for prospective expansion included Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Montreal. Conversely, the GMC made overtures to lure the most coveted franchise ripe for relocation – the St. Louis Browns. The *Milwaukee Journal* reported that GMC President Clifford A. Randall, an attorney, began negotiations with Browns’ owner Bill Veeck to bring his fledgling AL franchise to their growing city.
The GMC’s proposal to Veeck coincided with his efforts to relocate the Browns. Upon acquiring the Browns in the middle of the 1951 season, Veeck had one lofty objective – run the Cardinals out of St. Louis. This goal seemed plausible, since Veeck enjoyed two advantages. Cardinals owner Fred Saigh was under indictment for tax fraud, and more importantly, the Redbirds had dropped out of contention after a 1946 World Series appearance. Concurrently, during the 1952 season Veeck quietly contacted individual American League owners to obtain their support for a move in the event his battle with the Cardinals went badly. At the winter meetings of that same year, Veeck informed his fellow AL owners that the Browns might have to leave St. Louis before the start of next season and that he would present them with his plans at the spring meeting in Tampa. By February 1953, the Browns’ future was compromised in the Mound City when the Busch Brewery Company purchased the Cardinals. Veeck recognized he could not compete with the wealthy Busch and decided to move his Browns.  

Veeck’s desire was to return to Milwaukee, the scene of one of his greatest franchise building success. He owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise in the early 1940s, where his flair for promotional schemes came to fruition. The completion of Milwaukee County Stadium and the GMC’s overtures made Veeck’s return there more appealing. But the Browns owner had one problem – Boston Braves owner Lou Perini owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise.

Louis R. Perini was born in Ashland, Massachusetts on November 29, 1903. When Perini was nine, he already held lofty ambitions of owning a baseball club. He organized a team of boys, named them the Ashland Dreadnaughts, and went about raising funds from local merchants to provide the club with uniforms. His father, Bonfiglio
Perini, owned a construction company and when he died in 1924, Louis became president of B. Perini & Sons, Inc. Along with his brothers, Joseph and Charles, Louis had the small construction firm expanding rapidly. By 1936, B. Perini & Sons, Inc. was large enough to handle the maintenance on the Cape Cod Canal.  

Perini formed a partnership with C. Joseph Maney and Guido L. Rugo. Maney began his career as a timekeeper on Boston’s Washington Street subway tunnel. By 1931, he formed the C. J. Maney Company and by 1945 the firm was doing $30 million worth of post war construction contracts. Rugo began as a worker for the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation and later he became the treasurer of the Rugo Construction Company. Better known as the “Three Little Steam Shovels,” the three men first met as competitive bidders on numerous construction projects and later joined forces on larger jobs such as deep pressure tunnels, ordinance depots, and highway and airport construction. Among their projects were the Tuscarora Mountain tunnel in Pennsylvania, and the Park River Conduit in Hartford, Connecticut. In the decade before he took over the Braves, Perini’s company did more than $100,000,000 worth of business.

In 1941, Perini got involved in baseball at a time when the Boston Braves exemplified the National League’s version of the St. Louis Browns – an exercise in futility and mediocrity. Unlike their AL predecessor, the Braves won two NL pennants and one world championship in fifty years. In 1914, the infamous “Miracle Braves” defeated Connie Mack’s Philadelphia Athletics in four games. In other years, the Braves finished second once, third twice, fourth seven times, fifth five times, sixth nine times, seventh fifteen times, and eighth nine times. Braves owner Charles F. Adams, a grocery-chain magnate, had to sell the club because of his connection with the Suffolk Downs
racetrack. Fifteen Bostonians purchased stock, including Perini, Rugo, and Maney. The Braves stumbled along under mass ownership for three years, when Perini, along with Rugo and Maney, offered to buy out the other stockholders for what they paid or sell their stock on the same terms. The others sold and the steam shovels quickly replenished the club’s treasury. In 1947, they bought the Milwaukee Brewers for a reported $270,000.  

Although he did not devise Veeck like promotional schemes, Perini did operate the Braves with panache and imagination. The steam shovels introduced a new Braves theme song, four marching bands, a chorus of 7,500 boys from settlement houses and boys’ clubs, and an Indian chief from the Wampanog tribe on Cape Cod, Chief Wild Horse. For night games, Perini outfitted the Braves in satin uniforms, installed neon foul poles, and set off fireworks. The Braves gave away automobiles and free trips to spring training, placed suggestion boxes around the ball park, and became the first major league team to offer fried clams at their concession stands.

The steam shovels were fortunate enough to inherit executive John Quinn, a Boston college graduate whose father Bob had run the club since 1936. Quinn and the new owners were committed to making the Braves a NL pennant contender. They expanded the farm system, lured manager Billy Southworth from the Cardinals with a large contract offer, and purchased several veteran players, many of them from the Redbirds. While many of these players did not help the Braves, others like Bob Elliott, Earl Torgeson, and Alvin Dark paid dividends. After a $3.5 million investment, a National League pennant, and four consecutive profitable seasons, the Boston Braves were out of debt with a reported surplus of $4,537 in 1949.
By 1950, however, the Braves fortune began to sour. The club faltered on the field, major league attendance began to decline, and the Braves were unable to compete with their AL rivals the Red Sox. The Braves attendance experienced a sharp decline from a high of 1,455,439 in 1948 to 281,000 in 1952. Perini and his partners seemed powerless to prevent the slide.

To be sure, the Braves’ anemic attendance influenced Perini’s decision to relocate his Braves to Milwaukee. Despite the club landing in the black in 1949, the profits amassed did not justify the huge investment the steam shovels had made. Yet there was still a possibility that Perini could have stayed in Boston. According to the Sporting News, he gave Boston at least one more year to turn things around. If the situation remained bleak in the Hub, Perini would move his Braves before the start of the 1954 season. Several factors, however, occurred that changed his original plans.  

First, Perini bought out his long time partners, C. Joseph Maney and Guido Rugo, making him, along with his brothers Joseph and Charles, the Braves’ sole proprietors. During the winter of 1952, Perini told his stockholders that to ensure a better operation one person or one family should own the club. The Perinis offered to buy the stock of the other shareholders, paying them the same amount they originally paid. In this way individual shareholders would not have to shoulder the losses the ball club accrued. More important, if Perini decided to move his Braves from Boston, he would not have to worry about offending any of his partners. According to sportswriter Al Hirshberg, Perini stated that Maney would have never stood for the Braves’ transfer under any circumstances.
Bill Veeck’s desire to relocate to Milwaukee and the GMC’s endeavor to lure a major league franchise constituted the second factor. By late 1952, Veeck offered to sell Sportsman Park to Frederick C. Miller, CEO of the Miller Brewing Company and a GMC member, for a reported $800,000. This revenue would be used to relocate the Triple A Brewers to another city and allow the Browns to relocate to Milwaukee. At the same time, both the GMC and Milwaukee’s local politicians became more aggressive in their attempts to lure big league ball there. GMC President Clifford Randall offered Perini $500,000 to move the Brewers to Toledo, Ohio to enable the Browns to move to Milwaukee.  

External pressure came also from Milwaukee Journal sportswriter R. G. Lynch and Mayor Frank Zeidler. In an exchange of telegrams between Lynch and Perini, the Braves owner indicated that he would not stand in the way of Milwaukee receiving a major league team. However, Perini insisted that the Braves’ only condition for leaving would be relocating the Brewers to a city “with as good potential as Milwaukee.” Toledo guaranteed a minimum attendance of 200,000 a year for three years, but since that city had lost its franchise to Charleston, West Virginia in 1951, Perini evidently took the position that the Ohio city didn’t measure up. Given the overall decline in major and minor league attendance, his reservations were understandable.

Simultaneously, Mayor Zeidler contacted Braves’ Vice-President Joseph Cairnes and stated that the club did not “want to be in a position of preventing a major league franchise from coming to Milwaukee...” The people of Milwaukee had demonstrated “their willingness to support a major team erecting a substantial stadium and playing field.” Zeidler added: “The Braves organization would not want their Milwaukee club to
be playing to a hostile citizenry...” The mayor was confident that Braves officials would “review the whole position very earnestly in order to satisfy the Milwaukee public and the needs of baseball generally.” Concurrently, several organizations suggested that the county cancel its contract with Boston that allowed the Brewers to use the stadium. The contract provided for a 30-day notice of cancellation, but it also could be terminated only if a major league club moved into the city. 62

Public pressure and publicity generated pressure not only on Perini, but also on major league baseball. Mayor Zeidler and Governor Walter Kohler, Jr. wrote letters to Perini and to Commissioner Ford Frick, calling attention to the interests of the people. Wisconsin Congressman Clem Zablocki looked into the possibilities of antitrust action. Clifford Randall and stadium director Frederick Mendelson garnered enthusiastic support from business leaders and fans to bring major league baseball to the German Athens.

The possibility of antitrust action represented the third factor. The fact that Congressman Zablocki considered this possibility was a cause for concern for major league baseball. As Boston Globe sportswriter Harold Kaese accurately pointed out: “It did not take an act of Congress to break up the old league batting order, only an investigation by a Congressional committee.” Major league owners did not want to risk the chance of Congress lifting its antitrust exemption. More important, Perini recognized the need for major league baseball to expand into these growing metropolises. He was quoted as saying that the major leagues could not continue to ignore cities like Los Angeles, Seattle, Houston, and Montreal, but expansion should occur within the framework of baseball law and not by an act of Congress. 63
Finally, Lou Perini represented a new generation that took over the ownership of major league teams. Marshall states that the gentlemen sportmen were followed during the 1940s by a new generation of owners – the capitalists. These men who either earned or inherited their money viewed the sport as a financial opportunity and operated their clubs solely on business grounds. In addition to the steam shovels buying the Braves and Busch acquiring the Cardinals, Del Webb, Larry MacPhail, and Dan Topping bought the Yankees from Jacob Ruppert’s estate. MacPhail was a baseball man, but Topping and Webb came from completely different backgrounds. In 1947, the heirs of Barney Dreyfuss sold the Pittsburgh Pirates to a contingent that included Indianapolis banker Frank McKinney, lawyer/businessman Thomas P. Johnson, real estate mogul John Galbreath, and Hollywood entertainer Bing Crosby. Finally, Bob Carpenter, a scion of the wealthy Du Pont family, purchased the Philadelphia Phillies.  

Combined, these factors led Lou Perini to move the Braves to Milwaukee. Pressure generated from politicians, the GMC, and Bill Veeck placed the Braves owner in the role of a villain, if he prevented major league ball from coming to the beer capital. The negative publicity alone was not in Perini’s best interests. More important, since Perini saw the Braves as a financial opportunity, it made no business sense to continue investing substantial sums of money into a losing proposition. It should be noted, however, that moving to Milwaukee did not guarantee the Braves’ financial predicament would improve. In fact the Braves were moving from a larger market to a smaller one. However, the conditions in Boston made it untenable to remain there. As sportswriter Al Hirshberg pointed out, Braves Field had long outlived its usefulness, “because there was nothing very good about it.” The ballpark was located on a single streetcar line, off a
single main thoroughfare. It had inadequate parking and the main entrance was on a dead-end street, opposite a busy armory whose trucks used the same street. Braves Field was one of the hardest public places in Boston to reach. More troubling to Perini, advanced ticket sales were 35 percent behind the previous season. Faced with these issues, Milwaukee would have major league baseball for the start of the 1953 season, but it would be Perini’s Braves and not Veeck’s Browns who would move there. 65

When Perini refused to sell his Triple A Brewers, or relocate them to another city, Veeck turned his attention to Baltimore. Perini quietly established a coalition among the NL owners to move his franchise. On March 18, 1953, the NL owners unanimously approved Perini’s request to move his Braves to Milwaukee. Brooklyn Dodgers owner Walter O’Malley made the motion that Perini be allowed to make the shift. New York Giants magnate Horace Stoneham seconded the motion. On the same day, the American Association approved the Brewers’ transfer to Toledo and Perini made a $50,000 indemnity payment to the circuit. Because the Braves relocated into the western half of the National League, the owners revised the playing schedule. The Pittsburgh Pirates moved into the eastern division and took over the Braves schedule. The Braves took over the Pirates schedule.

Simultaneously, the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors voted unanimously to permit the Braves to play in the new stadium. Under the terms of the lease, the county would rent the stadium to the Braves for a nominal sum of $1,000 a year for the first two years. For the next three years the county would receive five percent of the revenues from the gate receipts and most of the concession sales. The county would provide additional lighting to conform to major league standards, erect additional permanent seats
“sufficient to meet the reasonable requirements of the National League,” and provide additional office space and concession stands. What constituted “National League standards” was not made explicit. The Braves received all revenue from broadcasting and telecasting of games for the first five years, subject to renegotiation once the contract expired. The Braves agreed to maintain the field, while the county reimbursed the club for maintenance costs incurred due to events other than baseball. The county would have all advertising rights at the stadium, except for those involved in radio and television broadcasts. The Braves would operate concessions for all events, including football, but the county was expected to receive a share of the revenues for events other than baseball.

Clearly Perini received a generous leasing agreement. The price for obtaining big league status was substantially high considering the huge investment the city of Milwaukee had made. County officials expected to generate revenue for the city by staging auxiliary events like boxing matches, semiprofessional and black baseball games and basketball contests. With the Braves as their tenant, the county expected to expand their market potential to attract fans from cities like Racine, Kenosha, Sheboygan, Oshkosh, and Green Bay Wisconsin. Undoubtedly they envisioned these fans spending consumer dollars in Milwaukee. It is problematic to suggest that this was the case. County officials and city fathers probably overestimated the potential “new” dollars the city could generate with a major league franchise. What is certain is that the Braves would benefit significantly by drawing fans from within this 115-mile radius of the city. Moreover, the Braves’ leasing agreement marked the start of post-World War II cities
offering attractive incentives to encourage major league franchises to relocate to their growing metropolises. 67

Nevertheless, to this generation of politicians and local boosters this large investment was worth it to them to revitalize Milwaukee’s cultural infrastructure. The Braves relocation to Milwaukee coincided with the city riding a wave of unprecedented prosperity, rising to new heights as an industrial power, and surging to an all-time population peak. Milwaukee welcomed new institutions that included an urban university, basketball and hockey teams, and an ultra-modern Memorial Center. Relegated for decades to a position in the second tier of American cities, Milwaukee aspired to higher things. 68

The Braves illustrated the importance civic leaders and local politicians placed on obtaining major league status to redefine its national identity in the 1950s. Mayor Zeidler typified the rhetoric of local politicians when he stated that Milwaukee had “long felt we were a capable people but because of our peculiar geography...our voice has not been heard in the land.” The mayor added: “This [the Braves] is a means of letting people know we exist.” “Have you heard,” the Greater Milwaukee Committee asked in its 1954 report. “We live not in Milwaukee (Wis.), WE LIVE IN MILWAUKEE!” Clifford Randall stated the Braves move to Milwaukee was “an historical example of the fact that the community can be as great as its citizens want it to be.” The rhetoric of these post-World War II boosters and politicians served as a form of ideological legitimacy to concentrate economic and political power to bring major league baseball to their growing metropolis. 69
On April 14, 1953, the Milwaukee Braves played the St. Louis Cardinals in their home opener. Centerfielder Bill Bruton hit a solo home run in the bottom of the tenth inning to give the Braves a 3-2 victory before a reported crowd of 34,157 fans. Milwaukee’s love affair with their Braves had begun.

CONCLUSION

Major League Baseball’s expansion process was influenced significantly by the Pacific Coast League’s desire to become a third major league. Their efforts were in response to Donald Barnes’ attempt to relocate his St. Louis Browns – along with civic boosters enticing them – to Los Angeles. PCL officials responded to this encroachment into their territory by seeking to elevate their entire league to major league classification, within the parameters of baseball law. Major league owners reacted by establishing a policy allowing individual magnates to relocate their clubs into a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense and make the necessary negotiations. Throughout the PCL’s plight, the stadium remained the sole constant that determined whether a league or city was a “potential major league territory.” Given the size of their ballparks in the late 1940s, major league owners never seriously considered elevating the PCL to a big league classification.

The Pacific Coast League’s attempt to become a third major league occurred simultaneously with the changing demographics of American cities, changes in technology and in the political economy, and the emergence of the new consumerism. In some ways, the PCL residing in the fastest growing region of the country frustrated their efforts. The league’s largest city – Los Angeles – grew disproportionately larger than the other league cities. Civic boosters like Supervisor Leonard Roach and sportswriter
Vincent Flaherty, sought to distance themselves from the other PCL cities and draw an existing MLB franchise or become an expansion team. Their endeavors were constantly thwarted by MLB’s territorial principle. The National League appeared to be more receptive to expansion. However, because baseball law required a unanimous consent from the owners of both leagues to either relocate a franchise or add new teams. These delaying tactics led to extensive congressional hearings to pressure the owners to expand. Combined with a decline in overall attendance and the threat of lifting MLB’s antitrust exemption, the owners amended their bylaws to facilitate the expansion process. They maintained their policy that allowed an individual owner to move their franchise, if they took on that responsibility, however.

The Boston Braves’ relocation to Milwaukee coincided with civic leaders and local politicians’ endeavors to revitalize the city’s cultural infrastructure. The construction of Milwaukee County Stadium and luring the Braves from the Hub served to shatter the city’s second tier image and redefine its national identity. Yet it still required a significant degree of external pressure to coerce Lou Perini to move his club. Unlike the civic leaders in Los Angeles, Milwaukee’s politicians and boosters formed a strong coalition to bring big league ball to the German Athens. Ironically, the city benefited from the constant bickering over finding a suitable location to build the facility. By the time Milwaukee County Stadium was completed, major league baseball was primed to move its struggling franchises.

Yet it appears that the city of Milwaukee paid a high price for obtaining major league status and redefining its national identity. The County Supervisors and the GMC probably overestimated the prospective windfall they expected to receive by housing the
Braves. Their efforts did exemplify the willingness of post-World War II cities to build lavish stadiums, offering incentives to hard to resist, luring an existing franchise or encouraging MLB to expand. For major league baseball, however, franchise relocation marked the start of a dramatic restructuring of the industry’s consumer market into its current configuration.
NOTES


2 Although they have several drawbacks, Neil Sullivan and William Marshall provide the most extensive effort of the PCL’s effort to become a third major league. See, Sullivan, *Dodgers*; William Marshall, *Baseball’s Pivotal Era 1945-1951* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999).


4 Seymour states that in the pre-World War II era, baseball owners tried to compensate for the inequity of markets by sharing gate receipts, giving 50 percent of the base admission price to the visiting team. The home team as an incentive to improve the stands and add more box and reserved seats retained the additional revenue from gate receipts. But as more and more higher-priced seats were made available, the percentage of the total gate receipts was reduced for the visiting team. In 1892 when there were fewer high price seats, visiting clubs received approximately 40 percent of the total revenue. By 1929 the visiting share dropped to 21 percent and by 1950 to only 14 percent. See *Baseball: The Golden Age, 7-8*.


7 *Sporting News* 128(August 31, 1949): 3-4, 10. Another article on the Browns aborted move appeared in the *Sporting News* in 1957. See *Sporting News*144(December 4, 1957): 5-6.


10 Chicago Tribune, December 10, 1941; Los Angeles Examiner, December 10, 1941; Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1941; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 10, 1941. Barnes quote in St. Louis Globe-Democrat, December 10, 1941.

11 Los Angeles Examiner, December 11, 1941.


16 Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1945.

17 Rowland’s comments in New York Times, December 12, 1945. See also Chicago Tribune, December 12, 1945.


19 Sporting News 120(December 13, 1945): 2. For Flaherty campaigning for a major league franchise, see, for example, Los Angeles Examiner, December 16, 1945. Lowenfish, “A Tale,” 73; Sullivan, Dodgers, 90-91.

20 Los Angeles Times, December 3, 1946.

21 Los Angeles Times, December 4, 7, 1946.


34 House, Organized Baseball, 952.


38 Chaffe, Unfinished Journey, 117-22.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Kaese, “They’re Digging,” 121; *Sporting News* 135(April 1, 1953): 5.


*Sporting News* 135(April 1, 1953): 5.


